The Nature and Ontological Status of Appearances

It is shown that things in themselves and appearances are numerically distinct existents whose primary difference consists in that the former are mind-independent while the latter are mind-dependent, in a sense that is explicated in detail. On the proposed reading, the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, comprises several levels of reality, most importantly, a mind-independent, transcendental level, at which things in themselves exits, and a mind-dependent, empirical level, at which appearances exist. Appearances are identified to be intentional objects of experience. The nature and ontological status of appearances is further investigated by way of an examination of Kant’s account of perception and his theory of experience, including a detailed consideration of the formal and material conditions of experience and of the implications of the mathematical antinomies for the specific flavor of Kant’s idealism about appearances.

Kant’s Case for Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

The foundational structure of, and Kant’s arguments for his transcendental idealism and empirical realism are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the ‘master argument’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic for the thesis that space and time are transcendentally ideal and nothing but forms of sensibility. A reconstruction of the master argument is provided, and each of its premises is examined in detail, including the especially important premise that we have an a priori intuition of space and time.

Kantian Things in Themselves, Leibniz-Wolffian Things in Themselves, and Fictionalism

An account is provided of how Kant’s apparent endorsement of fictionalism about things in themselves, as well as his apparent endorsement of the Leibniz-Wolffian conception of things in themselves, can be reconciled with the reading that he is a realist about things in themselves as characterized in critical idealism. In this context, the difference between Kantian things in themselves and noumena, that is, objects of the pure understanding, is explained as well. Furthermore, two additional arguments for transcendental idealism that are suggested by Kant are subject to scrutiny, both of which seem odd at first glance since they rely on premises about things in themselves to which he does not appear to be entitled within the framework of the critical philosophy.

Concluding Postscript: The World According to Kant

This completes my account of Kant’s critical idealism, understood as an ontological position, as developed in the Critique and associated theoretical writings. According to Kant, the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, comprises several levels of reality, most importantly, the transcendental level and the empirical level. The transcendental level is a mind-independent level at which Kantian things in themselves exist; the empirical level is a mind-dependent level at which Kantian appearances exist. Things in themselves are mind-independent, appearances are fully mind-dependent. Things in themselves and appearances are numerically distinct and do not ontologically overlap in any way. Kantian outer appearances essentially are intentional objects of outer experience; Kantian inner appearances essentially are intentional objects of inner experience. Empirical objects are Kantian outer appearances, empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of outer appearances, pure space and time are (nothing but) forms of sensibility, and empirical selves, or empirical minds, are Kantian inner appearances. In contrast to other intentional objects, such as the intentional objects of fictions, dreams, hallucinations, illusions, and perceptions, Kantian appearances genuinely exist, that is, they exist from the point of view of fundamental ontology. This is due both to the special character of experience, in particular, the special character of outer experience and its conformity to Kant’s formal conditions of objectivity, and to the grounding of Kantian appearances in things themselves. Kantian things in themselves transcendentally affect sensibility and thereby bring about sensations, which provide the ‘matter’ for Kantian appearances and underwrite their existence. Kantian things in themselves are supersensible, non-spatial, and non-temporal, as well as distinct from God and thus finite. Each inner appearance is grounded in a unique Kantian thing in itself that is a human transcendental mind, and all outer appearances are grounded in Kantian things in themselves that are distinct from all human minds. What we commonly call ‘the external empirical world’ exists, including empirical space and time. Accordingly, there is also at least one Kantian thing in itself that is not a human mind. Moreover, there is at least one human being, that is, an entity whose ontologically basic parts include, minimally, a body (which is an empirical object), an empirical self (which is an empirical mind), and a transcendental self (which is a human transcendental mind). Since other intentional objects that are not Kantian appearances, although not genuine existents, are not nothing but have some reality and being, it is useful to conceive of Kantian reality as including yet another mind-dependent level to provide a home for these other fully mind-dependent entities—even if this conception goes beyond the direct textual evidence and may also go beyond Kant’s private, explicitly articulated thoughts on the matter. The ultimate basis for Kant’s case for transcendental idealism is the finitude of the human mind and, more specifically, its fundamentally uncreative nature in which this finitude manifests ...

Introduction—the Plan for this Book and the Lay of the Land

The plan for the book is sketched, and a classification scheme for extant interpretations of Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves is provided. The interpretation of Kant’s critical idealism that will be developed in the book, which is a version of the so-called classic two-world view, is presented in outline, and a brief overview of the history of the classic two-world view is given.

Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

The core claims of transcendental idealism are examined, according to which empirical objects and empirical selves are appearances and not things in themselves, and pure space and time are nothing but forms of sensibility. Kant is shown to be a relationalist about empirical space and time in holding that empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of empirical objects. Furthermore, it is explicated how Kant can be both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist about empirical objects, empirical selves, and empirical space and time, and how his idealism differs from transcendental realism, as well as from ordinary idealism such as Berkeley’s.

Things in Themselves and their Relation to Appearances

The theses that things in themselves exist and ground appearances by affecting sensibility are discussed, a discussion that includes an examination of the difference between the empirical and transcendental distinction between things in themselves and appearances and of the role of the analogy between secondary qualities and spatiotemporal determinations in Kant’s explanation of critical idealism. The relation between the transcendental and the empirical self is revisited, and the two-world reading of this relation is confirmed and integrated with an account of Kant’s conception of human beings as composed of various distinct parts, including a body, an empirical self, and a transcendental self. The account, begun in chapter 3, of how critical idealism differs from ordinary idealism is further refined, and Kant’s arguments for the existence and grounding theses are reconstructed and shown to ultimately rely on the assumption that the human mind is essentially finite. Finally, two versions of critical idealism are distinguished—bold critical idealism and timid critical idealism—and it is argued that Kant is a bold critical idealist.