Larke v Nugus: practical points in an unsettled environment

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-153
Author(s):  
Stephen Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract The Court of Appeal decision in Larke v Nugus was handed down in 1979. Practitioners thought that the process of disclosing information from a Will Preparation File once a Will was in dispute was well established – but there have recently been considerable changes. The Law Society produced a new version of its Practice Note in December 2018. There are disagreements between stakeholders about the steps to be taken upon receipt of a Larke v Nugus letter. Some practices must cease forthwith. This article discusses these issues.

The Licensee's Period of Grace: Bellotti Reconsidered

1996 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240
Author(s):  
Tamara Kerbel
Keyword(s):  
Privy Council ◽  
Railway Company ◽  
Short Notice ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Law ◽  
Canadian Pacific Railway ◽  
Court Of Appeal

At present the law fails to provide an adequate balance between the interests of licensor and licensee when a licensor revokes a licence but gives an unreasonably short notice. The prevailing orthodoxy has followed the Court of Appeal decision in Minister of Health v. Bellotti. This article will argue that the consequences of this decision have proved disastrous for both licensors and licensees. In direct conflict with Bellotti is the Privy Council authority of Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. The King.

scholarly journals There is no Such Thing as a Sham Trust

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
BoHao (Steven) Li
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Bilateral Transaction ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Law ◽  
Trust Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Law Commission

The Court of Appeal decision in Official Assignee v Wilson is the leading New Zealand case on "sham trusts". Obiter, O'Regan and Robertson JJ held that for a sham trust to exist, the settlor and trustee must have a common intention to not create a trust. Post-Wilson, debate continues over the precise elements that render a trust a sham. The Law Commission suggested that the sham doctrine, as a means of analysing the validity of an express trust, may not be the best approach. A better starting point would be a return to the certainty of intention requirement. In arguing that the Law Commission's recommendation is correct, this article will discuss three legal issues: whether an express trust is a unilateral or bilateral transaction; whether the excluded evidence has always been part of the objective intention requirement; and whether the legislative and policy factors have made foreign trust law distinct from New Zealand trust law. Finally, this article will expand on the test proposed by the Law Commission.

scholarly journals Should Pension Savings Be a Protected Property at Bankruptcy?

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Trish Keeper
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Test Case ◽  
Business Innovation ◽  
Discussion Document ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In 2015, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held, in Trustee Executors Ltd v The Official Assignee,[1] a test case brought by the Official Assignee (OA), that the OA could not access the KiwiSaver balances of a bankrupt. In response, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment released a Discussion Document in July 2016, proposing a law change to make some, or all, of a bankrupt’s pension savings available to the OA for the benefit of a bankrupt’s creditors. This article outlines the Court of Appeal decision and its implications within the context of both the New Zealand Insolvency Act 2006 and the KiwiSaver Act 2006. It then critically discusses the law change proposed in the Discussion Document and suggests that, given the significant difficulties with this proposal, more limited reforms be implemented to prevent bankrupts unfairly using the inalienability of pension savings to defeat the interests of creditors. [1] [2015] NZCA 118.

Remoteness of damage in negligence: a rotten structure collapses

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Janet O'Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
London Borough ◽  
Borough Council ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

INThe Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] A.C. 388, Viscount Simmonds expressed the hope that, by replacing directness (and its attendant “insoluble” problem, the search for breaks in the chain of causation) with reasonable foreseeability as the test for remoteness of damage in negligence, “the law will be simplified and . . . palpable injustice will be avoided”. Lawyers have long recognised that the first of these aspirations has failed dismally. Regrettably, the Court of Appeal decision in Jolley v. Sutton London Borough Council [1998] 1 W.L.R. 1546 provides a stark example of failure on both counts.

Electronic eavesdropping and anomalies in the law of evidence

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
J.R. Spencer
Keyword(s):  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal

THERE is nothing wrong with the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Aujla [1998] 2 Cr.App.R. 16. Almost everything is wrong, however, with the law that the court was called on to interpret, and the decision is interesting because it shows this up.

Contract variation in the common law

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-207
Author(s):  
James C Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Business Exchange ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This note analyses the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd, a case that confirms the long uncertain ability of ‘No Oral Modification’ clauses to exclude informal variations in English law. This note argues that, while the Court was correct to reject the putative oral variation in question, the majority’s description of the law is unsatisfactory because of its detachment from wider contract law principle, and compares unfavourably with the alternative ratio by which Lord Briggs reached a concurring outcome. This note also comments on the Supreme Court’s (cursory) treatment of the portentous Court of Appeal decision in Williams v Roffey Bros, which has reformulated the law on contract variation across common law jurisdictions. The Court acknowledged, but declined to resolve, the tensions Roffey introduced in to the law on part payment of debts. While it is unfortunate that the opportunity to resolve these tensions was missed, this note endorses the Court’s ( obiter) rejection of the analysis by which the Court of Appeal below sought to extend Roffey to the part payment of debts.

Fracturing Constitutional Rights: The Prosecution of Alleged Broadcast Infringers in Nigeria

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Bankole Sodipo
Keyword(s):  
Civil Liability ◽  
Copyright Infringement ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
Written Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Material Form

Abstract Infringement of broadcasts is often treated as a crime. The Nigerian Constitution guarantees that no-one can be prosecuted for any act that is not prescribed in a written law. Section 20 of Nigeria's Copyright Act only criminalizes dealing with infringing copies. A “copy” is defined in terms of material form. An infringing broadcast therefore connotes a recorded broadcast or a copy of a broadcast. This article argues that, statutorily, not every act that gives rise to civil liability for broadcast copyright infringement constitutes a crime. The article reviews the first broadcast copyright prosecution Court of Appeal decision in Eno v Nigerian Copyright Commission. Eno was unlawfully prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned. The article seeks to stem the wave of prosecutions on the type of charges used in Eno. In the absence of law reform, the prosecutions based on the line of charges in Eno constitute a fracturing of constitutional rights.

scholarly journals Culpability, Kingston and the Law Commission

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby
Keyword(s):  
Justice System ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Character Theory ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Do So

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.

Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Psychological Harm ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Law Of Delict ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Made In

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.

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