Kant’s ‘Only Possible Argument’, Possibility and Necessity

2019 ◽  
pp. 104-132
Author(s):  
Uygar Abacı
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Per Se

This chapter offers a reconstruction and analysis of Kant’s reformed ontological argument, moving from the actualist principle (AP) that every real possibility must be grounded in actuality to the conclusion that there exists a unique really necessary being, grounding all real possibility. This argument turns on a distinction between real modality, i.e. possibility and necessity of existence, and logical modality, i.e. possibility and necessity of thought. The existing literature on the argument focuses on the problem that the singularity of the ground of all real possibility is not warranted by the premises of the argument. There is, however, an even more fundamental problem: what grounds the actualist principle? The principle can be interpreted ontologically, as expressing the conditions of real possibility per se, or epistemologically, expressing the conditions of our cognition of real possibility. The precritical Kant adopts the ontological interpretation, but does not provide a justification for it.

The Missing Premise in the Ontological Argument

1973 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman L. Geisler
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Valid Form

It appears to me that most traditional criticism of the Ontological argument misses the mark because the proponents imply a premise which, if true, would validate their argument on precisely the point attacked by the opponents. In view of this possibility, I propose the following analysis:(1) state the traditional ontological argument without the implied premise;(2) state the traditional criticisms, showing how they miss the mark;(3) restate the ontological argument with the implied premise made clear;(4) offer a defence of the implied premise;(5) show how the ontological argument is still invalidated by another criticism;(6) argue that the only way to avoid this other criticism is to borrow another premise from the cosmological argument, and(7) that when these premises are borrowed the result is a valid form of the cosmological argument for the existence of a necessary being.

The Cosmological and Ontological Arguments: How Saint Thomas Solved the Kantian Problem

1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. William Forgie
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Necessary Being

Let us call the Dependency Theses (DT) the view, first stated by Kant, that certain versions of the cosmological argument depend on the ontological argument. At least two different reasons have been given for the supposed dependence. Given the DT, some of Aquinas' views about God's essence, and about our knowledge of God's existence, can seem, at least at first, to be inconsistent. I consider two different ways of defending Aquinas against this suspicion of inconsistency. On the first defence, based on a widespread understanding of his notion of ‘necessary being’, Aquinas' views fall outside the scope of the DT. The success of this defence is doubtful. There is, however, another defence to be found in Aquinas' work, one directed not to avoiding, but actually to rejecting, the DT. In this second defence, the DT is not a correct assessment even of those views that do fall within its scope. Its success means that Aquinas had available a principled refutation of the DT some five hundred years before it was first formulated.

Divine Independence and the Ontological Argument – A Reply to James M. Humber

1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan G. Nasser
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Essential Component ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Empirical Fact ◽  
Definition Of

In a detailed and spirited critique, Professor James M. Humber has found my defence of the ontological argument unconvincing. Humber's case rests upon his claim that my ‘error’ is due to my ‘having accepted an incorrect definition of “physically necessary being” … ’. Now I do indeed claim that God must be conceived as a factuall necessary being, i.e. as eternally independent. I take the notion of God's aseity or eternal independence to be relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; it is accepted as an essential component of the concept God by many philosophers who also insist that there is no acceptable form of demonstrative theism. Thus, it is widely held that ‘God is a factually necessary being’ does not imply ‘God is a logically necessary being’; that God is eternally independent does not imply that he exists in all possible worlds. But it is precisely this view that I have argued is incorrect. While I concur that there is an intelligible concept of God as factually necessary, I deny that the existence of such a being is logically contingent, a mere matter of empirical fact. Indeed, a rigorous inspection of the concept of an eternally independent being reveals that whether that concept is instantiated, i.e. whether there exists a being exemplifying that concept, is knowable a priori. My claim is in fact stronger than this. I argue that the existence of an eternal, independent, omniscient and omnipotent being (God) is demonstrable by conceptual analysis. It is Humber's contention that my alleged demonstration of God's existence crumbles upon the discovery of the unacceptability of my definition of ‘factually necessary being’. Let us see.

E. J. Lowe on the modal ontological argument

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 611-622
Author(s):  
DAN-JOHAN EKLUND
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
Necessary Being

AbstractE. J. Lowe has defended a modal ontological argument that draws upon Plantinga's version. Briefly, the argument is this: God is a necessary being; possibly, God exists; hence, God exists. In this article, I accept the validity of Lowe's modal ontological argument and focus on how he seeks to justify the argument's possibility claim in reference to his essence-based account of modal knowledge. I argue that here Lowe's defence fails. I have two complaints. I call them ‘the modified “perfect island” objection’ and ‘the conflicting possibilities objection’. Both of these refer to the concern that Lowe's modal epistemology is too permissive: it permits justification of possibility claims that question the acceptability of the underlying modal epistemology.

The Argument from Perfections

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss ◽  
Joshua L. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Positive Property ◽  
Being There

A new ontological argument schema for the existence of a necessary being is presented. Several ways to fill in this schema are shown, based upon different conceptions of “positive property.” The argument is made that at least one of these senses matches an intuitive, prephilosophical concept on which the premises are plausible. This argument has certain advantages over ontological arguments for God. In particular, it is explained how one could find the premises in the argument plausible without being committed to premises that entail the stronger thesis that there must be a perfect being. There follows a discussion of an objection Oppy raises against an ontological argument for the stronger thesis, and an explanation of how the argument put forward in the chapter avoids that objection.

Ontotheology and Modality II

2019 ◽  
pp. 34-76
Author(s):  
Uygar Abacı
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Logical Truth ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
The Common

This chapter examines the prevalent conception of modality in German rationalist school, by looking at the modal version of the ontological argument, propounded by Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, and these figures’ accounts of modality in other metaphysical contexts. It disputes two claims of a common narrative concerning the school metaphysicians: (i) they were committed to logicism, according to which claims about possibility and necessity are exhaustively explained through formal-logical principles, while Kant introduced a real or metaphysical account of modality, involving extra-logical truth-makers of modal claims; (ii) they were committed to the view that existence is a real predicate or determination, which Kant strongly rejected. This chapter demonstrates that contrary to the common narrative, Leibniz and Wolff had robust conceptions of real possibility and necessity, and did not commit to the conception of existence as a distinct determination of things and even anticipated Kant’s position on existence in significant ways.

The ens realissimum and necessary being in The Critique of Pure Reason

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAWRENCE PASTERNACK
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Conceptual Relationship

Just prior to The Critique of Pure Reason's examination of the various arguments for God's existence, Kant discusses the conceptual relationship between the idea of an ens realissimum and that of a necessary being. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the extent to which this discussion informs his claim that the cosmological argument depends upon the ontological argument.

Hartshorne's Arguments Against Empirical Evidence for Necessary Existence: An Evaluation

1977 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen A. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Reasonable Belief ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Charles Hartshorne ◽  
Necessary Existence

Is experiential evidence irrelevant to acceptance or rejection of belief in the existence of a Divine Being? Charles Hartshorne answers that it is indeed irrelevant, and this answer has an initial and, for me, continuing surprising ring to it. Specifically, Hartshorne makes two distinguishable claims: (1) the traditional allegedly a posteriori arguments, the teleological and cosmological, are in fact incompatible with empiricist methodology and are disguised ontological arguments; (2) the conception of God as necessary being demands that belief in such a being's existence or non-existence in no way depend upon empirical evidence. On the contrary, I shall argue, first, that empirical evidence for God is truly empirical and second, that there is no incompatibility between empirical evidence and necessary existence. My argument will involve an attempt to understand and clarify somewhat the very difficult concepts of ‘experience’ and ‘necessity’ as they arise in the context of religious epistemology. I wish to make clear at the outset that my aim is not to eliminate ontological arguments for God in favour of empirical arguments, for I believe that Hartshorne's work on the modal ontological argument contributes substantially to providing grounds for reasonable belief in theism. Rather, my purpose is to show that ontological and empirical patterns of theistic argumentation are neither incompatible with each other nor reducible to each other.

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