Contract variation in the common law

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-207
Author(s):  
James C Fisher

This note analyses the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd, a case that confirms the long uncertain ability of ‘No Oral Modification’ clauses to exclude informal variations in English law. This note argues that, while the Court was correct to reject the putative oral variation in question, the majority’s description of the law is unsatisfactory because of its detachment from wider contract law principle, and compares unfavourably with the alternative ratio by which Lord Briggs reached a concurring outcome. This note also comments on the Supreme Court’s (cursory) treatment of the portentous Court of Appeal decision in Williams v Roffey Bros, which has reformulated the law on contract variation across common law jurisdictions. The Court acknowledged, but declined to resolve, the tensions Roffey introduced in to the law on part payment of debts. While it is unfortunate that the opportunity to resolve these tensions was missed, this note endorses the Court’s ( obiter) rejection of the analysis by which the Court of Appeal below sought to extend Roffey to the part payment of debts.

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-492
Author(s):  
Richard Mullender

In the law of defamation, the jury is “the constitutional tribunal” of fact (J.C.C. Gatley, Libel and Slander, 9th ed. (London 1998), pp. 889-890). The jury’s occupation of this position is usually traced back to Fox’s Libel Act 1792. While confined in terms to criminal trials, the 1792 Act is regarded as declaratory of the common law (see Sir Martin Nourse, “The English Law of Defamation-Is Trial by Jury Still the Best?”, in B.S. Markesinis (ed.), The Clifford Chance Lectures, vol. I, Bridging the Channel (Oxford 1996), ch. 4). One way in which to explain the jury’s role in defamation trials can be found in the ideal of institutional justice. This ideal specifies that institutions should, in order to be legitimate, adequately accommodate the views of those in the society where they operate (G. Cupit, Justice As Fittingness (Oxford 1996), ch. 5). There is, however, reason to regard defamation law’s commitment to institutional justice as qualified. Support for this view can be found in Grobbelaar v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 All E.R. 437. In Grobbelaar, a unanimous Court of Appeal overturned a jury’s findings of fact on the ground that they were perverse and unreasonable. This decision appears ground-breaking since the Court was unable to point to domestic authorities in which the same step had been taken.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


2021 ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Ariel Porat

This chapter illustrates personalized law “in action” by examining it in three areas of the law: standards of care under the common law tort doctrine of negligence, mandated consumer protections in contract law, and criminal sanctions. In each area, the chapter examines personalization of commands along several dimensions. In tort law, standards of care could vary according to each injurer’s riskiness and skill, to reduce the costs of accidents. In contract law, mandatory protections could vary according to the value they provide each consumer and differential cost they impose on firms, to allocate protections where, and only where, they are justified. And in criminal law, sanctions would be set based on what it takes to deter criminals, accounting for how perpetrators differ in their motives and likelihood of being apprehended, with the potential to reduce unnecessary harsh penalties.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kearns

This essay argues that the 1675 conviction of John Taylor by the Court of King's Bench for slandering God reveals Chief Justice Matthew Hale implementing a model of conjoint law-making between courts, Parliament, and crown that gave pre-eminent power to the common lawyers, and none to the Church of England. In doing so, it counters the prevailing literature on Restoration English law, which has treated the law as hierarchical, with the common lawyers subordinate to the sovereign. Rather than following statute or ecclesiastical law, which emphasised the spiritual nature of crimes like Taylor's, Hale located Taylor's offence in the exclusively temporal common law jurisdiction of defamation, which existed largely outside of monarchical purview. Hale's judgment reflected his rhetoric of judicial office outside the courtroom, where he argued the judiciary worked alongside King and Parliament in making law, but were not subservient to these institutions, for common lawyers relied on sources of law beyond sovereign-made statute. The language of sovereignty as hierarchical was thus a factional attack on an independent common law, an attempt to subordinate the common lawyers to the crown that was resisted by the lawyers like Hale in his rhetoric and exercise of office, and should not ground accounts of the Restoration regime.


Author(s):  
Daniel Visser

Unjustified enrichment confronted both civil and common lawyers with thinking which was often completely outside the paradigm to which they had become accustomed. The recognition of unjustified enrichment as a cause of action in its own right in English law created a new arena of uncertainty between the systems. This article argues that comparative lawyers can make an important contribution to the future of the fractured and fractious world of unjustified enrichment. It may help to uncover the enormous wealth of learning of which both the common law and the civil law are the repositories, and so bring the same level of understanding to the law of unjustified enrichment which has, over the years, been achieved between the systems in regard to contract and tort.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
Laura-Dumitrana Rath Boșca ◽  
Bogdan Bodea

Common Law represents the second biggest contemporary judicial system. Immanent to a historical process which led to the creation of a community, common law represents a form of social solidarity. It is not the result of any social consent to obey a law as much as it is the participation of the society, through its exceptions, to the process of elaborating the law by which it functions. So, society itself is through a sort of syncretism the common law.One the elementary concepts of common law is the doctrine of precedent which functions in parallel with organic laws in order to enhance both the results of judicial cases and the efficiency of the cases. In the English law, the testament is a representation of the wishes of a defunct person and the declaration of that persons wishes in relation to the belongings he wished to pass on after his death.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter considers a further source of the UK constitution: the law made by the judicial branch of government as a result of the cases heard by the courts. Today it is widely accepted that judge-made law is a reality. It takes two main forms: the development of the common law; or the interpretation of statutes. The two main approaches of the courts to interpretation of Acts of Parliament—the literal approach and the purposive approach—are discussed. The interpretative obligation imposed on the courts by s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is also reviewed.


Author(s):  
Gary F Bell

Indonesia is one of the most legally diverse and complex countries in the world. It practises legal pluralism with three types of contract law in force: adat (customary) contract laws, Islamic contract laws (mostly concerning banking), and the European civil law of contract, transplanted from the Netherlands in 1847, found mainly in the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata). This chapter focuses on European civil law as it is the law used for the majority of commercial transactions. The civil law of contract is not well developed and there is a paucity of indigenous doctrine and jurisprudence, since most significant commercial disputes are settled by arbitration. The contours of the law are consistent with the French/Dutch legal tradition. In the formation of contracts, the subjective intention of the parties plays a greater role than in the common law. As with most jurisdictions with a Napoleonic tradition, the offer must include all the essential element of the contract, there is no concept of ‘invitations to treat’ or of ‘consideration’, the common law posting rule is rejected, and the contract is formed only when the acceptance is received. There are generally few requirements of form but some contracts must be in writing and some in a notarial deed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Seyed Mohammad Mousavi ◽  
Arash Babaei ◽  
Shamsollah Khatami ◽  
Yousef Jafarzadi

<p>One characteristic of the force of law in the country, the integrity of the rules in all areas of all aspects of creation into account the distinction between crime and the crime and failed or incomplete in acts of crime and crime as the withdrawal. In this respect the rules on penalties culpability in the crime has been proposed that the content of the crime with absolute responsibility of these categories has manifested. Under the Articles 144 and 145 of the Latest version Islamic criminal law (2013), Create unintentional offenses, subject to verification of the fault committed. In crimes ranging from quasi-intentional unintentional deviation as retaliation book rules apply. Legislator to commit a fault, the reason for the error is considered criminal, which has always been considered an objective measure and a ruler (in Article 145), while the common law under subsection (1) "criminal law to crimes" adopted 1981 crime start as the offense is punishable total. This study showed that certain similarities between the laws. In this context, the two internal laws and the common law can be found, in which the underlying offense of absolute liability is not fixed in the courts. Always treat judges and lawyers in the face of legal texts are not consistent because of the lack of transparency and clarity of the rules. In particular, in the common law, when a crime for the first time in cour t, and a warrant has been issued about it in terms of predicting the law and with regard to the interpretation of judges, procedural difference is more tangible.</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 315-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier ◽  
Jill Poole

Course-focused and comprehensive, Poole’s Textbook on Contract Law provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. This chapter focuses on the legal treatment of ‘mistake’. It considers mistakes that prevent agreement (mutual or cross-purposes mistakes and unilateral mistake as to terms, particularly identity mistakes). It also examines the remedy of rectification when the contract does not accurately reflect what the parties agreed. It also considers the defence of non est factum. It then considers mistakes that are presumed to nullify consent if both parties entered into the contract under the same fundamental mistake. The doctrine of common mistake in English law is designed to protect the interests of third parties and to ensure certainty in transactions. A fundamental common mistake arises in cases where there is true impossibility or failure of consideration; the contract is automatically void and any money or property involved has to be returned. Distinctions can arise depending upon whether the impossibility is initial (common mistake) or subsequent (frustration doctrine). Categories of common mistake at common law include mistake as to subject matter (res extincta) and mistake as to ownership (res sua). A mistake as to quality will rarely be sufficiently fundamental to render the contract void. This chapter also discusses Lord Denning’s attempts to introduce an equitable jurisdiction to set aside on terms in cases of mistakes as to quality. These were rejected in Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd meaning that there is no remedial flexibility in such instances.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document