Fair Play and Its Rivals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Political Obligations

Proponents of the fair-play theory of political obligation face challenges not only from those who reject or discount the possibility of political obligations, such as philosophical anarchists, but also from the advocates of competing theories of political obligation. This chapter supports the case for fair-play theory by demonstrating its superiority to its three principal rivals among such theories. Those three rival theories are grounded in either consent, association, or natural duty. All three have their attractions, but they are also vulnerable to serious objections. Their attractions, moreover, often derive from an implicit reliance on considerations of fair play.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Justification Of Punishment ◽  
Sustained Effort

This book aims to develop a unified theory of political obligation and the justification of punishment that takes its bearings from the principle of fair play. Much has been written on each of these subjects, of course, including numerous essays in recent years that approach one or the other topic in fair-play terms. However, there has been no sustained effort to link the two in a fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment. This book undertakes such an effort. This introduction explains why such a theory is an attractive possibility and how the argument for it unfolds in the succeeding chapters.

Authority, Deference, and Fair Play

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
General Obligation ◽  
Service Conception ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

This chapter defends the fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment by addressing two further challenges. According to the first challenge, recent revisions to the standard conception of political and legal authority lead to the conclusion that there is no general obligation to obey the law. On this standard account, to have political or legal authority is to have a right to rule, and those subject to authority have an obligation to obey the directives of those who have the right to rule. If this account is faulty, then the connection between political authority and political obligation is neither as straightforward nor as strong as the standard account assumes. According to the second challenge, the problem is not with authority but with what citizens owe to their polities. That is, citizens do have duties with regard to the law, but the weaker duties of respect or deference rather than an obligation to obey. This chapter responds to the first challenge by demonstrating the superiority of the standard account to the so-called service conception of authority and to the second by showing how appeals to respect or deference rely on a belief in political obligation.

Justifying Punishment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Legal Punishment ◽  
Theories Of Punishment ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
Communicative Theories

Chapter 5 is the first of the three chapters of Playing Fair that make the case for fair play as the basis for a compelling justification of legal punishment. As it was with the discussion of political obligation, so it is necessary to begin this part of the book by clarifying key terms and confronting fundamental challenges to the enterprise of justifying punishment itself. The chapter thus begins with the questions of what is punishment and what are its proper aims. The latter question is usually answered by reference to retributivism and/or deterrence, and I try to place fair-play theory in this context by linking it to communicative theories of punishment while distinguishing it from Jean Hampton’s expressive version of retributivism. The chapter concludes with responses to those who would, for various reasons, abolish punishment altogether.

Political Obligation, Punishment, and the Polity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Legal Punishment ◽  
Practical Guidance ◽  
The One ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter completes the argument for the fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment by taking up two final tasks. The first is to explain how the two aspects of this theory—that is, the one concerned with political obligation and the one that justifies legal punishment—stand in relation to each other. The claim is that this relationship is interlocking and mutually reinforcing. The second task is to fill out and sharpen the conception of the polity as a cooperative meta-practice that is central to the fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment. In doing so, I hope to show how the fair-play account provides practical guidance even in conditions that fall short of the ideal of a polity so conceived.

Political Obligation as Fair Play

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Integral Feature

One aim of this chapter is to fill out the account of the fair-play theory of obligation sketched in previous chapters. In particular, I show how respect for the rule of law is an integral feature of fair-play theory. In most of the chapter, however, the elaboration proceeds by defending the theory against six important objections critics have lodged against it. One objection, raised memorably by Robert Nozick, would have us reject the principle of fair play altogether. The others allow that the principle is valuable and unobjectionable when confined to its proper sphere, but they insist that political obligation exceeds the boundaries of that sphere. In addition to defending the fair-play account against these objections, I also argue against those who believe that fair play is a necessary but insufficient element in a theory of political obligation that must be pluralistic if it is to be successful.

Political Obligation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Philosophical Anarchism

Although it is an ancient and much-discussed problem, political obligation continues to pose challenges to political and legal philosophers. Some of these challenges are conceptual, for they require explanations of what a political obligation is and how it differs from other obligations, duties, or responsibilities. Other challenges concern the practical matters of whether and to what extent political obligations are truly binding on us. In this respect, the foremost challenge is that of anarchism, including the “philosophical anarchism” that has become increasingly influential in recent decades. This chapter aims to meet these challenges by setting out a coherent account of political obligation and providing reason to believe that neither political nor philosophical anarchists have made a satisfactory a priori case against the possibility of a compelling theory of political obligation.

Reformist Consent and Political Obligation

1991 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 676-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Plausible Model ◽  
Voluntary Character ◽  
Voluntary Choice ◽  
Consent Theory

It is commonly held that theories of political obligation based on consent, whether express or tacit, cannot account for most people's obligations; that political obligations generally stem from being born into specific societies rather than from voluntary choice. In recent years, consent theorists have turned to ‘reformist’ consent, arguing that consent theory could be rescued if political institutions were reformed to allow the possibility of widespread consent. Various possible reforms are examined and shown to be inadequate. The most obvious mechanism, ‘consent-or-leave’, is disqualified because it is coercive. Other mechanisms would be unable to induce widespread consent while preserving consent's essential voluntary character. I refer to the most plausible model as ‘Hobbes's choice’, though because it must unacceptably limit non-consentors' ability to defend themselves, it too is unsatisfactory.

scholarly journals Playing Fair and Following the Rules

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 134-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The One

In his paper “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap” (published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy), Jiafeng Zhu argues that the principle of fair play cannot require submission to the rules of a cooperative scheme, and that when such submission is required, the requirement is grounded in consent. I propose a better argument for the claim that fair play requires submission to the rules than the one Zhu considers. I also argue that Zhu’s attribution of consent to people commonly thought to be bound to follow the rules by a duty of fair play is implausible.

Partisanship and Political Obligation

Politics ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

Political parties have generally been disregarded in the literature on political obligation. In this article I argue that, regardless of whether ordinary citizens or residents of a polity have any political obligations, partisanship generates its own kind of political obligations. Participating in party politics qua party members, supporters, activists or even mere voters produces benefits that generate corresponding and proportionate political obligations for those who enjoy them. The political obligations of partisans are easier to justify than those of ordinary citizens as the conditions under which the benefits of partisanship can be rendered excludable are easier to obtain.

scholarly journals CONSENT TO UNJUST INSTITUTIONS

Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Bas van der Vossen
Keyword(s):  
Ab Initio ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations

Abstract John Rawls wrote that people can voluntarily acquire political obligations to institutions only on the condition that those institutions are at least reasonably just. When an institution is seriously unjust, by contrast, attempts to create political obligation are “void ab initio.” However, Rawls's own explanation for this thought was deeply problematic, as are the standard alternatives. In this paper, I offer an argument for why Rawls's intuition was right and trace its implications for theories of authority and political obligation. These, I claim, are more radical than is often thought.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document