The Registration Continuum in Personality Disorder Studies: Theory, Rationale, and Template

Registration is a tool to increase rigor of personality disorder research and its ability to reduce human suffering through improving people’s lives. This article details the problems that exist without registrations, which revolve around a study’s outcomes’ dependence on the data rather than on the theory being tested. Registrations exist on a continuum underpinned by bipolar timing and unipolar disclosure dimensions, the latter of which poses myriad points of decisions for researchers to register. The registration process provides memory aids and guideposts for researchers through the course of a study, transparently maintains public trust in the scientific enterprise, and preserves the severity of the tests used in the study. This articles provide a template for personality disorder researchers to consider and examples of how researchers can use registered flexibility to plan for contingencies that might arise during a study. It also addresses challenges in evaluating registrations and implementing registration in a research workflow.

Scientific Variables

Despite their centrality to the scientific enterprise, both the nature of scientific variables and their relation to inductive inference remain obscure. I suggest that scientific variables should be viewed as equivalence classes of sets of physical states mapped to representations (often real numbers) in a structure preserving fashion, and argue that most scientific variables introduced to expand the degrees of freedom in terms of which we describe the world can be seen as products of an algorithmic inductive inference first identified by William W. Rozeboom. This inference algorithm depends upon a notion of natural kind previously left unexplicated. By appealing to dynamical kinds—equivalence classes of causal system characterized by the interventions which commute with their time evolution—to fill this gap, we attain a complete algorithm. I demonstrate the efficacy of this algorithm in a series of experiments involving the percolation of water through granular soils that result in the induction of three novel variables. Finally, I argue that variables obtained through this sort of inductive inference are guaranteed to satisfy a variety of norms that in turn suit them for use in further scientific inferences.

On WEIRD Anthropologists and Their White Skeletons

Most forensic anthropologists and the populations they study are WEIRD—that is, Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic. In their interventions into the WEIRD, Clancy and Davis (2019) contend that WEIRD is a euphemism for white and that it is the white, Western European–derived scientists and subjects that skew the predominating narrative of the human condition. While they demonstrate how biological anthropology can decenter the WEIRD, it is fruitful to extend their framework specifically to forensic anthropology. We argue that the scientific enterprise of forensic anthropology is unique in that: (1) it is touted as an objective tool that must operate within medicolegal systems, (2) it involves board certification and accreditation standards, and (3) it holds ancestry and race as core to its practice. In a bibliometric survey of journal articles over the past five years (n = 793), we find that up to 79% of authors originate from WEIRD contexts. In articles specifically studying ancestry, European-derived populations are included 88% of the time as a category for comparison to other groups, while only 12% do not include Europeans. Furthermore, 49% of articles unrelated to ancestry use white subjects solely or in part, reinforcing a historic tendency to measure all human variation against one particular norm. We also find that WEIRD articles receive significantly more recognition than non-WEIRD counterparts. In this reflexive and positional exercise, we hope to make visible how whiteness as WEIRDness informs the history, values, and practices of forensic anthropology on a global scale.

The disinformation playbook: how industry manipulates the science-policy process—and how to restore scientific integrity

For decades, corporate undermining of scientific consensus has eroded the scientific process worldwide. Guardrails for protecting science-informed processes, from peer review to regulatory decision making, have suffered sustained attacks, damaging public trust in the scientific enterprise and its aim to serve the public good. Government efforts to address corporate attacks have been inadequate. Researchers have cataloged corporate malfeasance that harms people’s health across diverse industries. Well-known cases, like the tobacco industry’s efforts to downplay the dangers of smoking, are representative of transnational industries, rather than unique. This contribution schematizes industry tactics to distort, delay, or distract the public from instituting measures that improve health—tactics that comprise the “disinformation playbook.” Using a United States policy lens, we outline steps the scientific community should take to shield science from corporate interference, through individual actions (by scientists, peer reviewers, and editors) and collective initiatives (by research institutions, grant organizations, professional associations, and regulatory agencies).

Gender Imbalance in the Editorial Activities of a Researcher-led Journal

Editorial decision-making is a fundamental element of the scientific enterprise. We examined whether contributions to editorial decisions at various stages of the publication process is subject to gender disparity, based on analytics collected by the biomedical researcher-led journal eLife. Despite efforts to increase women representation, the board of reviewing editors (BRE) was men-dominant (69%). Moreover, authors suggested more men from the BRE pool, even after correcting for men's numerical over-representation. Although women editors were proportionally involved in the initial editorial process, they were under-engaged in editorial activities involving reviewers and authors. Additionally, converging evidence showed gender homophily in manuscripts assignment, such that men Senior Editors over-engaged men Reviewing Editors. This tendency was stronger in more gender-balanced scientific disciplines. Together, our findings confirm that gender disparities exist along the editorial process and suggest that merely increasing the proportion of women might not be sufficient to eliminate this bias.

Separating the Theological Sheep from the Philosophical Goats

Andrew Torrance has recently argued that we can distinguish analytic theology from analytic philosophy of religion if we understand theology as, fundamentally, a scientific enterprise. However, this distinction holds only if philosophy of religion is not itself a science in the sense intended by Torrance. I argue that philosophy of religion is a science in this sense, and so, that Torrance cannot distinguish theology from philosophy of religion in the way suggested. Nevertheless, I offer two alternative routes to the distinction based on the nature of the respective objects of study in theology and philosophy of religion. Thus, I demonstrate that there is a coherent model available to Torrance which preserves the distinction he seeks.

Current Approaches for Integrating Responsible and Ethical Conduct of Research (RECR) Education into Course-based Undergraduate Research Experiences: A National Assessment

Incorporation of responsible and ethical conduct of research (RECR) education into course-based undergraduate research experiences (CUREs) remains largely unexplored despite the importance of RECR practices to the broader scientific enterprise. To address this concern, a mixed methods approach was employed to characterize the state of RECR education in biological sciences CUREs nationwide.

How Do Individuals Think About Knowledge and Knowing?

In everyday encounters with new information, conflicting ideas, and claims made by others, one has to decide who and what to believe. Can one trust what scientists say? What’s the best source of information? These are questions that involve thinking and reasoning about knowledge, or what psychologists call “epistemic cognition.” In Chapter 5, “How Do Individuals Think About Knowledge and Knowing?,” the authors explain how public misunderstanding of scientific claims can often be linked to misconceptions about the scientific enterprise itself. Drawing on their own research and that of others, the authors explain how individuals’ thinking about knowledge influences their science doubt, resistance, and denial. They explain how educators and communicators can enhance public understanding of science by emphasizing how scientific knowledge is created and evaluated and why it should be valued.

Bernhard Riemann, the Ear, and an Atom of Consciousness

Why did Bernhard Riemann (1826–1866), arguably the most original mathematician of his generation, spend the last year of life investigating the mechanism of hearing? Fighting tuberculosis and the hostility of eminent scientists such as Hermann Helmholtz, he appeared to forsake mathematics to prosecute a case close to his heart. Only sketchy pages from his last paper remain, but here we assemble some significant clues and triangulate from them to build a broad picture of what he might have been driving at. Our interpretation is that Riemann was a committed idealist and from this philosophical standpoint saw that the scientific enterprise was lame without the “poetry of hypothesis”. He believed that human thought was fundamentally the dynamics of “mind-masses” and that the human mind interpenetrated, and became part of, the microscopic physical domain of the cochlea. Therefore, a full description of hearing must necessarily include the perceptual dimensions of what he saw as a single manifold. The manifold contains all the psychophysical aspects of hearing, including the logarithmic transformations that arise from Fechner’s law, faithfully preserving all the subtle perceptual qualities of sound. For Riemann, hearing was a unitary physical and mental event, and parallels with modern ideas about consciousness and quantum biology are made. A unifying quantum mechanical model for an atom of consciousness—drawing on Riemann’s mind-masses and the similar “psychons” proposed by Eccles—is put forward.