Ricœur face la mort: L’attitude agnostique et ses ramifications dans l’œuvre posthume de Vivant jusqu’à la mort

Dans le second document d’archive, « La mort », de Vivant jusqu’à la mort deux lignes de réflexion sur l’imaginaire de la survie sont particulièrement développées. L’une est approfondie le concept de détachement parfait, qui peut permettre de mener à son terme le « travail de deuil » sans céder à l’imaginaire des morts qu’exprime habituellement la survie. Ricœur rate cette voie jusqu’à la mise en exergue d’un transfert à autrui de l'amour de la vie. La transmission de la vie passe alors par la « trace écrite », laissée comme témoignage aux autres-les survivants- d’un ayant été. La seconde ligne est celle du détachement imparfait. Ricœur insiste alors sur la « mémoire de Dieu », à travers l’expression « Dieu se souvient de moi », énoncée au présent éternel du souci de Dieu. Une reformulation au futur - « Dieu se souviendra de moi » - introduirait le risque d’une forme d’hypocrisie par projection imaginaire, ou bien d’une inauthentique « consolation ». La « mémoire de Dieu » reste la schématisation du présent éternel du souci du divin. Elle justifie l’existence humaine par la grâce. Ces deux lignes pour penser l’imaginaire de la survie - les détachements parfait et imparfait seraient un exemple de la mise en pratique d’une attitude agnostique dans la philosophie de Ricœur. Pour les mettre en lumière, la présente recherche souhaite mettre en regard l’influence de Whitehead et de Process Theology de Charles Hartshorne dans les dernières pensées ricœriennes

Evil and Divine Power: A Response to James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come. He suggests that this is the underlying element in discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, a doctrine that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion. Although, as hypothetical trolley cases demonstrate, human beings sometimes cannot avoid doing or permitting evil in order to prevent a greater evil, Sterba argues that the same cannot be said of an omnipotent God and that, since our world contains horrendous evils, the existence of a God who is both omnipotent and good is therefore logically impossible. I argue that, if God is thought to be a conscious being with unlimited power to prevent horrendous evils, Sterba’s argument might be valid. I also argue, however, that divine power need not be construed in this way. Drawing on some ideas derived from the work of Charles Hartshorne, I suggest that God is not a kind of divine micromanager and that it is more coherent and, indeed, helpful to think of God as a social influencer whose power is a source of positive energy for the promotion of goodness.

Harvard lectures, fall semester 1925

Notes taken by Fritz Jules Roethlisberger and Charles Hartshorne during Whitehead’s class ‘Philosophy 3b: Philosophy of Science’. These notes parallel those of the Radcliffe women, which are given in the previous section. The topics covered in these forty-one lectures are wide-ranging, but the focus is largely on metaphysics and the intersection of philosophy and science.

Harvard lectures, spring semester 1926

Notes taken by Fritz Jules Roethlisberger, Edward Schouten Robinson, and Charles Hartshorne during Whitehead’s class ‘Philosophy 3b: Philosophy of Science’. The topics covered in these thirty-seven lectures are wide-ranging, but the focus is largely on metaphysics and the intersection of philosophy and science.

On Hartshorne's Creative Understanding of the Christian View of Love and Its Significance for Comparative Religious Studies

Charles Hartshorne highlights sympathy as a core element of God's love that is undervalued in Christian theology. A detailed understanding of the relationship between loving God and loving others and loving others as oneself is developed based on God's sympathetic love. A comparison between Hartshorne's sympathetic love and Confucian empathetic ren is possible since both eliminate the estrangement between the subject loving and the subject loved and both expand love to others beyond the limited scope of love in human moral practice.

The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy Debate Revisited

This article explores the relationship between "the God of religion" and "the God of philosophy" via four key concepts: existence, actuality, reality, and mystical experience. The exploration of these key concepts relies heavily on the thought of Charles Hartshorne, but it also relies on crucial insights from Charles Sanders Peirce and Simone Weil.

The correctness and relevance of the modal ontological argument

This paper deals with some metaphilosophical aspects of the modal ontological argument originating from Charles Hartshorne. One of the specific premises of the argument expresses the idea that the existence of God is not contingent. Several well-known versions of the argument have been formulated that appeal to different ways of clarifying the latter. A question arises: which of the formally correct and relevant versions is proper or basic? The paper points to some criteria of formal correctness, and distinguishes two types of relevance for these versions: strong and weak. Its aim is to furnish a strictly worked out answer to the question, taking into account each of these types. As a result, a very simple, formally correct and (weakly) relevant version of the modal ontological argument is formulated. The results obtained are also used to criticize a popular belief about the relations in which the main versions of the modal ontological argument stand to one another.