scholarly journals Autonomy and Beneficence in Assisted Dying in Canada: The Eligibility of Mature Minors

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliet Guichon ◽  
Farah Mohamed ◽  
Kim Clarke ◽  
Ian Mitchell

In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada legalized physicianassisted dying. Responding to this decision, Parliament passed Bill C-14, which provides that adults who suffer intolerably from a terminal medical condition may seek assistance to end their lives. Notably, the legislation does not grant access to mature minors. This article considers whether access should be granted, examining the Canadian assisted dying framework, situations of minors who might seek assisted dying, the law concerning mature minor consent to medical treatment, and other jurisdictions that grant access to mature minors. It argues that the ethical principles of autonomy and beneficence that underlie the Carter decision should be used to determine whether mature minors should have access to physician-assisted dying.

ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.


Federalism-E ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-65
Author(s):  
Joshua Nahmias

This article explores the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its role in altering two core concepts of Canadian democracy: parliamentary sovereignty and federalism. The author argues that the Charter has undermined these concepts through the empowerment of Canada's judiciary, namely the Supreme Court of Canada. The article explores ways in which the powers of parliament have been superseded by the courts, specifically through the establishment of "charter proofing," parliament's loss of power over the "public purse," and the erosion of the provinces' policy autonomy. Ultimately, the article seeks to demonstrate that the Charter has "legalized" Canadian politics to the extent that the judiciary unwieldy an unacceptable amount of power in Canada's political environment. Cases explored in the essay include Morgentaler v. the Queen (1988), Schachter v. Canada (1992), and Attorney-General of Québec v. Association of Québec Protestant School Boards (1984).


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2006
Author(s):  
Sanjeev Anand

The topic of judicial activism in Canada generates considerable disagreement. At a recent conference, retired Supreme Court of Canada Justice John Major stated that “there is no such thing as judicial activism in Canada.”1 In 2001, speaking in his capacity as the Canadian Alliance’s Justice critic, the current federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Vic Toews, told Parliament that the Supreme Court has “engaged in a frenzy of constitutional experimentation that resulted in the judiciary substituting its legal and societal preferences for those made by the elected representatives of the people . . . [producing] legal and constitutional anarchy.”2 One prominent constitutional scholar fears that the debate on judicial activism in Canada has begun to produce excessive judicial deference that allows legislatures and officials to act without scrutiny by the judiciary concerning the effects of state action on vulnerable minorities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman ◽  
Cory Steele

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada has shifted away from transcendent/religious to nonreligious conceptualizations of assisted dying. Design/methodology/approach A discourse analysis of a Supreme Court of Canada case on assisted dying and the facta of the 26 associated interveners. Findings The research points to a shift away from religious to nonreligious understandings in the way the Court conceptualizes suffering, pain, illness and assisted dying. Originality/value This paper contributes to the understanding of nonreligion as a social phenomenon.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Ryan Beaton

This paper offers a short story of Crown sovereignty at the Supreme Court Canada in order to shed light on questions the Court has raised about the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty over territory claimed by First Nations. In skeletal form, the story is simple. The Crown — first Imperial British and later Canadian federal and provincial — asserted sovereignty over what is now Canadian territory, and Canadian courts (and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) accepted those assertions without question. Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has lately qualified Crown sovereignty in striking ways, perhaps most notably in speaking of “de facto Crown sovereignty” in reasons released in 2004.The purpose behind this qualification, in line with the Court’s Aboriginal rights and title cases since Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), seems to be to encourage the Crown to negotiate modern treaties and settle outstandingAboriginal rights and title claims in order to perfect or legitimate Crown sovereignty. As Crown negotiations with First Nations stalled, however, the Court proceeded to develop its own framework for the procedural legitimation of Crown sovereignty, i.e. a framework of procedural safeguards designed to weed out “bad” exercises of Crown sovereignty from legitimate ones.


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Palmer

IN a groundbreaking decision, the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 5 has declared the criminal law measures prohibiting the provision of assistance in dying unconstitutional. In doing so, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled its previous decision (Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519) upholding the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-96
Author(s):  
Richard Moon

Very early in my academic career I wrote two pieces about section 15.1 The first was written in 1987, before the Supreme Court of Canada had heard any section 15 cases,2 and the second in 1989 was a comment on Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, the first of the Court’s section 15 decisions.3 When I re-read these pieces recently it struck me that with a few minor updates they could be read as comments on the Court’s recent decision in Fraser v Canada(Attorney General). 4 The same issues and tensions that were there at the beginning of section 15 are still there. They are built into the concept of constructive/effects discrimination and are not about to disappear. Shamelessly, I have reconstituted these two earlier pieces into a comment, of sorts, on the Fraser case. Other contributors in this special issue of the Constitutional Forum have set out the facts of the Fraser case and so I have not done so here. 1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Richard Moon, “Discrimination and Its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights under the Charter” (1988) 26:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 673.3 Richard Moon, “A Discrete and Insular Right to Equality: Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia”(1989) 21:3 Ottawa L Rev 563.4 2020 SCC 28 [Fraser].


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Jennifer Koshan

It has been a long road to the judicial recognition of women’s inequality under the Cana‑ dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 The Supreme Court of Canada ruling in Fraser v Can‑ ada is significant for being the first decision where a majority of the Court found adverse effects discrimination based on sex under section 15,2 and it was only two years prior that a claim of sex discrimination in favour of women was finally successful at the Court,3 almost 30 years after their first section 15 decision in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia. 4 1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter], s 15. 2 Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 [Fraser]. 3 Quebec (Attorney General) v Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux,  2018 SCC 17 [Alliance] (majority found sex discrimination under s 15 and rejected the government’s justification argument under s 1 in the pay equity context). See also Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 18 [Centrale] (majority found violation of s 15 but accepted the government’s s 1 argument, also in the pay equity context). For comments on these decisions see Fay Faraday, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Substantive Equality, Systemic Discrimination and Pay Equity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2020) 94 SCLR (2d) 301; Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Equality Rights and Pay Equity: Déjà Vu in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2019) 15 JL & Equality 1. See also British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association, 2014 SCC 70 (a one-paragraph decision restoring an arbitrator’s award allowing a s 15 employment benefits claim by women); Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 SCC 66 (finding a violation of s 15 but accepting the government’s s 1 argument, again in the pay equity context).4 [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1.


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