scholarly journals ANALISIS YURIDIS CABANG PEMERINTAHAN KEEMPAT DALAM STRUKTUR KETATANEGARAAN DI INDONESIA

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Tri Suhendra Arbani
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
State System ◽  
Modern State ◽  
Independent State ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Government Functions ◽  
State Commission ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
State Body

AbstractThe development of the modern state system is also followed by the establishment of new institutions as a support of the institutions that have been there before. The most significant event in the development and establishment of institutions is the new power branch, which is called by the experts in constitutional as an independent state commission. Independent state commission institution which, if seen from the character and the authority, the agency in some literature in American constitutional law is referred to as the fourth branch of power (The Fourth Branch of Government). Some things that make this institution called the fourth branch of government (The Fourth Branch of Government) is the fact that the agency, or commission or the state body run more than one function of government as well. The existence of a fourth branch of government (The Fourth Branch of Government) with the characteristics of state institutions whose authorities are quasi, combinations, as well as the accumulation of three existing government functions and make this institution to be difficult to identify in thought Trias Politica. The phenomenon of the rise of an institution with a new concept that has influenced the constitutional system in many countries.AbstrakPerkembangan sistem ketatanegaaran modern dikuti pula dengan terbentuknya lembaga-lembaga baru sebagai penunjang dari lembaga yang telah ada sebelumnya. Hal yang paling signifikan dalam perkembangan dan pembentukan institusi domokratis tersebut tidak lain adalah cabang kekuasaan baru yang biasa disebut oleh kalangan ahli tata negara sebagai komisi negara independen.  Lembaga komisi negara independen yang jika dilihat dari sifat dan kewengannya, lembaga tersebut dalam beberapa literatur hukum tata negara di Amerika disebut sebagai cabang kekuasaan keempat (The Fourth Branch of Goverment). Beberapa hal yang membuat lembaga negara ini disebut sebagai cabang pemerintahan keempat (The Fourth Branch of Government) adalah fakta bahwa lembaga, atau komisi atau badan negara tersebut menjalankan lebih dari satu bahkan ketiga fungsi pemerintahan sekaligus. Eksistensi cabang pemerintahan keempat (The Fourth Branch of Government) dengan karakteristik lembaga negara yang kewenangannya yang bersifat kuasi, kombinasi, maupun akumulasi dari tiga fungsi pemerintahan yang ada dan menjadikan lembaga ini untuk sulit diidentifikasi dalam pemikiran Trias Politica. Fenomena munculnya sebuah lembaga dengan konsep baru tersebut telah ikut mempengaruhi sistem ketatanegaraan dibanyak negara.

scholarly journals Constitutional amendment in Laos

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 756-786
Author(s):  
Ngoc Son Bui
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Constitutional System

Abstract Laos, a socialist state in Southeast Asia, adopted an amended Constitution in 2015. This article investigates and explains this experience from the perspective of comparative constitutional amendment, supported by a qualitative empirical methodology: extensive formal interviews with several local constitutional amenders and informal conversations with a local lawyer and several legal scholars. It argues that Laos has introduced progressive constitutional amendments—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of its socialist constitutional system which in turn will promote the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of local people.

scholarly journals PERAN KOMISI YUDISIAL DALAM SISTEM KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ujang Bahar
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
State Institution ◽  
Independent State ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Audit ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Selection Of

The Judicial Commission (JC) is a new independent state institution established as a product of the reform in the constitutional system and its existence is confirmed in the 1945 Constitution. The Judicial Commission was established following the idea of a one-roof system in the judicial authority. Among the roles and authority of the Judicial Commission are to propose appointment of the Supreme Court justices to the House of Representatives (DPR) and to supervise the conducts of justices/judges in order to maintain their respect, dignity and honor and good conduct.  However, in the performance of its duties, the Judicial Commission is not yet as independent as it has been expected. It can be seen from its limited authority. In supervising the conduct of the judges/justices, the Commission is not authorized to impose any sanctions and in the process of selection of candidates for the Supreme Court justices, its authority is limited only at the ratio 3:1. Therefore, the existence of the Commission under the 1945 Constitution becomes unclear, since it is placed under the chapter of the judicial authority, but in reality it does not exercise its judicial authority and only functions as a supervisory agency like the State Audit Board (BPK) instead. Consequently, the Commission only serves as the supporting institution to the Supreme Court, President and the House of Representatives. In order that the Commission becomes truly independent as an institution which supervises the implementation of the judicial power sitting at an equal level with other state institutions, it is necessary to strengthen the institution by making amendments (to re-determine the position of the Judicial Commission) in the 1945 Constitution and other relevant laws and regulations.

scholarly journals Perluasan Kewenangan Pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Berdasarkan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945

2020 ◽  
pp. 31-53
Author(s):  
Hananto Widodo
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Independent State ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Government Functions ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Election Commission

In general, there are at least 3 functions of the people's representative body. First, the function of legislation. Second, the supervisory function. Third, the budget function. This type of research used in this study is normative research. By using a statutory, conceptual and historical approach. The authority of the DPR's oversight before and after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution does not only lie in the regulation, where before the change is stipulated in the explanation and after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution is regulated in the Articles of the Constitution, but there is an expansion of the intended subject. In the 1945 Constitution prior to the amendment, the supervision of the House of Representatives was only addressed to the President whereas after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution the supervision of the House of Representatives was not only addressed to the President, but to all agencies or officials who carried out Government functions. The authority of the House of Representatives in conducting oversight becomes wider after the issuance of the Constitutional Court ruling No. 36 / PUU-XV / 2017, because independent state institutions, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission and the Election Commission can be subject to oversight by the House of Representatives.

scholarly journals Kajian Yuridis Hak Angket Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Terhadap Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Dikaji dari Perspektif Hukum Tata Negara)

Acta Comitas ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 142
Author(s):  
I Gusti Ngurah Adityanatha
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Independent State ◽  
State Commission ◽  
State Administration ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Right ◽  
National Police

The House of Representatives as a legislative commission has the privilege of being a right of inquiry in order to run a system of government that is check and balances. With regard to the right of inquiry The House of Representatives to The Corruption Eradication Commission, it is feared to be used as a means to influence and interfere with The Corruption Eradication Commission, even weaken the role of The Corruption Eradication Commission as an independent institution free from any influence of power. Regarding the formulation of the problem in this scientific research is, how the position of The Corruption Eradication Commission in the constitutional system in Indonesia as an independent institution? and whether The House of Representatives may use the right of inquiry to The Corruption Eradication Commission? The type of research used in this scientific research is normative legal research. The Corruption Eradication Commission is an independent state commission in Indonesia that is outside the realm of the three original powers of executive, legislative, and judicial (trias potilica) in the state administration system in Indonesia, so that The Corruption Eradication Commission can not be subject to the right of inquiry by The House of Representatives. It is also reinforced by the subject of a limited questionnaire on the implementation of a law and / or government policy carried out solely by The President, Vice President, State Minister, Commander of the Indonesian National Army, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police, the Attorney General, or the non-ministerial government agencies. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat sebagai lembaga legislatif memiliki hak istimewa yakni hak angket dalam rangka menjalankan sistem pemerintahan yang bersifat check and balances. Terkait dengan hak angket terhadap Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, dikhawatirkan digunakan sebagai sarana untuk mempengaruhi dan mengintervensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, bahkan dapat melemahkan peran Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi sebagai lembaga independen dan bebas dari pengaruh kekuasaan manapun. Mengenai rumusan masalah dalam karya ilmiah ini yaitu, bagaimanakah kedudukan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dalam sistem ketatanegaraan di Indonesia sebagai lembaga independen? dan apakah Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat dapat menggunakan hak angket terhadap Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi? Jenis penelitian yang digunakan pada karya ilmiah ini adalah penelitian hukum normatif. Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi merupakan komisi negara independen di Indonesia yang berada di luar ranah tiga poros kekuasaan asli yaitu eksekutif, legislatif, dan yudisial (trias potilica) dalam sistem ketatanegaraan di Indonesia, sehingga Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi tidak dapat dijadikan subjek dari hak angket oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Hal tersebut juga diperkuat dengan subjek dari hak angket yang terbatas pada pelaksanaan suatu undang-undang dan/atau kebijakan pemerintah yang dilaksanakan sendiri oleh Presiden, Wakil Presiden, Menteri Negara, Panglima Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Jaksa Agung, atau pimpinan lembaga pemerintah non-kementerian.

scholarly journals THE POLITICS OF LAW CONCERNING THE TENURE OF VILLAGE HEAD REVIEWED FROM THE CONSTITUALISM PERSPECTIVE

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-42
Author(s):  
Achmad Hariri
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Modern State ◽  
Abuse Of Power ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
State Constitution ◽  
Village Government ◽  
Executive Position ◽  
The Village ◽  
Law Making

The politics of law is an instrument of law-making to achieve legal objectives, and the objectives of the law-making must be in line with the constitutional norms. The constitution is a foundation rule for law-making (the politics of law), and in its development, the modern state constitution must be constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is an idea that the constitution must limit the power to hinder the abuse due to unrestricted power. The politics of constitutional law can be seen in the first amendment, namely, Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution: the tenure of a president is five years and limited to two periods, the 1945 constitution is, therefore, constitutionalism. The power limitation of high state institutions is constitutional, but in Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages, some norms are contrary to the constitution: Article 39 related to the tenure of the village head. The tenure of village head in this article is relatively longer than the executive position in supra-village government, that is six years and can be re-elected for three periods, meaning that the village head can occupy the position for a maximum of 18 years. This tenure is eight years longer than the tenure of the president, governor, regent and mayor, thus, it is likely for the village head to conduct the "abuse of power" and the tenure is against the constitutionalism. Abstrak: Politik hukum merupakan instrumen pembuatan hukum untuk mencapai tujuan hukum, adapun tujuan pembentukan hukum harus sejalan dengan norma Konstitusi. Konstitusi itu merupakan aturan dasar yang menjadi sumber pembentukan hukum (politik Hukum), dalam perkembangannya kemudian konstitusi negara modern itu harus konstitusionalisme, paham konstitusionalisme adalah suatu paham dimana konstitusi harus membatsasi kekuasaan, kekuasaan harus dibatasi untuk menjauhi dari tindakan penyelewengan akibat tidak dibatasinya kekuasaan, dalam politik hukum konstitusi dapat dilihat pada amandemen ke satu yaitu pasal 7 UUD 1945, masa jabatan presiden 5 tahun dan dibatasi dua periode, oleh sebab itu konstitusi UUD 1945 konstitusionalisme. Pembatasan kekuasaan lembaga tinggi negara sudah konstitusional, namun dalam UU No. 6 Tahun 2014 tentang Desa ada norma yang bertentangan dengan konstitusi yaitu pada pasal 39 terkait masa jabatan kepala Desa. Dalam pasal tersebut massa jabatan kepala desa relatif lebih lama dibandingkan dengan jabatan eksekutif di pemerintahan supra desa, yaitu 6 tahun dan dapat dipilih lagi sampai tiga periode, artinya kepala desa dapat menduduki sebagai orang nomor satu di desa sampai dengan delapan belas (18) tahun. Masa jabatan ini relatif lebih lama delapan tahun dibanding jabatan presiden, gubernur, bupati dan wali kota, sehingga kepala desa akan dimungkinkan dapat menyelewengkan kewenangan “abuse of power’ dan masa jabatan tersebut bertentangan dengan konstitusionalisme. Kata Kunci: Politik Hukum, Massa Jabatan Kepala Desa, Konstitusionalisme

scholarly journals KEDUDUKAN KOMISI PEMBERANTASAN KORUPSI DALAM SISTEM KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Mahesa Rannie
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
State Institution ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Independent State ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Right

Abstrak Kedudukan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia memang seringkali diperdebatkan, hal ini terbukti dengan Putusan-Putusan MK yang berubah-ubah. Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam putusannya pernah beberapa kali memutuskan berbeda tentang kedudukan KPK ini dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia. Mahkamah Konstitusi pernah memutuskan KPK merupakan lembaga negara independen di luar ranah kekuasaan eksekutif, legislatif, dan yudikatif. Pernah pula memutuskan bahwa KPK merupakan eksekutif dilihat dari kewenangannya. Putusan-putusan MK ini tentu saja membawa pengaruh terhadap undang-undang KPK. Revisi undang-undang KPK terbaru, yaitu Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 menyatakan KPK masuk dalam ranah kekuasaan eksekutif sehingga dengan demikian KPK dapat menjadi objek hak angket Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). Hal demikian tentu saja menambah panjang perdebatan di kalangan ahli hukum dengan argumentasinya masing-masing. Dari argumentasi-argumentasi tersebut penulis menganggap KPK adalah lembaga negara independen di luar struktur organ negara yang utama. Hal ini sejalan dengan theory the new separation of power sebagai konsekuensi dari teori negara kesejahteraan (welfare state) di era abad modern ini. Sebagai lembaga negara independen yang kedudukannya tidak sekuat lembaga negara utama dalam ranah kekuasaan eksekutif, legislatif, dan yudikatif tentu saja KPK bisa dibubarkan jika lembaga yang selama ini sebetulnya mempunyai wewenang kuat untuk melaksanakan penegakan hukum dalam rangka pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi (Kepolisian dan Kejaksaan) mampu berbenah diri. Selama belum mampu berbenah maka wewenang tersebut bisa dilaksanakan oleh KPK yang keberadaannya sampai saat ini masih tetap diperlukan dalam rangka pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi di Indonesia. Kata kunci: Kedudukan KPK, Sistem Ketatanegaraan, Indonesia Abstract The position of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the constitutional system of Indonesia is often debated. This is evidenced by the inconsistent decisions of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has ever made different decisions several times regarding the position of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the constitutional system of Indonesia. The Constitutional Court once decided that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was an independent state institution outside the realm of executive, legislative and judicial powers. It has also decided that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is an executive body in terms of its authority. These inconsistent decisions of the Constitutional Court, of course, have an influence on the law of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The latest revision of the law of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), namely the Law Number 19 of 2019 states that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is classified to be in the realm of executive power so that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) can become the object of the right to inquiry by the House of Representatives (DPR). This situation, of course, adds to the length of debate among legal experts with their respective arguments. Based on these arguments, the writer considers that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is an independent state institution outside the main state organ structure. This is in line with the theory of the new separation of power as a consequence of the theory of the welfare state in this modern era. As an independent state institution whose position is not as strong as the main state institutions in the realm of executive, legislative and judicial powers, of course, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) can be dissolved if the institutions that actually have strong authority to carry out law enforcement in the context of eradicating criminal acts of corruption (Police and Prosecutors) are able to empower themselves to execute their authority. However, if those institutions have not been able to execute their authority, this authority can be exercised by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), whose existence is still needed in the context of eradicating criminal acts of corruption in Indonesia.

The Integration Model

2020 ◽  
pp. 209-243
Author(s):  
Ngoc Son Bui
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Integration Model ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Constitutional System

On December 8, 2015, the National Assembly of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) (or Laos) approved a new Constitution, replacing the 2003 one. This chapter focuses on that constitutional replacement through amendment. It demonstrates that Laos introduces progressive constitutional change—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of the socialist constitutional system which in turn promotes the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of the Lao multi-ethnic people. The adherence to the integration of the Lao multi-ethnic people legitimatizes the process and substance of constitutional change in this country. The Lao story, therefore, indicates the integration model of socialist constitutional change.

O potrzebie wprowadzenia ustawy referendalnej do systemu prawnego w Polsce

2021 ◽  
Vol 1(162) ◽  
pp. 127-145
Author(s):  
Piotr Uziębło
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Constitutional System

The problems raised in the doctrine of constitutional law related to the implementation of a decision taken in a referendum in matters of particular importance to the state, as well as the generally marginal use of the institution of popular vote in the constitutional prac-tice, give rise to reflection on the introduction of the institution of a referendum law into the Polish constitutional system. In this article the author considers the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution, analyzing at the same time contemporary normative regulations concerning such acts in other countries. The research leads to the conclusion that despite the risks involved, the refer-endum law should appear in the Polish constitutional system in the future, as it would not only give a chance for a more complete reflection of the will of the collective subject of sovereignty without the necessity of its decoding by the parliament, but it could also be an impulse for the development of the referendum practice in the Republic of Poland. However, it is important to introduce proce-dural barriers that will prevent depreciation of this institution.

Opposition weakness will help Polish ruling coalition

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Independent State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Party Control ◽  
State Of The Economy ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law And Justice

Significance At the beginning of 2021, the ZP coalition of the Law and Justice (PiS), Accord and United Poland (SP) parties is stable, but not as strong as it has been in previous years. This weakening in the PiS-led government’s condition is due to many factors, among which the coronavirus pandemic is one of the most important. Impacts The process will continue of subordinating any independent state institutions still left to party control. PiS will take further, similar steps regarding the media, academia and NGOs. After months of pandemic lockdown, the state of the economy is stable if not ideal, and will not lead to early elections.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document