Arnold Bennett
Virginia Woolf’s accusation that ‘Life escapes’ from the aesthetic horizons of Bennett’s fiction has long haunted his critical reception. Chapter 3 therefore turns to the function of description within realism, arguing that Bennett does not conceptually prioritize either the particulars, as Woolf argued, or the aggregated scene, as in Barthes’s ‘reality effect’, where the specificities of detail are secondary to its ideological function. The solid superficies for which Bennett has become infamous never constitute individual atoms of meaning, for he insists on both the particularity of a given scene and its transient coherence as a totality. This stereoptic effect mobilizes a searching scepticism as to reality’s appearances, which makes Bennett aim at what is at once both a more abstract and a more concrete notion of truth, one whose material manifestations carry with it the mark of its relation to a whole range of universal truths of which it is part. In this, Bennett acknowledges a debt to the ‘synthetic philosophy’ of Herbert Spencer. By examining more closely the influence of Spencer’s metaphysics on Bennett’s realist aesthetics, and focusing on Bennett’s novels together with his numerous critical writings, this chapter gives long-overdue attention to an often neglected figure in modern British literature.