Political Obligation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Philosophical Anarchism

Although it is an ancient and much-discussed problem, political obligation continues to pose challenges to political and legal philosophers. Some of these challenges are conceptual, for they require explanations of what a political obligation is and how it differs from other obligations, duties, or responsibilities. Other challenges concern the practical matters of whether and to what extent political obligations are truly binding on us. In this respect, the foremost challenge is that of anarchism, including the “philosophical anarchism” that has become increasingly influential in recent decades. This chapter aims to meet these challenges by setting out a coherent account of political obligation and providing reason to believe that neither political nor philosophical anarchists have made a satisfactory a priori case against the possibility of a compelling theory of political obligation.

Reformist Consent and Political Obligation

1991 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 676-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Plausible Model ◽  
Voluntary Character ◽  
Voluntary Choice ◽  
Consent Theory

It is commonly held that theories of political obligation based on consent, whether express or tacit, cannot account for most people's obligations; that political obligations generally stem from being born into specific societies rather than from voluntary choice. In recent years, consent theorists have turned to ‘reformist’ consent, arguing that consent theory could be rescued if political institutions were reformed to allow the possibility of widespread consent. Various possible reforms are examined and shown to be inadequate. The most obvious mechanism, ‘consent-or-leave’, is disqualified because it is coercive. Other mechanisms would be unable to induce widespread consent while preserving consent's essential voluntary character. I refer to the most plausible model as ‘Hobbes's choice’, though because it must unacceptably limit non-consentors' ability to defend themselves, it too is unsatisfactory.

1. Political obligation

2019 ◽  
pp. 6-24
Author(s):  
Keith Hyams
Keyword(s):  
Contract Theory ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Philosophical Anarchism ◽  
Consent Theory ◽  
Do So

This chapter discusses the justifications for political obligation. The most important historical justification for political obligation is what is often called consent theory or contract theory. Consent theorists claim that we should obey the law because we have consented to do so. Meanwhile, the theorist H. L. A. Hart argues that if we accept a benefit, then it is only fair that we should reciprocate and give something back; if we enjoy the protection of police and armies, if we use roads, hospitals, schools, and other government-run services, then we should reciprocate by obeying the law. Other theorists argue that political obligation is something that we are bound by simply for being a member of a political community. If we cannot justify an obligation to obey the law, then we may have to adopt some form of philosophical anarchism — the view that we have no obligation to obey the law.

Partisanship and Political Obligation

Politics ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

Political parties have generally been disregarded in the literature on political obligation. In this article I argue that, regardless of whether ordinary citizens or residents of a polity have any political obligations, partisanship generates its own kind of political obligations. Participating in party politics qua party members, supporters, activists or even mere voters produces benefits that generate corresponding and proportionate political obligations for those who enjoy them. The political obligations of partisans are easier to justify than those of ordinary citizens as the conditions under which the benefits of partisanship can be rendered excludable are easier to obtain.

scholarly journals CONSENT TO UNJUST INSTITUTIONS

Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Bas van der Vossen
Keyword(s):  
Ab Initio ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations

Abstract John Rawls wrote that people can voluntarily acquire political obligations to institutions only on the condition that those institutions are at least reasonably just. When an institution is seriously unjust, by contrast, attempts to create political obligation are “void ab initio.” However, Rawls's own explanation for this thought was deeply problematic, as are the standard alternatives. In this paper, I offer an argument for why Rawls's intuition was right and trace its implications for theories of authority and political obligation. These, I claim, are more radical than is often thought.

Obligation, political

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. John Simmons
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Political Roles ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Quality ◽  
The Subject

The problem of political obligation has been one of the central concerns of political philosophy throughout the history of the subject. Political obligations are the moral obligations of citizens to support and comply with the requirements of their political authorities; and the problem of political obligation is that of understanding why (or if) citizens in various kinds of states are bound by such obligations. Most theorists conservatively assume that typical citizens in reasonably just states are in fact bound by these obligations. They take the problem to be that of advancing an account of the ground(s) or justification(s) of political obligation that is consistent with affirming widespread obligations. Other theorists, however, anarchists prominent among them, do not accept the conservative assumption, leaving open the possibility that the best theory of political obligation may entail that few, if any, citizens in actual states have political obligations. Much of the modern debate about political obligation consists of attempts either to defend or to move beyond the alleged defects of voluntarist theories. Voluntarists maintain that only our own voluntary acts (such as freely consenting to the authority of our governments) can bind us to obedience. Because actual political societies appear not to be voluntary associations, however, voluntarism seems unable to satisfy conservative theoretical ambitions. Some individualists turn as a result to nonvoluntarist theories of political obligation, attempting to ground obligations in the receipt by citizens of the benefits governments supply or in the moral quality of their political institutions. Others reject individualism altogether, defending communitarian theories that base our political obligations in our social and political roles or identities. Individualist anarchists reject instead the conservative ambitions of such theories, embracing a voluntarism which entails that most citizens simply have no political obligations.

Resistance in the Age of Trump

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candice Delmas
Keyword(s):  
Hate Crimes ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Law ◽  
Political Association

This chapter uses the book’s previous arguments to inquire into American citizens’ and officials’ present political obligations under President Donald Trump. Citizens are bound by the natural duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and political association to resist the various injustices threatened or enacted by Trump’s administration, including by protesting, educating themselves, disobeying the law, intervening in cases of hate crimes, acting in solidarity, and donating cash and time to movements. The chapter then presents the recent debate over whether to serve under Trump, and argues that civil servants (officials and bureaucrats) have a political obligation to minimize damage from within, that is based on the duty of justice and the principle of fairness. Finally, it argues that resistance from within, given its anti-democratic appearance, should generate feelings of ambivalence among civil servants.

Political Obligation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Modern Theory ◽  
Medieval Period ◽  
Moral Requirement ◽  
Late Medieval Period ◽  
Central Value ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Tacit Consent ◽  
Philosophical Anarchism

By political obligation, theorists generally mean a moral requirement to obey the law of one's state or one's country. In the liberal tradition, liberty is a central value, and so the fact that some individuals should obey others must be explained. The liberal—or “modern”—view of political obligation is classically expressed in John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. According to Locke, political obligation must stem from an individual's own consent, and so must be self-assumed, based on a specific action or performance by each individual himself. Thomas Hobbes presented a fully modern theory of political obligation. With Hobbes, the burden of argument shifts. Whereas, in the late medieval period, the default position favored obedience, Hobbes's starting point is individual freedom. Locke's view of tacit consent was classically criticized by David Hume, who believes that his account has the considerable advantage of doing without the fictions of an original state of nature, individual consent, and social contract. Contemporary debates about political obligation have been heavily influenced by the popularity of so-called philosophical anarchism.

Hypothetical Consent and Political Obligation

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-63
Author(s):  
Chris King ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Hypothetical Consent ◽  
Normative Argument ◽  
As If

Hypothetical Consent Situations are widely employed in normative argument as if they help to justify normative claims or to explain normative facts. Historically, however, there is plenty of suspicion about them. In this light, there is a tendency to prefer theories of political obligation that do not depend upon hypothetical consent to explain political obligations – those that appeal, for instance, a general moral principle (like a natural duty) or to actual consent. This paper makes no full-throated defense of hypothetical consent. But it does try to identify more carefully than is usually done what sorts of cases they represent and to show that at least two concerns about them are unwarranted.

ACCEPTANCE, FAIRNESS, AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION

Legal Theory ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Song
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Cooperative Scheme

Among the most popular strategies for justifying political obligations are those that appeal to the principle of fairness. These theories face the challenge, canonically articulated by Robert Nozick, of explaining how it is that persons are obligated to schemes when they receive goods that they do not ask for but cannot reject. John Simmons offers one defense of the principle of fairness, arguing that people could be bound by obligations of fairness if they voluntarily accept goods produced by a cooperative scheme. Simmons, however, thinks that such a theory will do little work in justifying political obligations, since virtually no one voluntarily accepts state goods. This paper attempts to advance just such a theory by arguing that states are in fact genuine cooperative schemes and that Simmons is overly pessimistic in his appraisal of whether the majority of citizens accept the goods provided by their states.

POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS IN A SEA OF TYRANNY AND CRUSHING POVERTY

Legal Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 186-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Maltais
Keyword(s):  
Political Order ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations

Christopher Wellman is the strongest proponent of the natural-duty theory of political obligations and argues that his version of the theory can satisfy the key requirement of “particularity”; namely, justifying to members of a state the system of political obligationstheyshare in. Critics argue that natural-duty theories like Wellman's actually require well-ordered states and/or their members to dedicate resources to providing the goods associated with political order to needy outsiders. The implication is that natural-duty approaches weaken the particularity requirement and cannot justify to citizens the systems of political obligation they share in. I argue that the critics’ diagnosis of natural-duty approaches is correct, whereas the proposed implication is false. I maintain that 1) only natural-duty approaches can justify political obligations, and that 2) weakening the particularity requirementcontributesto the theory's ability to justify a range-limited system of political obligationsamongcompatriots.

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