Interpreting Historical-Philosophical Sources of Intellectual Property

2021 ◽  
pp. 283-293
Author(s):  
Maurizio Borghi

This chapter considers the approach to traditional philosophical sources of intellectual property (IP). It argues that philosophical questioning is characterized by specific and unique features that distinguish it from all other forms of knowledge, including scientific knowledge. It then shows how philosophical concepts—i.e. concepts coined in the course of philosophical questioning—translate in other domains of knowledge, such as jurisprudence, where they eventually decay into empty rhetorical tools devoid of questioning force. The current ‘intellectual property debate’ illustrates this point. In this connection, the chapter questions how intellectual property concepts can be reconstructed in their original philosophical dimension. By way of example, the interpretation of three great philosophers—Kant, Fichte, and Hegel—is considered, by reference to their seminal writings on intellectual property issues.

1997 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Humphries

This article results from reading Lather's Getting Smart (1991) and Hammersley's The Politics of Social Research (1995). The theme is the debates between ‘traditional’ research approaches and ‘emancipatory’ research approaches. It is argued that these debates are based on stereotypical views which obscure important characteristics held in common, and both require to be interrogated. The article examines two of these characteristics, appeals to a metanarrative of emancipation and the will to power, and considers the implications of the privileging of scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge. It concludes by considering the possibilities for a praxis-oriented research which may lead to possibilities for emancipatory action.


2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 343-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Robertson

Objective: To consider the state of knowledge in psychiatry with reference to the ‘Osheroff debate’ about the treatment of depression. Method: A review of the key philosophical issues regarding the nature of knowledge applied to the Osheroff case. Results: There is an apparent dichotomy between knowledge derived from a reductionist scientific method, as manifest in evidence-based medicine, and that of a narrative form of knowledge derived from clinical experience. The Focauldian notion of knowledge/power and knowledge as discourse suggests that scientific knowledge dominates over narrative knowledge in psychiatry. The implication of this applied to the Osheroff case is the potential annihilation of all forms of knowledge other than science. Conclusions: Knowledge in psychiatry is a pluralist, rather than singularly scientific enterprise. In the Osheroff case, the potential for scientific knowledge to abolish other forms of knowledge posed a serious threat of weakening the profession. In the light of the current debate about best practice, there is a need for reconsideration of the implications of Osheroff.


2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric C. Kansa ◽  
Jason Schultz ◽  
Ahrash N. Bissell

The twenty-first century has ushered in new debates and social movements that aim to structure how culture is produced, owned, and distributed. At one side, open-knowledge advocates seek greater freedom for finding, distributing, using, and reusing information. On the other hand, traditional-knowledge rights advocates seek to protect certain forms of knowledge from appropriation and exploitation and seek recognition for communal and culturally situated notions of heritage and intellectual property. Understanding and bridging the tension between these movements represents a vital and significant challenge. This paper explores possible areas of where these seemingly divergent goals may converge, centered on the Creative Commons concept ofsome rights reserved. We argue that this concept can be extended into areas where scientific disciplines intersect with traditional knowledge. This model can help build a voluntary framework for negotiating more equitable and open communication between field researchers and diverse stakeholding communities.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Jeffrey Wright ◽  
Diarmid A. Finnegan

Recent years have seen the development of a more nuanced understanding of the emergence of scientific naturalism in the nineteenth century. It has become apparent that scientific naturalism did not emerge sui generis in the years following the publication of Charles Darwin's On the origin of species (1859), but was present, if only in incipient form, much earlier in the century. Building on recent scholarship, this article adopts a geographically focused approach and explores debates about geology and phrenology—two of the diverse forms of knowledge that contributed to scientific naturalism—in late-Georgian Belfast. Having provided the venue for John Tyndall's infamous 1874 address as president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Belfast occupies a central place in the story of nineteenth-century scientific naturalism. However, in uncovering the intricate and surprising ways in which scientific knowledge gained, or was denied, epistemic and civic credibility in Belfast, this discussion will demonstrate that naturalism, materialism and the relationship between science and religion were matters of public debate in the town long before Tyndall's intervention.


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