Against Irreducibility-Parity

2019 ◽  
pp. 96-116
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Law

It is argued that the second version of the parity premise—irreducibility-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements, unlike moral judgements, are committed to merely reducibly normative properties. The argument for this is based on the same basic rationale outlined in chapter 3: epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law. A ‘back-up’ view is introduced: even if irreducibility-parity is true, the analogy between epistemic judgements and normative or evaluative judgements within institutions can yet be used to render the epistemic error theory less implausible than it may at first appear.

Against Internalism-Parity

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-78
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Law

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.

Prudential Normativity, Moral Scepticisms, and Metaethics

Dear Prudence ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Guy Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Moral Debate ◽  
Companions In Guilt ◽  
Moral Scepticism

In earlier chapters it was argued that prudential value gives agents normative, prudential reasons and that prudential judgements are normative judgements on a par with moral judgements. This chapter spells out some ramifications of these theses by examining four different areas of inquiry about morality and moral discourse, showing how the theses hitherto defended in this book affect them. It begins with the form of moral scepticism found within the ‘why be moral?’ debate. It then examines hermeneutic moral error theory and proposes a companions-in-guilt argument based on the normativity of prudential discourse. Third, it examines arguments given within the literature on revisionary metaethical views, pointing out and questioning their commitment to prudential justifications. Finally, it is shown how the normativity of prudential properties applies to a central debate about thick concepts, that between reductionists and non-reductionists about such concepts.

Moral Error Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
The Relationship

Two varieties of moral error theory are identified. According to the first—the internalism-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of categorical normative reasons for action. These are incompatible with plausible constraints on the relationship between one’s reasons and one’s psychology. So they do not exist. According to the second—the irreducibility-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of irreducibly normative properties and relations. These are incompatible with plausible assumptions about the constituents of the world. So they do not exist. The differences and commonalities between these two varieties of moral error theory are identified.

The Law Relating to Pornography: A Psychological Overview

1980 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurice Yaffé
Keyword(s):  
Double Standard ◽  
Sexually Explicit Material ◽  
Psychological Issues ◽  
Explicit Material ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Sexually Explicit ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law

The law relating to pornography, that is, sexually explicit material, is presently under review. Decisions regarding reform are complex, due in part to the fact that it is one of those emotive subjects involving moral judgements and often a double standard. The twenty-year history of the 1959 Obscene Publications Act is reviewed along with other relevant legislation, and examples of prosecutions during this period are used to illustrate psychological issues and defence arguments. Recommendations are made with respect to changes in the law.

Unbelievable Errors

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Philosophical Progress

This book defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. The book also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. Instead of being a problem for the theory, the book argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory. The book then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their methodology if there can be true philosophical theories that we cannot believe. It concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should make a sharp distinction between a theory’s truth and our ability to believe it.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
Argument From Analogy

The moral error theory—i.e. moral judgements attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, and as a consequence those judgements are systematically mistaken—and the argument from analogy—the argument for thinking that morality is systematically mistaken in this way—are introduced. Interest in the argument from analogy is motivated by situating it within recent trends in both moral philosophy and epistemology. A roadmap for the book is provided. The conclusion of the book is outlined: it is that the argument from analogy fails. It is not inferred from this that the moral error theory is true. The arguments do not lead to this conclusion. But the book does claim that—for now at least—we do not know that the argument from analogy is false.

DOES THE LAW AFFECT MORAL JUDGEMENTS?

1964 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 570-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
NIGEL WALKER ◽  
MICHAEL ARGYLE
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Law

Von der Möglichkeit des moralischen Subjektivismus. Eine Untersuchung zum Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion

Methodus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-31
Author(s):  
Michael Oliva Córdoba
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Religious Obligation ◽  
Moral Facts

Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only but seems to have considerable merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, is more convincingly dealt with by subjectivism than by its rivals: In contrast to realism or even relativism (with which subjectivism often gets confused), subjectivism can help to explain the peculiarities of obligation without forcing us to disregard the parallel problem in the field of religion. This finding calls into question the rationale for, as well as the success of, central assumptions in ontology and semantics which the realist so freely hands out in order to make his point: If religious facts and the truth-aptness of religious judgements will not explain religious obligation, moral facts and the truth-aptness of moral judgements will not help the moral realist either. So, unless we do not wish to simply cast the problem of moral obligation aside, in future, moral subjectivism must be seriously considered as a worthwhile position in its own right.

Law's Halo

1986 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald H. Regan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Social Fact ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Pure Error ◽  
The Law ◽  
Just Society

Like many people these days, I believe there is no general moral obligation to obey the law. I shall explain why there is no such moral obligation – and I shall clarify what I mean when I say there is no moral obligation to obey the law – as we proceed. But also like many people, I am unhappy with a position that would say there was no moral obligation to obey the law and then say no more about the law's moral significance. In our thinking about law in a resonably just society, we have a strong inclination to invest law with a sort of moral halo. It does not feel right to suggest that law is a morally neutral social fact, nor to suggest that law is merely a useful social technique.In this essay, I shall try to account in part for law's moral halo. (Let me emphasize “in part”; I do not purport to say everything that could be said.) Because I share the widespread inclination to invest law with this halo, I shall not be interested in a merely historical account of how we come to see law with a halo – a pure “error theory” of law's halo, if you will. I want to justify the halo. On the other hand, the main way to justify the halo is to get clear just what law's moral significance is. It is unlikely that at the end of the process of clarification the halo will have exactly the shape or luminance that it had at the beginning.

Ethical Challenges: Less About Moral Wrongdoing and More About Communication Breakdown

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Leslie ◽  
Mary Casper
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Challenges ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Thickened Liquids ◽  
Communication Breakdown ◽  
Professional Duty ◽  
Language Pathology ◽  
The Law ◽  
Personal Case

“My patient refuses thickened liquids, should I discharge them from my caseload?” A version of this question appears at least weekly on the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association's Community pages. People talk of respecting the patient's right to be non-compliant with speech-language pathology recommendations. We challenge use of the word “respect” and calling a patient “non-compliant” in the same sentence: does use of the latter term preclude the former? In this article we will share our reflections on why we are interested in these so called “ethical challenges” from a personal case level to what our professional duty requires of us. Our proposal is that the problems that we encounter are less to do with ethical or moral puzzles and usually due to inadequate communication. We will outline resources that clinicians may use to support their work from what seems to be a straightforward case to those that are mired in complexity. And we will tackle fears and facts regarding litigation and the law.

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