Against Internalism-Parity

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-78
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Law

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.

scholarly journals Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Epistemic Trust ◽  
Conceptual Connection ◽  
Epistemic Blame

AbstractThe normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.

Against Irreducibility-Parity

2019 ◽  
pp. 96-116
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Law

It is argued that the second version of the parity premise—irreducibility-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements, unlike moral judgements, are committed to merely reducibly normative properties. The argument for this is based on the same basic rationale outlined in chapter 3: epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law. A ‘back-up’ view is introduced: even if irreducibility-parity is true, the analogy between epistemic judgements and normative or evaluative judgements within institutions can yet be used to render the epistemic error theory less implausible than it may at first appear.

scholarly journals Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Epistemic Instrumentalism

Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model of practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. This chapter argues that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provides normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the correct epistemic verdicts. On this account, epistemic permissibility can be understood on the model of the wide-scope instrumental norm for instrumental rationality, while normative evidential reasons for belief can be understood in terms of instrumental transmission.

Moral Error Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
The Relationship

Two varieties of moral error theory are identified. According to the first—the internalism-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of categorical normative reasons for action. These are incompatible with plausible constraints on the relationship between one’s reasons and one’s psychology. So they do not exist. According to the second—the irreducibility-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of irreducibly normative properties and relations. These are incompatible with plausible assumptions about the constituents of the world. So they do not exist. The differences and commonalities between these two varieties of moral error theory are identified.

The Law Relating to Pornography: A Psychological Overview

1980 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurice Yaffé
Keyword(s):  
Double Standard ◽  
Sexually Explicit Material ◽  
Psychological Issues ◽  
Explicit Material ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Sexually Explicit ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law

The law relating to pornography, that is, sexually explicit material, is presently under review. Decisions regarding reform are complex, due in part to the fact that it is one of those emotive subjects involving moral judgements and often a double standard. The twenty-year history of the 1959 Obscene Publications Act is reviewed along with other relevant legislation, and examples of prosecutions during this period are used to illustrate psychological issues and defence arguments. Recommendations are made with respect to changes in the law.

The law of unfair dismissal and behaviour outside work

Legal Studies ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 328-352
Author(s):  
Astrid Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Unfair Dismissal ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law

Four of the better-known unfair dismissal cases involve dismissals of employees for behaviour outside work. All four of those dismissals were held to be ‘fair’. This paper looks afresh at the subject matter of dismissals for behaviour outside work. It will argue, first, that employment tribunals should apply a separate framework to dismissals for behaviour outside work and not just apply the normal framework that is designed for dismissals for behaviour at work. Secondly, the paper will construct this separate framework to apply to dismissals for extramural behaviour. It will be argued that there should henceforth be a presumption that dismissals for behaviour outside work will be unfair unless the employer has a strong reason for thinking that the extramural behaviour of the employee will damage the business of the employer. The purpose of this paper is to suggest legal reasons for change to this area of unfair dismissal law as an addition to previously discussed normative reasons for change. In particular, the paper will develop the analogy between unfair dismissal cases on behaviour outside work and breach of personal confidence cases since the Human Rights Act 1998.

Simple Veritism

2019 ◽  
pp. 138-159
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
The Law

In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has been assumed that the final or basic epistemic value is true belief. This chapter considers objections to this from knowledge-first and anti-consequentialist conceptions of epistemic norms. It presents reasons for scepticism about these views and claims that these alternatives are still compatible with the basic view in the book of the contrast between epistemic norms and moral norms and so with its rejection of the parity premise.

DOES THE LAW AFFECT MORAL JUDGEMENTS?

1964 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 570-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
NIGEL WALKER ◽  
MICHAEL ARGYLE
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Law

scholarly journals Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law?

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmund Tweedy Flanigan
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
The Law

Instead of the question, ‘Do we have an obligation to obey the law?,’ we should first ask the easier question, ‘Do we have reasons to obey the law?.’ This paper offers a new account of the notion of what Hart called the content-independence of legal reasons in terms of the normative grounding relation. That account is then used to mount a defense of the claim that we do indeed have content-independent, genuinely normative reasons to obey the law (because it is the law), and that these reasons do sometimes amount to an obligation to so-act.

Ethical Challenges: Less About Moral Wrongdoing and More About Communication Breakdown

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Leslie ◽  
Mary Casper
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Challenges ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Thickened Liquids ◽  
Communication Breakdown ◽  
Professional Duty ◽  
Language Pathology ◽  
The Law ◽  
Personal Case

“My patient refuses thickened liquids, should I discharge them from my caseload?” A version of this question appears at least weekly on the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association's Community pages. People talk of respecting the patient's right to be non-compliant with speech-language pathology recommendations. We challenge use of the word “respect” and calling a patient “non-compliant” in the same sentence: does use of the latter term preclude the former? In this article we will share our reflections on why we are interested in these so called “ethical challenges” from a personal case level to what our professional duty requires of us. Our proposal is that the problems that we encounter are less to do with ethical or moral puzzles and usually due to inadequate communication. We will outline resources that clinicians may use to support their work from what seems to be a straightforward case to those that are mired in complexity. And we will tackle fears and facts regarding litigation and the law.

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