scholarly journals Meillassoux, Correlationism, and the Ontological Difference

PhaenEx ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
G. Anthony Bruno

Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of thought and being—specifically, subjectivity and objectivity—which he attributes to Heidegger. This attribution is inapt. It is only by accessing being—via existential analysis—that we can properly distinguish beings like subjects and objects. I propose that Meillassoux’s misattribution ignores the ontological difference that drives Heidegger’s project. First, I demonstrate the inadequacy of Meillassoux’s account of correlationism as a criticism of Heidegger and dispense with an objection. Second, I argue that Meillassoux’s neglect of the ontological difference stems from a question-begging appeal to transcendental realism, which is at odds with Heidegger’s twin claims for a variety of transcendental idealism in Being and Time. Third, I offer a reflection on three general marks of transcendental idealism.

Author(s):  
Alison Assiter

This chapter outlines a strong version of ‘realism’ against what Meillassoux labels ‘correlationism’. It suggests, however, that the critiques made by certain realists of the Kantian noumenal can be answered. It begins by defending Kantian ‘empirical realism’ against the critiques of some realists. Then it moves on to claim that Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism are stronger than those for Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. The chapter suggests, more controversially, that if one takes seriously Kant’s notion of ‘spontaneous causation’, it is possible to offer a Kantian defence of the ‘grounding’ of the phenomenal in the noumenal. Finally, it argues that Kant offers a stronger form of realism than is generally supposed by his critics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 453-462
Author(s):  
Ian Proops

In this concluding chapter the main lessons of the book are reviewed, and some further problems for Kant raised. The chapter reflects once again on Kant’s confession that he had found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, offering a deeper explanation of this claim than was given in the introduction. It then considers the consequences of his having regarded Transcendental Realism as not just false, but rather logically impossible. It asks whether such a view can be reconciled—given Kant’s views on contradiction—with the supposed contentfulness of transcendental illusion or with Transcendental Idealism itself. It raises a problem for Kant’s account of metaphysical error as arising from transcendental illusion. Finally, it evaluates Kant’s claim to have offered an exhaustive critique of speculative metaphysics, arguing that this is unfortunately not the case.


2018 ◽  
pp. 42-50
Author(s):  
Thomas Nail

This chapter lays out a methodology of transcendental realism and new materialism based on motion. Transcendental realism is the study of the real minimal ontological conditions for the actual emergence of the historical present. The purpose of this method is to give a description of what previous being must at least be like given that it appears as it does today: in motion. The chapter offers critiques of constructivism, empiricism, metaphysics, and transcendental idealism. It also offers a critique of vitalist new materialism, negative materialism, object-oriented ontology, formalism, and all ahistorical methods of thinking about matter and materialism. It concludes with a theory of “process materialism.”


Author(s):  
Yohei Kageyama

The purpose of this paper is phe-nomenological interpretation of the various faces of divinity in the later Heidegger and elucidation of the human comportment corresponding to this divinity. In the first chapter, I will make clear the relation between ontological difference in the sense of the later Heidegger and the primordial dimension of divinity which is called the last god (der letzte Gott) and the sacred (das Heilige). Further, the relation between such divinity and entity as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen) will be clarified. In the second chapter, I will elucidate the place of the divinities in the manifestation of entity as a whole by considering the role of the godlikes (die Göttlichen) in the fourfold (das Geviert). When the primordial alterity of the last god should be experienced in entity as whole, which leads to the notion of the godlikes, it must confront human subject in totally asymmetrical manner. Such asymmetrical communication can be structurally made explicit by taking the concept of “discourse” in Being and Time into account. Finally, I will consider the character of human comportment called preservation (Bergung) with focusing on its relation to the later Heidegger’s conceptions of divinity. This will shed light on how human beings could properly appreciate the experience of what is beyond our understanding and nevertheless supporting our existence.El objetivo de la ponencia es llevar a cabo una interpretación fenomenológica de las diversas facetas de la divinidad en el Hei-degger tardío y elucidar el comportamiento humano respecto de esta divinidad. En el primer capítulo, se esclarece la relación entre la diferencia ontológica en el sentido que le da el segundo Heidegger y la dimensión primordial de la divinidad, llamada el último dios (der letzte Gott) y lo sagrado (das Heilige). A conti-nuación, se esclarecerá la relación entre la divinidad así concebida y lo ente en totalidad (das Seiende im Ganzen). En el segundo apar-tado, se elucidará el lugar de las divinidades en la manifestación de lo ente en totalidad considerando el papel de los divinos la Cuaternidad (das Geviert). Cuando la alteridad primordial del último dios se experimente en lo ente en totaliadd, lo cual conduce a la noción de los divinos, tiene que enfrentarse al sujeto humano de una forma totalmente asimétrica. Esta comunicación asimétrica puede explicitarse estructuralmente mediante la consideración del concepto del discurso en Ser y tiempo. Final-mente, consideraré el carácter del comportamiento humano denominado la preservación (Bergung), con especial atención a su relación con la noción de lo divino en Heidegger tardío. Esto arrojará luz sobre cómo los seres humanos podrían apreciar de manera adecuada lo que está más allá de nuestra comprensión y sin embargo, sostiene nuestra existencia. 


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry E. Allison

The debate regarding the interpretation of Kant's idealism is usually seen as turning on the best way to understand his transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves: that it marks either a contrast between two types of thing (the ‘two-object’ or ‘two-world’ view) or one between two sides or aspects of ordinary empirical objects (the ‘two-aspect’ view). But, even though I have long been associated with the latter camp, I have also thought for many years that this is not the most helpful way to frame the issue. The problem lies in an ambiguity inherent in the two-aspect view. It can be understood either metaphysically, as a thesis about the kinds of properties attributable to empirical objects, that is, as a form of property dualism in which these objects are assigned both phenomenal and noumenal properties, or methodologically, as a contrast between two ways in which such objects can be considered in a philosophical reflection on the conditions of their cognition. Accordingly, I take the fundamental question to be whether transcendental idealism is to be understood in the latter way or as a form of metaphysical dualism (whether as a thing or a property dualism being a matter of relative indifference). And I have further thought that the best way of addressing that question is through a consideration of the view which Kant opposes to transcendental idealism, namely, transcendental realism. If this realism is identified with a particular metaphysical doctrine then transcendental idealism must be as well; but if, as I maintain, transcendental realism cannot be so understood, then neither can Kant's idealism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
Natalia I. Ishchenko ◽  

A competent acquaintance with Martin Heidegger’s major works, such as “Being and Time”, is impossible without understanding the primeval methodological foundations of this German thinker, – or, in other words, without comprehending the principal connection between his existen­tial analysis and the destruction of the European metaphysical knowledge. The inevitable connec­tion of ontic and ontological levels of philosophical research reveals a hardly definable concept of Dasein, while the notion of “openness”, we are interested in, serves as a meaningful specification of Dasein. In this paper, the notion of “openness” is analyzed in two aspects: from the point of a new understanding of the traditional metaphysical problems (the problems of being and entity, in particular) and from the point of a completely new substantiation of these problems (which eventually determines the Heidegger’s existential analysis as a fundamentally-ontological). Thus, the notion of “openness” is understood in the context of the problem of Being (not only Dasein). The phenomenon of openness itself is analyzed as a primordial phenomenon. The existential, “un­derstanding”, is ontologically examined in relation with the phenomenon of openness. Observing Heideggerian existential-ontological analysis of this phenomenon (primarily, in the aspect of “tran­scendence” and “truth”) this paper defines Dasein as a way of existence of Being as such.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 23-33
Author(s):  
Clayton Shoppa ◽  

Heidegger’s National Socialist political sympathies are plainer and more troubling to contemporary readers than ever before. This paper examines the relation of leader to society Heidegger uses to ground his account of the state. Heidegger draws on Aristotle and Kant to make his case in the 1930s. But breakthroughs in the previous decade, in Being and Time in particular, make the political ontology he endorses less than compelling. The power of the leader over the society he or she leads cannot repeat the relation of Being over entities. The ontological difference is different from, and incompatible with, all possible statements of political community. Ontologically speaking, totalitarianism is a category mistake. Confusing the transcendental domain for its ontic content, Heidegger refuses to learn his own lesson in ways Eric Voegelin helps us detect.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document