scholarly journals Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doruk rii ◽  
Jungmin Lee ◽  
Alessandro Tavoni
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

scholarly journals Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 1331-1353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doruk İriş ◽  
Jungmin Lee ◽  
Alessandro Tavoni
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence

1998 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 603-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Bram Cadsby ◽  
Elizabeth Maynes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

A Public Goods Game Theory-Based Approach to Cooperation in VANETs Under a High Vehicle Density Condition

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (11) ◽  
pp. 3995-4005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Ding ◽  
Xikai Zeng ◽  
Xinming Zhang ◽  
Dan Keun Sung
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Density Condition ◽  
Vehicle Density

Study on Cooperative Evolution Behaviors in Spatial Public Goods Game Based on Self-Questioning Mechanism

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 1783-1787
Author(s):  
Rui Xue Feng ◽  
Juan Ge
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Self ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Intensity Parameter ◽  
Cooperative Evolution

We introduce a self-questioning mechanism under spatial public goods game in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory where players are located on a square lattice and realize it by a intensity parameter a. By stimulation and analysis, we find that compared with the original Fermi updating (a=0), the introduction of the self-questioning (a>0) can be better promote cooperative behavior at the smaller r. Subsequently, we stimulate in self-questioning mechanism (a=1), the cooperator frequency fc as a function of the factor r for different values of noise K. Results show that at the larger and smaller noise K, the system presents a considerably different cooperation phenomenon. Whats more, fc as a function of r has center symmetry nature about point (5.0, 0.5) whatever the noise K is. Further analysis indicates the reasons for the formation of these phenomena. Finally, we report the agents average payoff in the steady state and its reasons for it.

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Binary Decision ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

scholarly journals Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 1030-1068
Author(s):  
Luca Corazzini ◽  
Christopher Cotton ◽  
Tommaso Reggiani
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Multiple Threshold ◽  
Threshold Public Goods
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