scholarly journals GAARs and the Nexus between Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Drafting: Lessons for the U.S. from Canada

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah ◽  
Amir Pichhadze
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that apply generally. The U.S. for example has tended to rely heavily on general doctrines. One such doctrine which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter is the “economic substance” doctrine. Yet as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out “although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of complicated tax abuse judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation leading to substantial uncertainty and risk.” One way to limit the discretionary power of judges and overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is by formalizing the doctrines as the US has done by codifying the “economic substance” doctrine in 2010. As explained in part 2 of this chapter a limitation of the “economic substance” doctrine whether it is established judicially or codified by statute may be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax avoidance. Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this limitation by adopting a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”). GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But they do so based on whether the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions as they were conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer is relying on for achieving the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) explained “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to schemes that are not inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory provision invoked by the taxpayer GAAR effectively limits the scope of the principle in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.” Based on Canada’s experience with the GAAR parts 4 and 5 identify and explain the nexus between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting and the implications of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S. should Congress choose to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant tax provision the court has also held that it will only give effect to those intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision and will not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to convey. Part 5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S. courts should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore it would be up to Congress as it is similarly up to Canada’s Parliament to carefully and clearly draft its legislative intentions otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be undermined.

scholarly journals Corporate Tax Planning: GAAR: An Economic Test?—The Courts Divide

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 351-390
Author(s):  
Brian R. Carr ◽  
Brittany Finn ◽  
Ryan Wolfe
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Tax Planning ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Inherent Difficulty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
Compare And Contrast ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The authors of this article review the history and development of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in section 245 of the Income Tax Act (Canada), for the purpose of assisting in the analysis of recent decisions of the federal and provincial courts of appeal. They discuss the inherent difficulty in construing section 245 and outline various tests that the courts could have employed to interpret its provisions. The authors then review three of the four decisions in which the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted GAAR—<i>Canada Trustco</i>, <i>Mathew</i>, and <i>Copthorne</i>. With that background, the authors contrast the different approaches to the provincial general anti-avoidance rules taken, on the one hand, by the Alberta Court of Appeal in <i>Husky Energy</i> and <i>Canada Safeway</i>, the Ontario Court of Appeal in <i>Inter-Leasing</i>, and the BC Court of Appeal in <i>Veracity</i>, and, on the other hand, by the Quebec Court of Appeal in <i>OGT</i> <i>Holdings</i> and <i>Iberville</i>. They then compare and contrast those approaches with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada on how GAAR should be interpreted. The authors also discuss the approach taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in four recent GAAR decisions—<i>Univar</i>, <i>Oxford Properties</i>, <i>594710 British Columbia Ltd.</i>, and <i>Birchcliff</i>. They compare and contrast that approach with the approaches of the provincial courts, and consider whether the Federal Court of Appeal's approach is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's pronouncements on GAAR. Finally, the authors offer some advice for tax planners based on the recent GAAR decisions of the various courts of appeal.

scholarly journals Les erreurs de droit dans l'exercice d'une compétence

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-516
Author(s):  
Denis Lemieux
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
Legal Foundations ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In this paper, the author deals with the legal foundations of judicial control over errors of law allegedly committed by administrative authorities. The paper also considers the scope of error of law on the face of the record as a ground of review. More specifically, the author has examined all the decisions rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Federal Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada in 1980 and 1981 where there was an allegation of error of law. From this statistical analysis, the author describes and explains the different, and seemingly contradictory, results achieved by these different jurisdictions. The author adds some comments on the constitutionality of privative clauses excluding judicial review of non-jurisdictional errors of law.

Ford and Irwin Toy 30 Years Later: A Conversation with Justice Montigny

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Han-Ru Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
National Level ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
First Year ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
First Year Students ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Thirty years ago, in a tense national political context, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered judgment in three cases that have had a profound impact on Canadian society and constitutional law: Ford v. Québec (A.G.) and its related appeal, Devine v. Québec (A.G.), and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (A.G.) decided a few months apart1. Against the backdrop of language conflicts in Québec and constitutional reform at the national level, this Supreme Court trilogy established the foundations of freedom of expression and the application of the notwithstanding clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the quasi-constitutional nature of Québec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Before the Supreme Court of Canada, the Government of Québec was represented by Yves de Montigny — now a Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal — as lead counsel. On the occasion of the trilogy’s 30th anniversary, Justice de Montigny was invited to the Université de Montréal, Faculty of Law, to share with first-year students his reflections on the three Supreme Court decisions as well as his experience as a young lawyer at the forefront of the major constitutional debates of the time.

scholarly journals The Evolution of the Duty to Consult

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Current Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The duty to consult has been the subject of many trials and headlines, yet many still feel as though the consultation process is faulty. Relying on recent caselaw from the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal, I trace the evolution of the duty to consult from its inception to the latest major cases. I suggest that the current process can be improved to better engage all parties, (i.e. Crown, regulatory agency, industry proponent, Indigenous peoples), with a stronger emphasis on efficiency and reconciliation. I rely on the work of Matthew Hodgson to further solidify my consultation framework by advancing the idea of a specialized tribunal charged with reviewing the adequacy of consultations.

scholarly journals Le contrôle des prix et des revenus au Canada

2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-310
Author(s):  
Richard G. Lipsey
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Traditional Methods ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The U.S

Abstract This paper is a summary of the Legal Factum submitted by the Canadian Labor Congress to the Supreme Court of Canada. It intends to demonstrate the irrelevance of the Anti-Inflationnary Act of October 1975. Three main questions are dealt with. First, was there an economic crisis in October 1975? Analysing various sets of data, the paper concludes that, by no stretch of imagination, could October 1975 be called an economic crisis. Second, was there a policy crisis in the sense that traditional methods had been tried and failed? It establishes here that no serious attempt had been made to contain inflation by traditional fiscal and monetary tools by October 1975. Third, what results can be expected from income policies? This part gives a summary of the voluminous evidence for the U.K. and the U.S., and concludes that the evidence of other incomes policies is that their effects on slowing the rate of inflation are small and often transitory.

The Justiciability of Paraguay’s Claim of Treaty Violation

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Fisler Damrosch
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Government’s position asserting nonjusticiability of the treaty claims raised by Paraguay in the domestic and international lawsuits is disturbing. The Government’s amicus filings at the court of appeals and the Supreme Court denied that Paraguay’s claims belonged in federal court (or indeed in any court at all); at die International Court of Justice, the United States admitted a treaty violation but denied the competence of that tribunal to enter a judicial remedy. At one or another phase of these proceedings, the U.S. Government pressed a variety of arguments that (if accepted) would rule out virtually any judicial consideration of a treaty-based claim. The haste with which the Supreme Court denied a stay in Breard’s case foreclosed adequate consideration of the justiciability of such claims in domestic courts and also effectively barred Paraguay from achieving the relief it sought on the international plane.

Democracy and the Freedom of Speech: Rethinking the Conflict between Liberty and Equality

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmin Dawood
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Competing Values ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Normative Claim ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The U.S

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in its Citizens United decision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (Harper and Bryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.

scholarly journals Les exigences de l'impartialité quasi-judiciaire

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 585-594
Author(s):  
Patrice Garant
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Worth Reading ◽  
The One

The Supreme Court decision commented upon is another important administrative law decision which relates to principles of natural justice, and especially to the nemo judex rule (freedom from bias). Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Laskin states that the function exercised by the National Energy Board under section 44 of the National Energy Board Act is quasi-judicial although it consists in issuing a licence according to an extensive discretionary power. Consequently, principles of natural justice must be applied. The nemo judex rule means that if there is a "reasonable apprehension of bias" due to the past behavior or actions of a member of a quasi-judicial tribunal, that member must be disqualified from acting. Otherwise, the decision rendered by the tribunal must be quashed. Two years before his appointment to the Board, the chairman of the National Energy Board had in fact participated actively in operations and decisions bearing on the very subject-matter subsequently submitted to the Board. That placed the chairman in a situation of conflict of interest, although he had no personal pecuniary interest in the matter involved. The majority of the Supreme Court dissagrees with Mr. Justice de Grandpré's dissent as well as with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. Each expresses a point of view which is worth reading. The majority of the Supreme Court applies to administrative boards or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions the same critérium as the one applied under the common law to any inferior court. Another remarkable judgment of our Supreme Court.

scholarly journals Alberta's Court of Next-to-Last Resort: Appeals from the Alberta Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, 1970-1990

1969 ◽  
pp. 861
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Success Rates ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Statistical Survey ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This paper reports the results of a statistical survey of the success rates of appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. Appeals from all provinces were examined, but in his analysis Professor McCormick focuses on the Alberta Court of Appeal. The variables he discusses include the geographic and political composition of the Supreme Court, the mix of cases from different areas of the law, the length of experience of Court of Appeal judges, and the presence or absence of dissenting opinions.

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