Taking Comparative Law Seriously: Rethinking the Supreme Court of Canada’s Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-210
Author(s):  
Lorne Neudorf
2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-221
Author(s):  
Paulina Fishman

The modern approach to statutory construction guides the judiciary, the legal profession, litigants, and academics in interpreting the myriad legislative provisions in Australian law. Yet what if critical sections have been construed in ways that are irreconcilable with the basic rules of modern statutory interpretation? One of the most important commercial statutes in the country is the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This article exposes one instance of misinterpretation in respect of that statute, contained in a decision of a unanimous Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and makes proposals for resolving such quandaries.


Author(s):  
Suhrith Parthasarathy

This essay is an overview of the use of comparative law in the NJAC Case, and offers a critique of the Supreme Court’s analysis of comparative law in judicial appointments. The essay argues that the Supreme Court adopted an isolationist approach by shunning international experience from fifteen countries cited before it by the Union of India to drive home the point that executive presence in judicial appointments does not, by itself, impinge upon judicial independence. The author contests the Supreme Court’s cursory dismissal of relevant international experience on the ground that India, with its peculiar set of circumstances cannot replicate the experiences of other nations in judicial appointments. The author argues that this is self-serving and the judgment would have been better served by a surer grasp of comparative law and its rationales.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-130
Author(s):  
Hugo S. W. Farmer

            Recently, a circuit split has arisen with regard to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The circuit split concerns the question of what it takes for an individual to qualify as a “whistleblower” under the terms of the statute. This circuit split is surprising, as the Dodd- Frank Act purports to answer this question itself by providing a definition of this term, a definition which the Fifth Circuit has treated as being conclusive. Nonetheless, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have held that with respect to some, but not all, of the Dodd-Frank Act, this statutory “whistleblower” definition does not apply. Shortly, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the matter when it hears an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc. This article provides three broad reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Second and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations. First, the interpretation endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits is the result of a flawed exercise in statutory interpretation that incorrectly applies principles recently set down by the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell, and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. Secondly, while the Second and Ninth Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuits’ interpretation on the basis that it withholds the protection of the Dodd-Frank Act from auditors and attorneys, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ preferred interpretations also fail to protect auditors and attorneys. Finally, the policy reasons in favor of extending the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections to auditors and attorneys are insufficiently strong to warrant departing from the natural meaning of the statutory language at issue.   


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Goldsworthy

Abstract In his 2017 Hamlyn Lectures, Professor (now Lord) Burrows set out his opinions about statutory interpretation. Given his recent appointment to the UK Supreme Court, these opinions now have more practical importance than those of most academic theorists. One of his main theses is that the modern approach to statutory interpretation, which focuses on text, context and purpose, should not include any reference to legislative intention. He dismisses this as ‘an unhelpful fiction or mask that should be avoided altogether’. I show that this thesis is mistaken, internally inconsistent, and might in practice undermine sound interpretation based on fundamental constitutional principles.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-303
Author(s):  
Jordan Yospe

AbstractUnder most workers' compensation statutes, an injury must “arise out of” and “in the course of” employment in order to qualify as a compensable disability. In U.S. Industries v. Director, the Supreme Court held that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act must be strictly construed to avoid transforming the compensation system into a form of social insurance. In U.S. Industries, the Court denied a disability claim based on an arthritic condition which was manifested while the worker was at home in bed. This Note contends that the Supreme Court neglected to consider pertinent medical realities when analyzing the causation question. Thus, the decision undermines the overall rationale behind workers' compensation legislation. Nonetheless, the Note argues that the case does not relax the requirement of adequately scrutinizing the causative elements underlying any reasonable claim for disability benefits. An analysis adequately accommodating both medical and legal facts, instead of relying upon the vagaries of statutory interpretation, is necessary to improve the efficiency and fairness of workers' compensation disability determinations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah ◽  
Amir Pichhadze

Abstract Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that apply generally. The U.S. for example has tended to rely heavily on general doctrines. One such doctrine which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter is the “economic substance” doctrine. Yet as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out “although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of complicated tax abuse judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation leading to substantial uncertainty and risk.” One way to limit the discretionary power of judges and overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is by formalizing the doctrines as the US has done by codifying the “economic substance” doctrine in 2010. As explained in part 2 of this chapter a limitation of the “economic substance” doctrine whether it is established judicially or codified by statute may be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax avoidance. Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this limitation by adopting a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”). GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But they do so based on whether the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions as they were conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer is relying on for achieving the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) explained “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to schemes that are not inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory provision invoked by the taxpayer GAAR effectively limits the scope of the principle in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.” Based on Canada’s experience with the GAAR parts 4 and 5 identify and explain the nexus between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting and the implications of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S. should Congress choose to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant tax provision the court has also held that it will only give effect to those intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision and will not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to convey. Part 5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S. courts should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore it would be up to Congress as it is similarly up to Canada’s Parliament to carefully and clearly draft its legislative intentions otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be undermined.


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