The Economic Impact of Index Investing

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (9) ◽  
pp. 3461-3499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Brogaard ◽  
Matthew C Ringgenberg ◽  
David Sovich

Abstract We study the impact of index investing on firm performance by examining the link between commodity indices and firms that use index commodities. Around 2004, commodity index investing dramatically increased. This event is referred to as the financialization of commodity markets. Following financialization, firms that use index commodities make worse production decisions, earn 40% lower profits, and have 6% higher costs. Consistent with a feedback channel in which market participants learn from prices, our results suggest that index investing distorts the price signal, thereby generating a negative externality that impedes firms’ ability to make production decisions. Received March 31, 2017; editorial decision July 5, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (12) ◽  
pp. 4734-4766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajashri Chakrabarti ◽  
Nathaniel Pattison

Abstract Auto lenders were perhaps the biggest winners of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform, as Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers can no longer “cramdown” the amount owed on recent auto loans. We estimate the causal effect of this anticramdown provision on the price and quantity of auto credit. Exploiting historical variation in states’ usage of Chapter 13 bankruptcy, we find strong evidence that eliminating cramdowns decreased interest rates and some evidence that loan sizes increased among subprime borrowers. The decline in interest rates is persistent and is robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. We rule out other reform changes as possible causes. Received September 29, 2016; editorial decision January 15, 2019 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (12) ◽  
pp. 4696-4733 ◽  
Author(s):  
André F Silva

Abstract This paper examines whether banks strategically incorporate their competitors’ liquidity mismatch policies when determining their own and the impact of these collective decisions on financial stability. Using a novel identification strategy exploiting the presence of partially overlapping peer groups, I show that banks’ liquidity transformation activity is driven by that of their peers. These correlated decisions are concentrated on the asset side of riskier banks and are asymmetric, with mimicking occurring only when competitors take more risk. Accordingly, this strategic behavior increases banks’ default risk and overall systemic risk, highlighting the importance of regulating liquidity risk from a macroprudential perspective. ReceivedMay 4, 2016; editorial decision January 1, 2019 by Editor Philip Strahan. Author has furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erkko Etula ◽  
Kalle Rinne ◽  
Matti Suominen ◽  
Lauri Vaittinen

Abstract We present broad-based evidence that the monthly payment cycle induces systematic patterns in liquid markets around the globe. First, we document temporary increases in the costs of debt and equity capital that coincide with key dates associated with month-end cash needs. Second, we present direct and indirect evidence on the role of institutions in the genesis of these patterns and derive estimates of the associated costs borne by market participants. Third, and finally, we investigate the limits to arbitrage that prevent markets from functioning efficiently. Our results indicate that many investors and their agents, including mutual funds, suffer from liquidity-related trading. Received January 16, 2018; editorial decision January 2, 2019 by Editor Robin Greenwood. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 2997-3035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Calzolari ◽  
Jean-Edouard Colliard ◽  
Gyongyi Lóránth

Abstract Supervision of multinational banks (MNBs) by national supervisors suffers from coordination failures. We show that supranational supervision solves this problem and decreases the public costs of an MNB’s failure, taking its organizational structure as given. However, the MNB strategically adjusts its structure to supranational supervision. It converts its subsidiary into a branch (or vice versa) to reduce supervisory monitoring. We identify the cases in which this endogenous reaction leads to unintended consequences, such as higher public costs and lower welfare. Current reforms should consider that MNBs adapt their organizational structures to changes in supervision. Received January 9, 2017; editorial decision September 15, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 3036-3074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Borja Larrain ◽  
Giorgo Sertsios ◽  
Francisco Urzúa I

Abstract We propose a novel identification strategy for estimating the effects of business group affiliation. We study two-firm business groups, some of which split up during the sample period, leaving some firms as stand-alone firms. We instrument for stand-alone status using shocks to the industry of the other group firm. We find that firms that become stand-alone reduce leverage and investment. Consistent with collateral cross-pledging, the effects are more pronounced when the other firm had high tangibility. Consistent with capital misallocation in groups, the reduction in leverage is stronger in firms that had low (high) profitability (leverage) relative to industry peers. Received July 3, 2017; editorial decision April 7, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (9) ◽  
pp. 4061-4101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tania Babina

Abstract Using U.S. Census firm-worker data, I document that firms’ financial distress has an economically important effect on employee departures to entrepreneurship. The impact is amplified in the high-tech and service sectors, where employees are key assets. In states with enforceable noncompete contracts, the effect is mitigated. Compared to typical entrepreneurs, distress-driven entrepreneurs are high-wage workers who found better firms, as measured by jobs, pay, and survival. Startup jobs compensate for 33% of job losses at the constrained incumbents. Overall, the financial inability of incumbent firms to pursue productive opportunities increases the reallocation of economic activity into new firms. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (10) ◽  
pp. 3884-3919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianpaolo Parise ◽  
Kim Peijnenburg

AbstractThis paper provides evidence of how noncognitive abilities affect financial distress. In a representative panel of households, we find that people in the bottom quintile of noncognitive abilities are 10 times more likely to experience financial distress than those in the top quintile. We provide evidence that this relation largely arises from worse financial choices and lack of financial insight by low-ability individuals and reflects differential exposure to income shocks only to a lesser degree. We mitigate endogeneity concerns using an IV approach and an extensive set of controls. Implications for policy and finance research are discussed.Received September 24, 2017; editorial decision September 26, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 783-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Ellul ◽  
Marco Pagano ◽  
Annalisa Scognamiglio

Abstract We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imputed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these scarring effects can be ascribed to a drop in asset managers’ reputation. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Vallée

AbstractThis paper studies liability management exercises (LME) by banks, which have comparable regulatory capital effects than contingent capital triggers. LMEs are concentrated on low capitalization situations, both in the cross-section and in the time series and are frequently associated with equity issuances. These exercises prove effective at improving bank capitalization levels. The market reaction to LMEs is positive and mostly accrues to debt holders. These findings strengthen the case for innovative liabilities securities as a tool to improve bank resilience.Received February 8, 2019; editorial decision May 16, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 1618-1672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Augustin ◽  
Yehuda Izhakian

Abstract We explore the implications of ambiguity for the pricing of credit default swaps (CDSs). A model of heterogeneous investors with independent preferences for ambiguity and risk shows that, because CDS contracts are assets in zero net supply, the net credit risk exposure of the marginal investor determines the sign of the impact of ambiguity on CDS spreads. We find that ambiguity has an economically significant negative impact on CDS spreads, on average, suggesting that the marginal investor is a net buyer of credit protection. A 1-standard-deviation increase in ambiguity is estimated to decrease CDS spreads by approximately 6%. (JEL C65, D81, D83, G13, G22) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


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