Exchange-rate Attack as a Coordination Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence

2002 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 462-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Heinemann
Author(s):  
Marco Fabbri ◽  
Matteo Rizzolli ◽  
Antonello Maruotti

Abstract In all legal systems, possession and property are inextricably linked. Game theory captures this relationship in the Hawk–Dove game: players competing for an asset are better off when the possessor plays Hawk and the intruder plays Dove (the bourgeois strategy) so that property can emerge as a spontaneous convention. This theory has been supported by large experimental evidence with animals. This paper presents a lab experiment where possession is manipulated to study the emergence of the property convention with human subjects. We show that the highest coordination emerges when possession is achieved meritoriously and that possession induces only bourgeois coordination (never antibourgeois).


SERIEs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio J. Morales ◽  
Enrique Fatas

AbstractThe standard approach to nominal illusion in Economics sees it as a transitory phenomenon, as economic agents eventually see through the nominal veil, making the right choices. Recent empirical studies suggest that money illusion may persist, distorting real prices in a variety of economic environments, including the housing market and the stock market. In this paper, we explore the emergence and persistence of nominal illusion in an experimental entry game where firms must choose which local market to enter, and then compete in prices. All local markets are equivalent in real terms and they only differ in the currency the price competition is run under. Our experimental results show a positive, persistent and monotone effect of the nominal exchange rate on market prices, statistically significant for large enough exchange rate. We provide an explanation in terms of players simplifying the choice set using discrete grids.


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