The Integration Model

2020 ◽  
pp. 209-243
Author(s):  
Ngoc Son Bui
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Integration Model ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Constitutional System

On December 8, 2015, the National Assembly of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) (or Laos) approved a new Constitution, replacing the 2003 one. This chapter focuses on that constitutional replacement through amendment. It demonstrates that Laos introduces progressive constitutional change—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of the socialist constitutional system which in turn promotes the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of the Lao multi-ethnic people. The adherence to the integration of the Lao multi-ethnic people legitimatizes the process and substance of constitutional change in this country. The Lao story, therefore, indicates the integration model of socialist constitutional change.

scholarly journals Constitutional amendment in Laos

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 756-786
Author(s):  
Ngoc Son Bui
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Constitutional System

Abstract Laos, a socialist state in Southeast Asia, adopted an amended Constitution in 2015. This article investigates and explains this experience from the perspective of comparative constitutional amendment, supported by a qualitative empirical methodology: extensive formal interviews with several local constitutional amenders and informal conversations with a local lawyer and several legal scholars. It argues that Laos has introduced progressive constitutional amendments—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of its socialist constitutional system which in turn will promote the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of local people.

scholarly journals Constitutional Change: Towards Better Human Rights Protection in Australia

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 248
Author(s):  
Mohammad Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Primary Sources ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Legal Scholar ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Constitutional System

Many legal scholars contend that Australia does not have a charter of rights in its Constitution. The legal scholar Rosalind Dixon, however, suggests that the Constitution does include some provisions that could be viewed as resembling a (partial) bill of rights. This constitutional framework might cause one to ponder whether human rights are adequately protected in the Australian constitutional system. This paper attempts to consider this question. It is argued that the protection of human rights under the Constitution, federal and state laws is not fully capable of responding to at least three human rights crises presented. Accordingly, the paper suggests that Australia should consider the idea of amending the Constitution in order to better human rights protection in the country. It offers suggestion that the Canadian model protection of human rights could be considered as one of the primary sources for reforms in the future.

scholarly journals Presidential Term Limits and the African Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (S1) ◽  
pp. 131-160
Author(s):  
Micha Wiebusch ◽  
Christina Murray
Keyword(s):  
Active Role ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
African Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
African Charter

AbstractA growing number of states have modified constitutionally determined presidential term limits or adopted a flexible interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions to allow incumbent leaders additional terms in the highest office. This article investigates African Union (AU) responses to attempts to overturn or weaken term limits on executive power, one of the most tenacious constitutional trends in Africa. Inspired by the AU's well-established discourse on “unconstitutional changes of government” under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the article frames the manipulation of presidential term limits as “undemocratic changes of the constitution”. From this perspective it argues for a more active role for the AU in monitoring and enforcing constitutionalism and respect for democratic standards by member states when they amend their constitution. It concludes with a tentative set of principles to guide processes of constitutional change in Africa.

Ideology and Institutions in North America

1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 671-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Finbow
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Development ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Initial State ◽  
State Action ◽  
National Differences ◽  
Labour Policy ◽  
State Interventions

AbstractThe orthodox view that Canada's ideological tradition is more supportive of an active state cannot explain earlier innovations in social and labour policy in the United States. A neo-pluralist and neo-institutionalist synthesis is used to contrast these nations. Organic ideologies of labour, agrarian, business and professional groups reveal no consistent national differences in support for state action. Initial state interventions were similar and limited. But institutional development occurred in different contexts, producing more effective executive leadership in Canada. American policy was constrained by the Congress, with its opportunities for blocking, and by inadequate executive power. Frustration with inaction plus greater social well-being reduced demands in the US for state action. Canada's institutions allowed more creative policy and fostered greater support for state action, especially where the weak economy exacted costs on social groups. But constitutional change could replicate American gridlock, and reduce the capacity for new state action.

scholarly journals ANALISIS YURIDIS CABANG PEMERINTAHAN KEEMPAT DALAM STRUKTUR KETATANEGARAAN DI INDONESIA

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Tri Suhendra Arbani
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
State System ◽  
Modern State ◽  
Independent State ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Government Functions ◽  
State Commission ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
State Body

AbstractThe development of the modern state system is also followed by the establishment of new institutions as a support of the institutions that have been there before. The most significant event in the development and establishment of institutions is the new power branch, which is called by the experts in constitutional as an independent state commission. Independent state commission institution which, if seen from the character and the authority, the agency in some literature in American constitutional law is referred to as the fourth branch of power (The Fourth Branch of Government). Some things that make this institution called the fourth branch of government (The Fourth Branch of Government) is the fact that the agency, or commission or the state body run more than one function of government as well. The existence of a fourth branch of government (The Fourth Branch of Government) with the characteristics of state institutions whose authorities are quasi, combinations, as well as the accumulation of three existing government functions and make this institution to be difficult to identify in thought Trias Politica. The phenomenon of the rise of an institution with a new concept that has influenced the constitutional system in many countries.AbstrakPerkembangan sistem ketatanegaaran modern dikuti pula dengan terbentuknya lembaga-lembaga baru sebagai penunjang dari lembaga yang telah ada sebelumnya. Hal yang paling signifikan dalam perkembangan dan pembentukan institusi domokratis tersebut tidak lain adalah cabang kekuasaan baru yang biasa disebut oleh kalangan ahli tata negara sebagai komisi negara independen.  Lembaga komisi negara independen yang jika dilihat dari sifat dan kewengannya, lembaga tersebut dalam beberapa literatur hukum tata negara di Amerika disebut sebagai cabang kekuasaan keempat (The Fourth Branch of Goverment). Beberapa hal yang membuat lembaga negara ini disebut sebagai cabang pemerintahan keempat (The Fourth Branch of Government) adalah fakta bahwa lembaga, atau komisi atau badan negara tersebut menjalankan lebih dari satu bahkan ketiga fungsi pemerintahan sekaligus. Eksistensi cabang pemerintahan keempat (The Fourth Branch of Government) dengan karakteristik lembaga negara yang kewenangannya yang bersifat kuasi, kombinasi, maupun akumulasi dari tiga fungsi pemerintahan yang ada dan menjadikan lembaga ini untuk sulit diidentifikasi dalam pemikiran Trias Politica. Fenomena munculnya sebuah lembaga dengan konsep baru tersebut telah ikut mempengaruhi sistem ketatanegaraan dibanyak negara.

5. Human Rights in Comparative Politics

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonia Cardenas
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Rights Violations ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
International Linkages ◽  
Domestic Level

This chapter examines the importance of comparative politics for understanding human rights practices. Comparative politics has advanced our knowledge of why states sometimes violate internationally recognized human rights. Both domestic incentives and exclusionary ideologies increase the likelihood of rights violations. On the other hand, comparative politics has attempted to explain human rights protection, showing how domestic structures (both societal groups and state institutions) can influence reform efforts. This chapter first consider alternative logics of comparison, including the merits of comparing a small versus a large number of cases and human rights within or across regions. It then explores the leading domestic-level explanations for why human rights violations occur. It also describes the use of domestic–international linkages to explain otherwise perplexing human rights outcomes. Finally, it analyses the ways in which, in the context of globalization, comparative politics shapes human rights practices.

scholarly journals KEDUDUKAN KOMISI PEMBERANTASAN KORUPSI DALAM SISTEM KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Mahesa Rannie
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
State Institution ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Independent State ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Right

Abstrak Kedudukan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia memang seringkali diperdebatkan, hal ini terbukti dengan Putusan-Putusan MK yang berubah-ubah. Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam putusannya pernah beberapa kali memutuskan berbeda tentang kedudukan KPK ini dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia. Mahkamah Konstitusi pernah memutuskan KPK merupakan lembaga negara independen di luar ranah kekuasaan eksekutif, legislatif, dan yudikatif. Pernah pula memutuskan bahwa KPK merupakan eksekutif dilihat dari kewenangannya. Putusan-putusan MK ini tentu saja membawa pengaruh terhadap undang-undang KPK. Revisi undang-undang KPK terbaru, yaitu Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 menyatakan KPK masuk dalam ranah kekuasaan eksekutif sehingga dengan demikian KPK dapat menjadi objek hak angket Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). Hal demikian tentu saja menambah panjang perdebatan di kalangan ahli hukum dengan argumentasinya masing-masing. Dari argumentasi-argumentasi tersebut penulis menganggap KPK adalah lembaga negara independen di luar struktur organ negara yang utama. Hal ini sejalan dengan theory the new separation of power sebagai konsekuensi dari teori negara kesejahteraan (welfare state) di era abad modern ini. Sebagai lembaga negara independen yang kedudukannya tidak sekuat lembaga negara utama dalam ranah kekuasaan eksekutif, legislatif, dan yudikatif tentu saja KPK bisa dibubarkan jika lembaga yang selama ini sebetulnya mempunyai wewenang kuat untuk melaksanakan penegakan hukum dalam rangka pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi (Kepolisian dan Kejaksaan) mampu berbenah diri. Selama belum mampu berbenah maka wewenang tersebut bisa dilaksanakan oleh KPK yang keberadaannya sampai saat ini masih tetap diperlukan dalam rangka pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi di Indonesia. Kata kunci: Kedudukan KPK, Sistem Ketatanegaraan, Indonesia Abstract The position of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the constitutional system of Indonesia is often debated. This is evidenced by the inconsistent decisions of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has ever made different decisions several times regarding the position of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the constitutional system of Indonesia. The Constitutional Court once decided that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was an independent state institution outside the realm of executive, legislative and judicial powers. It has also decided that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is an executive body in terms of its authority. These inconsistent decisions of the Constitutional Court, of course, have an influence on the law of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The latest revision of the law of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), namely the Law Number 19 of 2019 states that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is classified to be in the realm of executive power so that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) can become the object of the right to inquiry by the House of Representatives (DPR). This situation, of course, adds to the length of debate among legal experts with their respective arguments. Based on these arguments, the writer considers that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is an independent state institution outside the main state organ structure. This is in line with the theory of the new separation of power as a consequence of the theory of the welfare state in this modern era. As an independent state institution whose position is not as strong as the main state institutions in the realm of executive, legislative and judicial powers, of course, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) can be dissolved if the institutions that actually have strong authority to carry out law enforcement in the context of eradicating criminal acts of corruption (Police and Prosecutors) are able to empower themselves to execute their authority. However, if those institutions have not been able to execute their authority, this authority can be exercised by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), whose existence is still needed in the context of eradicating criminal acts of corruption in Indonesia.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document