Divine Independence and the Ontological Argument – A Reply to James M. Humber

1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan G. Nasser
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Essential Component ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Empirical Fact ◽  
Definition Of

In a detailed and spirited critique, Professor James M. Humber has found my defence of the ontological argument unconvincing. Humber's case rests upon his claim that my ‘error’ is due to my ‘having accepted an incorrect definition of “physically necessary being” … ’. Now I do indeed claim that God must be conceived as a factuall necessary being, i.e. as eternally independent. I take the notion of God's aseity or eternal independence to be relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; it is accepted as an essential component of the concept God by many philosophers who also insist that there is no acceptable form of demonstrative theism. Thus, it is widely held that ‘God is a factually necessary being’ does not imply ‘God is a logically necessary being’; that God is eternally independent does not imply that he exists in all possible worlds. But it is precisely this view that I have argued is incorrect. While I concur that there is an intelligible concept of God as factually necessary, I deny that the existence of such a being is logically contingent, a mere matter of empirical fact. Indeed, a rigorous inspection of the concept of an eternally independent being reveals that whether that concept is instantiated, i.e. whether there exists a being exemplifying that concept, is knowable a priori. My claim is in fact stronger than this. I argue that the existence of an eternal, independent, omniscient and omnipotent being (God) is demonstrable by conceptual analysis. It is Humber's contention that my alleged demonstration of God's existence crumbles upon the discovery of the unacceptability of my definition of ‘factually necessary being’. Let us see.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

Norman Malcolm e Alvin Plantinga - Duas Versões Analíticas do Argumento do Proslogionde Santo Anselmo

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (34) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Maria Helena Reis Pereira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
De Dicto

The purpose of this work is to show some aspects which characterized the way analytical philosophers in the sixties and seventies (last Century) have read Saint Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion, thereby bringing its problematic into a new light. And had the virtue to begin the question of the existence of God in the heart of the analytical philosophy which up to the date was concerned by atheism. In the Introduction, we will point out the most frequent analytical objections to the argument - (i) existence is not a predicate (ii) the concept of God is incoherent (iii) existence is not perfection. Anscombe - an exception in this analytical context - has defended and supported the thesis that the argument is not an ontological one. Malcolm discovered two arguments in the Proslogion: one in chapter II which he considers invalid, another one in Chapter III considered valid and interpreted as modal by him. Plantinga was one of the first critics of the modal proof because there was - according to him - a confusion between necessity de dicto and necessity de re. Plantinga thought that the two arguments implied and/or complemented each other and developed a theory of modal realism in which he explains the nature and divine necessity in terms of possible worlds. Based on this concept he has rewritten a new modal proof considered “victorious” by him but that was later refuted by Mackie, Tooley and Davis (amongst others) and accused of circularity. Plantinga didn’t accept his proof to be considered fallacious and Oppy didn’t also recognize the same claim made by Fergie. However, Plantinga has rephrased his proof and summarized it in just one premise: “maximal greatness is possibly instantiated”. More than a proof of God’s existence, this is a defense of the acceptance of theism, a justification of the rationality of belief. And the possibility of existence of a metaphysically necessary being drives us to a deepest reflection from where every cognitive potentiality from the labor of the philosopher can be taken.

Conceptual analysis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hanna
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Paradox Of Analysis ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

A distinction must be made between the philosophical theory of conceptual analysis and the historical philosophical movement of Conceptual Analysis. The theory of conceptual analysis holds that concepts – general meanings of linguistic predicates – are the fundamental objects of philosophical inquiry, and that insights into conceptual contents are expressed in necessary ’conceptual truths’ (analytic propositions). There are two methods for obtaining these truths: - direct a priori definition of concepts; - indirect ’transcendental’ argumentation. The movement of Conceptual Analysis arose at Cambridge during the first half of the twentieth century, and flourished at Oxford and many American departments of philosophy in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the USA its doctrines came under heavy criticism, and its proponents were not able to respond effectively; by the end of the 1970s the movement was widely regarded as defunct. This reversal of fortunes can be traced primarily to the conjunction of several powerful objections: the attack on intensions and on the analytic/synthetic distinction; the paradox of analysis; the ‘scientific essentialist’ theory of propositions; and the critique of transcendental arguments. Nevertheless a closer examination indicates that each of these objections presupposes a covert appeal to concepts and conceptual truths. In the light of this dissonance between the conventional wisdom of the critics on the one hand, and the implicit commitments of their arguments on the other, there is a manifest need for a careful re-examination of conceptual analysis.

Causal Necessity and the Ontological Argument

1974 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Humber
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
The Past ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Causal Necessity ◽  
Physical Necessity ◽  
Philosophical Community

The ontological argument appears in a multiplicity of forms. Over the past ten or twelve years, however, the philosophical community seems to have been concerned principally with those versions of the proof which claim that God is a necessary being. In contemporary literature, Professors Malcolm and Hartshorne have been the chief advocates of this view, both men holding that God must be conceived as a necessary being and that, as a result, his existence is able to be demonstrated a priori. This claim has not gone unchallenged; indeed, numerous writers have argued that neither Malcolm nor Hartshorne has exercised due care in his use of ‘necessary’. That is, critics charge that the arguments of both men have only the appearance of validity, for in their reasonings the defenders of the a priori proof have tacitly assumed that God is a logically necessary being. Whether or not a being can be logically necessary, however, is a quaestio disputata. In fact, until recently the question was not in dispute at all—virtually all ‘competent judges’ agreed that only propositions could be spoken of as logically necessary, and thus that God must be defined as a physically or factually necessary being. But is the statement, ‘a physically necessary being exists’, logically true? Critics of the ontological argument think not; and in support of this view they offer analyses of ‘physical necessity’ which, they feel, not only give meaning to the phrase, but also show that a physically necessary being's existence can be proven only by some kind of a posteriori investigation.

Ontotheology and Modality I

2019 ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
Uygar Abacı
Keyword(s):  
General Framework ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Classical Version ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Necessary Being

This chapter offers a general framework for reading ontotheology, according to which any version of the ontological argument consists of two logical steps. First, it introduces existence into the concept of God in one way or another; second, it infers the existence of God from the concept of God and asserts identity between two distinct notions of God, viz. as the most real being and as the necessary being. With this framework in place, the chapter then examines the classical version of the ontological argument, introduced by St Anselm and popularized by Descartes. It demonstrates that while Kant’s primary objection, i.e. existence is not a real predicate, applies equally to both Anselm’s and Descartes’ arguments, Descartes importantly anticipates the actualist principle, i.e. facts about possibility must be grounded on facts about actuality, which will come to be a major insight in Kant’s theory of modality.

Natural Theology and the Concept of Perfection in Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-475
Author(s):  
Mark O. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Natural Theology ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Analytic Work ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Idea Of God

One of the hallmarks of the early modern rationalists was their confidence that a great deal of metaphysics could be done by purely a priori reasoning. They thought so at least partly because they inherited via Descartes Anselm's confidence that the existence of God could be established by purely a priori reasoning in an ontological argument. They also inherited a Thomistic and scholastic confidence that the concept of God as supremely perfect being, if subjected to serious and deep analysis, would yield sound doctrine. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all three took it that they had in their stock of ideas an idea of God sufficiently clear and detailed that a little analytic work could produce real metaphysical results, not only about God himself, but also about the universe in which they found themselves (for Spinoza, these turned out to be the same thing). Though they start with what purport to be ideas of the same God, they get radically different results in their analyses.

The Failure of Conceptual Analysis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Conditional Statements ◽  
Reductive Analysis

Dispositions are often regarded with suspicion. Consequently, some philosophers try to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions to sentences containing only non-dispositional vocabulary. Typically, reductionists attempt to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. These conditional statements, like other modal claims, are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds semantics. However, conditional analyses are subject to a number of problems and counterexamples, including random coincidences, void satisfaction, masks, antidotes, mimics, altering, and finks. Some analyses fail to reduce disposition ascriptions to non-modal vocabulary. If reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions fails, then perhaps there can be metaphysical reduction of dispositions without semantic reduction. However, the reductionist still owes us an account of what makes disposition ascriptions true. But to posit a causal power for every unreduced dispositional predicate is an overreaction to the failure of conceptual analysis.

Pragmatic Reconstruction in Jurisprudence: Features of a Realistic Legal Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-202
Author(s):  
Brian Z. Tamanaha
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Coercive Force ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Planning System ◽  
Universal Feature ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Theory Of Law

A century ago the pragmatists called for reconstruction in philosophy. Philosophy at the time was occupied with conceptual analysis, abstractions, a priori analysis, and the pursuit of necessary, universal truths. Pragmatists argued that philosophy instead should center on the pressing problems of the day, which requires theorists to pay attention to social complexity, variation, change, power, consequences, and other concrete aspects of social life. The parallels between philosophy then and jurisprudence today are striking, as I show, calling for a pragmatism-informed theory of law within contemporary jurisprudence. In the wake of H.L.A. Hart’s mid-century turn to conceptual analysis, “during the course of the twentieth century, the boundaries of jurisprudential inquiry were progressively narrowed.”1 Jurisprudence today is dominated by legal philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis built on intuitions, seeking to identify essential features and timeless truths about law. In the pursuit of these objectives, they detach law from its social and historical moorings, they ignore variation and change, they drastically reduce law to a singular phenomenon—like a coercive planning system for difficult moral problems2—and they deny that coercive force is a universal feature of law, among other ways in which they depart from the reality of law; a few prominent jurisprudents even proffer arguments that invoke aliens or societies of angels.

scholarly journals Aerosol-based antimicrobial photoinactivation in the lungs: an action spectrum study

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Treghini ◽  
Alfonso Dell’Accio ◽  
Franco Fusi ◽  
Giovanni Romano
Keyword(s):  
Light Source ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Action Spectrum ◽  
Multidrug Resistant ◽  
Theoretical Modelling ◽  
Resistant Bacteria ◽  
Lung Infections ◽  
Killing Action ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractChronic lung infections are among the most diffused human infections, being often associated with multidrug-resistant bacteria. In this framework, the European project “Light4Lungs” aims at synthesizing and testing an inhalable light source to control lung infections by antimicrobial photoinactivation (aPDI), addressing endogenous photosensitizers only (porphyrins) in the representative case of S. aureus and P. aeruginosa. In the search for the best emission characteristics for the aerosolized light source, this work defines and calculates the photo-killing action spectrum for lung aPDI in the exemplary case of cystic fibrosis. This was obtained by applying a semi-theoretical modelling with Monte Carlo simulations, according to previously published methodology related to stomach infections and applied to the infected trachea, bronchi, bronchioles and alveoli. In each of these regions, the two low and high oxygen concentration cases were considered to account for the variability of in vivo conditions, together with the presence of endogenous porphyrins and other relevant absorbers/diffusers inside the illuminated biofilm/mucous layer. Furthermore, an a priori method to obtain the “best illumination wavelengths” was defined, starting from maximizing porphyrin and light absorption at any depth. The obtained action spectrum is peaked at 394 nm and mostly follows porphyrin extinction coefficient behavior. This is confirmed by the results from the best illumination wavelengths, which reinforces the robustness of our approach. These results can offer important indications for the synthesis of the aerosolized light source and definition of its most effective emission spectrum, suggesting a flexible platform to be considered in further applications.

Toward a Functional Definition of the A Priori

1944 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 155
Author(s):  
Arthur Child
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Definition Of
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