The Place of Expert Intuition in Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 184-207
Author(s):  
Elijah Chudnoff

The Standard Picture of philosophical methodology includes the following claims: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind; (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology; (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken as given inputs into generally accepted forms of reasoning; (D) Philosophical methodology is reasonable. Negative experimental philosophers accept claims (A), (B), and (C), but challenge (D). This chapter develops a variant on the expertise defense of traditional philosophy. The defense hinges on denying (C) in the Standard Picture: philosophers do not treat their intuitions as data; they treat their intuitions as observations that can be improved through reasoning. The chapter explores both historical antecedents in the rationalist tradition, and descriptive accuracy with respect to current practice.

2020 ◽  
pp. 159-183
Author(s):  
Elijah Chudnoff

The Standard Picture of philosophical methodology includes the following claims: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind; (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology; (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken as given inputs into generally accepted forms of reasoning; (D) Philosophical methodology is reasonable. Work in negative experimental philosophy has motivated some to question the descriptive accuracy of the Standard Picture. Some philosophers such as Timothy Williamson challenge (A) on the grounds that philosophy cannot be distinguished by its reliance on a distinctive epistemic source. Other philosophers such as Herman Cappelen and Max Deutsch challenge (B) on the grounds that philosophers do not treat intuitions as evidence. This chapter defends (A) and (B) in the Standard Picture against these challenges.


Author(s):  
Scott Soames

Early analytic philosophical methodology was dominated by two paradigms. The first, arising from the logicism of Frege and Russell, held that linguistic and logical analyses are tools for answering traditional philosophical questions—for example, What are numbers, material objects, and other minds? and How do we know about them? The answers were that these things are whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them. For Russell, this inspired a conception of logical analysis that led to revisionary metaphysical minimalism in the service of an unexamined conception of knowledge. The second paradigm, stemming from Wittgenstein and Carnap, was based on philosophical theories of the limits of meaningful discourse that excluded most traditional philosophy. G. E. Moore, whose starting point was common-sense knowledge, offered a partial corrective to both paradigms. The era’s most important achievements were the foundations it laid for genuine sciences of language, logic, and information.


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Zajac

Abstract The purpose of this opinion article is to review the impact of the principles and technology of speech science on clinical practice in the area of craniofacial disorders. Current practice relative to (a) speech aerodynamic assessment, (b) computer-assisted single-word speech intelligibility testing, and (c) behavioral management of hypernasal resonance are reviewed. Future directions and/or refinement of each area are also identified. It is suggested that both challenging and rewarding times are in store for clinical researchers in craniofacial disorders.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
James C. Blair

The concept of client-centered therapy (Rogers, 1951) has influenced many professions to refocus their treatment of clients from assessment outcomes to the person who uses the information from this assessment. The term adopted for use in the professions of Communication Sciences and Disorders and encouraged by The American Speech-Language-Hearing Association (ASHA) is patient-centered care, with the goal of helping professions, like audiology, focus more centrally on the patient. The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the principles used in a patient-centered therapy approach first described by de Shazer (1985) named Solution-Focused Therapy and how these principles might apply to the practice of audiology. The basic assumption behind this model is that people are the agents of change and the professional is there to help guide and enable clients to make the change the client wants to make. This model then is focused on solutions, not on the problems. It is postulated that by using the assumptions in this model audiologists will be more effective in a shorter time than current practice may allow.


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