scholarly journals The Alchemy of Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-84
Author(s):  
Joshua Sealy-Harrington
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Precise Definition ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Test ◽  
Elusive Concept

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.”2 Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics. 1 s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].

scholarly journals Comment on Fraser v Canada (AG): The More Things Change

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-96
Author(s):  
Richard Moon
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Academic Career ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

Very early in my academic career I wrote two pieces about section 15.1 The first was written in 1987, before the Supreme Court of Canada had heard any section 15 cases,2 and the second in 1989 was a comment on Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, the first of the Court’s section 15 decisions.3 When I re-read these pieces recently it struck me that with a few minor updates they could be read as comments on the Court’s recent decision in Fraser v Canada(Attorney General). 4 The same issues and tensions that were there at the beginning of section 15 are still there. They are built into the concept of constructive/effects discrimination and are not about to disappear. Shamelessly, I have reconstituted these two earlier pieces into a comment, of sorts, on the Fraser case. Other contributors in this special issue of the Constitutional Forum have set out the facts of the Fraser case and so I have not done so here. 1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Richard Moon, “Discrimination and Its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights under the Charter” (1988) 26:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 673.3 Richard Moon, “A Discrete and Insular Right to Equality: Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia”(1989) 21:3 Ottawa L Rev 563.4 2020 SCC 28 [Fraser].

scholarly journals Interpretation of Equality of Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Practice of the Canadian Supreme Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Tatyana A. Vasilyeva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

The Canadian system of human rights protection is an original one. The Supreme Court of Canada is one of the most influential constitutional review bodies in the field of human rights. At the time of its adoption, the Canadian Charter of rights and freedoms had the broadest catalog of equality rights in Western countries, formed on the basis of the Bill of rights and provincial human rights codes case-law, as well as the activities of political movements and groups of equality advocates who played a decisive role in its drafting. In Canada, a distinction is made between the enumerated in Charter and analogous grounds of discrimination established by court. The plaintiffs may claim differences on the basis of the enumerated or analogous grounds, or indicate the necessity to establish new analogous grounds. Article 15 (the right to equality) is recognized as one of the most conceptually complex provisions of the Charter. It is aimed at ensuring equality in the process of law drafting and implementation, as well as protecting human dignity. The Supreme Court of Canada is considering the provisions of the first part 1 of article 15, which enshrines the right to equality, and part 2 of this article, which provides for affirmative actions to assist disadvantaged groups as interrelated, reflecting the understanding of equality according to which affirmative actions are considered not as an exception, but as one of its best manifestations.

scholarly journals Intersections and Roads Untravelled: Sex and Family Status in Fraser v Canada

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Jennifer Koshan
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Sex Discrimination ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Family Status ◽  
Pay Equity ◽  
Employment Benefits ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

It has been a long road to the judicial recognition of women’s inequality under the Cana‑ dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 The Supreme Court of Canada ruling in Fraser v Can‑ ada is significant for being the first decision where a majority of the Court found adverse effects discrimination based on sex under section 15,2 and it was only two years prior that a claim of sex discrimination in favour of women was finally successful at the Court,3 almost 30 years after their first section 15 decision in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia. 4 1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter], s 15. 2 Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 [Fraser]. 3 Quebec (Attorney General) v Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux,  2018 SCC 17 [Alliance] (majority found sex discrimination under s 15 and rejected the government’s justification argument under s 1 in the pay equity context). See also Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 18 [Centrale] (majority found violation of s 15 but accepted the government’s s 1 argument, also in the pay equity context). For comments on these decisions see Fay Faraday, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Substantive Equality, Systemic Discrimination and Pay Equity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2020) 94 SCLR (2d) 301; Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Equality Rights and Pay Equity: Déjà Vu in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2019) 15 JL & Equality 1. See also British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association, 2014 SCC 70 (a one-paragraph decision restoring an arbitrator’s award allowing a s 15 employment benefits claim by women); Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 SCC 66 (finding a violation of s 15 but accepting the government’s s 1 argument, again in the pay equity context).4 [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1.

scholarly journals COLONIAL LEGACIES AND COMPETING MASCULINITIES: THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S RETURN TO REASON IN R. V. KAPP

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Hodes
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Gender Dynamics ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Colonial Legacies ◽  
Legal Test ◽  
Legal Strategies

This article examines a series of unarticulated gender dynamics that shaped some of the recent changes to the legal test for discrimination under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Despite the volume of literature that references R. v. Kapp, none of it has specifically addressed how race is gendered through the claims of the accused, the witnesses who testified on their behalf or the decisions of the judges who interpreted their testimony. Revisiting the legal strategies used in this case reveals ongoing challenges to accessing justice for marginalized groups and impediments to reconciliation.

Pesky Polygamist Women: The Marginalization of Qualitative Data in British Columbia’s Charter Reference on Polygamy

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Nerida Bullock
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
British Columbia ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Opinion ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Family Formation ◽  
Feminist Research ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Value Neutrality

AbstractThis paper explores the thorny mingling of law with qualitative social science methodologies through the lens of the 2010–11 Supreme Court of British Columbia Charter Reference on polygamy, which was conducted to determine whether the criminalization of polygamy was consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Reference reveals how the marginalization of qualitative research(ers) effectively controlled whose voices were to be heard and whose were to be silenced in the broader project of sovereign intervention into family formation. With specific focus on Professor Angela Campbell, who provided expert opinion testimony in the Reference, this paper reflects on two important questions: when social science is invoked in legal settings, whose knowledge is legitimized, and who benefits from this legitimization? Drawing upon the longstanding feminist project of deconstructing assumptions of value-neutrality in all science, this paper considers how qualitative, feminist research(ers) may be inherently at odds with law’s quest for (rational) “truth.”

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

scholarly journals Was the Supreme Court right to change the law on the right to a speedy trial?

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reasonable Time ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.

scholarly journals Settling the Fisheries: Pre-Confederation Crown Policy in Upper Canada and the Supreme Court's decisions in R. v. NIKAL and LEWIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-172
Author(s):  
Peggy J. Blair
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Upper Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Although a casual reading of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Nikal and R. v. Lewis might suggest otherwise, this article will argue that Court's decisions in two recent British Columbia aboriginal fishing cases do not apply in Ontario. In doing so, it will be shown that the Supreme Court of Canada relied on evidence of historic Crown policies towards aboriginal fishing rights in Upper Canada in the absence of appropriate context as to when, how and why those policies evolved. As a result, the Court wrongly concluded that fisheries could not be the subject of exclusive aboriginal rights.

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