Think More About Camels

1837 ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 125-144
Author(s):  
Paul W. Werth

Russia’s military campaign against the khanate of Khiva in 1839–40 is noteworthy for its disastrous outcome. Planned for the winter months in order to obviate the absence of water in the arid Kazakh steppe, the campaign encountered an uncommonly severe winter, which imposed exceptional hardships and compelled the expedition to return to the outpost of Orenburg. Felled largely by the decimation of its camels in the cold winter, the campaign is enmeshed in larger changes unfolding in Russia’s relationship to Kazakhs, Central Asia, and the wider world. A growing Russian attitude of European superiority and preoccupations with great-power status after the defeat of Napoleon equipped tsarist elites with an enhanced sense of entitlement. The year 1837 proved critical for translating these sentiments into attempted conquest. Russian activity in the region also served as the midwife for an intense British Russophobia.

The article analyzes some features of public administration in the empire of Amir Temur. About a century before Amir Temur came to power, significant changes took place in the ethnic composition of the Movarounnakhr population. The invasion of the Mongols in the territory of Central Asia, in turn, contributed to the emergence of new tribes and nations. In particular, in the middle of the thirteenth century there was a migration of ethnic groups of jaloyir, barlos, kavchin and arlot to Central Asia. In the first half of the XIII-XIV centuries some groups of olchin, duglat, mongol, sulduz, oyrot, bakhrin, market, mang’it, kungrad and other tribes moved to Movarounnakhr. Even the Turkic Mongols living in Movarounnakhr gradually forgot the term "Mongol" and called themselves "chigatay." B.Manz, M. Haydar and other authors commented on the role of tribes in socio-political life, career and rank, as well as the great power of Amir Temur in distribution. It is possible to conclude that the tribes’ nobles of Amir Temur were widely involved in the posts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147-154
Author(s):  
Jacqueline L. Hazelton

This chapter argues that counterinsurgency success is about power, co-optation, building a coalition, and crushing opposition, not good governance. In the cases examined in the previous chapters, great power backing helped the client government achieve counterinsurgent success, and all six states remain at least nominally partnered with the West on important issues. But all six campaigns also had high human and moral costs. These findings force those who support great-power, liberal military intervention to consider unpalatable choices about national interests. Individually and collectively, these cases provide strong evidence of the explanatory power of the compellence theory, with its emphasis on coalition building among rival elites and a military campaign targeting civilians as well as insurgents. The chapter then looks at the implications of this analysis on peacekeeping and state-building efforts.


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