What’s Wrong with (Some) Judges? Carter and the Invention of a Right to ‘Physician-Assisted Dying’

2020 ◽  
pp. 268-308
Author(s):  
Nigel Biggar

This chapter argues that, in addition to rights-fundamentalism, another problem lies in the ‘progressive’ zeal, which moves some judges to exploit the room for creativity granted by abstract concepts, in order to invent novel rights. This, too, is imprudent in having courts, rather than elected legislatures, decide ethical issues that are politically controversial. The argument develops through an examination of Carter v. Canada, the 2015 judgement of Canada’s Supreme Court, which decided that an absolute prohibition of ‘physician-assisted dying’ violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The chapter concludes that Carter shows that charters that include unspecified rights generate several problems: they give judges no determinate guidance in deciding cases; they purport to exist before their limits have been set in relation to competing rights, whereas a right’s existence cannot be known until competing claims have been considered; and they afford judges vast room for the exercise of philosophical discretion, in which they lack professional expertise or authority. In addition, there are also problems with the views of the interpretation of rights: that judges have privileged insight into what ‘real rights’ are; and that they are not simply interpreters but developers of law, responsible for keeping it abreast of ‘progressive’ social mores. These views incline judges to overlook the natural myopia of their case-focused attention, the limitations of courts in achieving a comprehensive view of social facts, judges’ lack of accountability for the policy effects of their decisions, and their relative immunity from direct challenge by diverse viewpoints.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliet Guichon ◽  
Farah Mohamed ◽  
Kim Clarke ◽  
Ian Mitchell

In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada legalized physicianassisted dying. Responding to this decision, Parliament passed Bill C-14, which provides that adults who suffer intolerably from a terminal medical condition may seek assistance to end their lives. Notably, the legislation does not grant access to mature minors. This article considers whether access should be granted, examining the Canadian assisted dying framework, situations of minors who might seek assisted dying, the law concerning mature minor consent to medical treatment, and other jurisdictions that grant access to mature minors. It argues that the ethical principles of autonomy and beneficence that underlie the Carter decision should be used to determine whether mature minors should have access to physician-assisted dying.


Author(s):  
Nerida Bullock

AbstractThis paper explores the thorny mingling of law with qualitative social science methodologies through the lens of the 2010–11 Supreme Court of British Columbia Charter Reference on polygamy, which was conducted to determine whether the criminalization of polygamy was consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Reference reveals how the marginalization of qualitative research(ers) effectively controlled whose voices were to be heard and whose were to be silenced in the broader project of sovereign intervention into family formation. With specific focus on Professor Angela Campbell, who provided expert opinion testimony in the Reference, this paper reflects on two important questions: when social science is invoked in legal settings, whose knowledge is legitimized, and who benefits from this legitimization? Drawing upon the longstanding feminist project of deconstructing assumptions of value-neutrality in all science, this paper considers how qualitative, feminist research(ers) may be inherently at odds with law’s quest for (rational) “truth.”


2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 409-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Brannan ◽  
Ruth Campbell ◽  
Martin Davies ◽  
Veronica English ◽  
Rebecca Mussell ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110321
Author(s):  
Kayla S. Canelo

Scholars have sought to understand the dual characterization of Supreme Court justices as both legal and political actors. One way to further uncover this complexity is to assess how the justices engage with the interest groups that file amicus curiae or “friend-of-the-Court” briefs. Scholars have revealed that the justices often “borrow language” from these briefs in their opinions. However, much less often, they cite the amici. These two uses are distinct in that one is revealed to the reader while the other is not. So which interest groups do the justices decide to cite and which do they borrow language from? I find the justices borrow more language from ideologically similar interests, but that ideology plays a less central role in the decision to cite. Specifically, I find that the justices are less likely to cite briefs filed by ideologically overt interests, but this only extends to the most ideologically “extreme” groups. Further, the justices are not more likely to cite briefs filed by interests that are ideologically similar to their own preferences. These findings provide insight into how the justices balance policy and legitimacy goals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-84
Author(s):  
Joshua Sealy-Harrington

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.”2 Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics. 1 s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].


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