scholarly journals Culpability, Kingston and the Law Commission

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.

1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gardner

The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is much disparaged by today's criminal lawyers. Its provisions have been described as “impenetrable” by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords could not conceal its dissatisfaction with what is called “the irrational result of this piecemeal legislation”. Andrew Ashworth has written of the “antiquated and illogical structure” of an Act which the Law Commission regards as “unsatisfactory in very many respects”. Most recently Brooke J., launching the latest version of the Commission's reform package, lambasted the operation of the 1861 Act as “a disgrace”, and claimed that this hostile view is shared in every corner of the criminal justice system.


Author(s):  
Rudi Fortson

This chapter examines the legal and practical issues encountered by practitioners when dealing with unfitness to plead litigation. As the Law Commission for England and Wales has pointed out, defendants charged with a criminal offence may be unfit to plead or to stand trial for a variety of reasons, including difficulties resulting from mental illness, learning disability, developmental disorder, or communication impairment. Two issues are considered: (i) how might those defendants who are unfit be accurately identified; and (ii) what steps should be taken by legal practitioners and by the courts of criminal jurisdiction to cater for the interests of vulnerable defendants, victims, and society, and to maintain the integrity of the legal process as one that is fair and just? The chapter evaluates the reform proposals of the English Law Commission and assesses how the law could be improved for all those who are involved in dealing with the unfit to plead.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-84
Author(s):  
Akalafikta Jaya ◽  
Triono Eddy ◽  
Alpi Sahari

In the past, the punishment of children was the same as the punishment of adults. This causes the psychological condition of children ranging from investigation, investigation and trial to be disturbed because it is often intimidated by law enforcement agencies. Under these conditions, Law No. 11 of 2012 concerning the Juvenile Justice System was born. One of the reforms in the Child Criminal Justice System Law requires the settlement of a child criminal case by diversion. Based on the results of research that the conception of criminal offenses against children in conflict with the law in Indonesia is different from criminal convictions to adults. Children are given the lightest possible punishment and half of the criminal convictions of adult criminal offenses. That criminal liability for children who are ensnared in a criminal case according to the Law on the Criminal Justice System for Children is still carried out but with different legal sanctions from adults. Criminal imprisonment against children is an ultimumremedium effort, meaning that criminal imprisonment against children is the last legal remedy after there are no other legal remedies that benefit the child. That the concept of enforcement of criminal law against children caught in criminal cases through diversion is in fact not all have applied it. Some criminal cases involving children as the culprit, in court proceedings there are still judges who impose prison sentences on children who are dealing with the law.


1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 649
Author(s):  
J Morris

This article considers the impact of gender upon women's experiences of the New Zealand justice system, as lawyers and clients. As well as summarising study and survey material, it draws upon information provided to the Law Commission in the course of its project on Women's Acces to Justice: He Putanga mo nga Wahine ki te Tika. It concludes that women are still significantly disadvantaged by the justice system as a result of their gender and that there is an ongoing need for debate and consideration of these issues if women's access to justice is to be improved.


Surprisingly, there are no official authoritative series of law reports in England to equate with the Queen’s Printers copy of an Act of Parliament. The Stationery Office is responsible for publishing revenue, immigration and social security law cases. However, traditionally, law reports remain in the hands of private publishers. Today, there are numerous, often competitive, private publishers. Although there are no official series of law reports, the courts do respect some reports more than others. A long established, conventional rule is that a law report, if it is to be accepted by the relevant court as an authority, must be prepared by and published under the name of a fully qualified barrister. The greater accuracy of modern reporting, and the vetting by judges, necessitates longer delays before the cases are published. Also, the Law Reports only cover 7% of the cases in the higher courts in any given year. Interesting issues are: (a) who selects which cases to report? (b) how are they selected? Editors select the cases for inclusion in the series of law reports. These are highly trained lawyers, well acquainted with precedent and the likely importance of cases. During the past 150 years publishers of law reports have been generalists or specialists. Some law reports are annotated, particularly for the use of practitioners, others left without annotations, introductions, etc. In addition to reported cases, the Supreme Court Library contains thousands of files of unreported cases. In 1940, the Lord Chancellor’s Department prepared a report: The Report of the Law Reporting Committee. The Committee considered that, after editors had made their choices, ‘What remains is less likely to be a treasure house than a rubbish heap in which a jewel will rarely, if ever, be discovered’ (p 20). (Note the poetic language that forcefully carries the point.) Of course, today, there is a vast range of electronic retrieval systems for accessing details of thousands of unreported cases. This has caused its own problems and there was a legitimate concern that courts would be inundated with cases that did not really contain any new law, but which had been retrieved from electronic sources. In the case of Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd [1983] 2 AC 192, the House of Lords took the step of forbidding the citation of unreported cases of the civil division of the Court of Appeal without special leave. The rule remains, however, that to be an accepted version that can be quoted in court the report must have been prepared and published by a barrister. When law students read law reports they must ask: (a) is this report the most authoritative version available? (b) are there fuller versions? (c) if unreported, does this case add to the law? Figure 4.2, below, sets out the types of reports available for the law student to consult.

2012 ◽  
pp. 78-79

Legal Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-693
Author(s):  
Richard Glover

AbstractThis paper examines the law on good character evidence in criminal trials through a discussion of the important but under-analysed case of Hunter, in which a five-judge Court of Appeal sought to clarify the law on good character directions to the jury. However, it is argued here that the judgment conflicts with the leading House of Lords decision in Aziz. The paper considers how the court misinterpreted the law and, in particular, the defeasible nature of the rule in Aziz and the impact of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As a result, the circumstances in which a good character direction will be provided have diminished significantly. It is argued that this has important implications for the right to a fair trial, as good character directions act as a ‘backstop’ against miscarriages of justice. They also form a vital part of the ‘framework of fairness’ considered necessary, in lieu of reasoned jury verdicts, by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Taxquet v Belgium. Accordingly, it is contended that Aziz rather than Hunter should be followed so that, where there is evidence of good character, a direction is normally provided as a matter of law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-96
Author(s):  
Chris Bevan

AbstractThe doctrine of benefit and burden – an indirect method for enforcing the burden of positive freehold covenants – developed as an exception the strict Austerberry rule that the burden of positive covenants cannot bind successors directly at law. Three recent Court of Appeal cases (Davies v Jones; Wilkinson v Kerdene and Elwood v Goodman) confirm the continued existence and application of the doctrine but also reveal its deficiencies and limitations. This article explores the contemporary application of the doctrine, identifies its theoretical, historical and elemental frailty and, drawing on recent reform proposals of the Law Commission, highlights the case for reform. In so doing, this article argues that a vital theoretical issue has been overlooked in the reform debate: the numerus clausus principle.


1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Sales

The litigation in Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc. appeared to herald a much-needed review by the House of Lords of the torts of conspiracy to injure by lawful and unlawful means. Since that will not now take place, the law will for the present remain as the Court of Appeal in Metall und Rohstoff has interpreted the decision of the House of Lords in Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (No. 2). The purpose of this article is to argue that there is an important division in principle between the tort of conspiracy to injure another by lawful means and the tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, and that the rules governing liability for the former tort should be different from, and more limited than, the rules governing liability for the latter tort. Thus recent authority is questioned on the basis that the law in this area was properly set out in the older cases, but for reasons which lie buried and are not always expressly articulated in them. It will be the thrust of this article that the narrow view of the scope of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means which appears in the speech of Lord Diplock in Lonrho v. Shell (No. 2), as interpreted after full argument in the Court of Appeal in Metall und Rohstoff, is mistaken, and that the House of Lords (when eventually it has the opportunity to review these two decisions) should revive the distinction which existed between conspiracy to injure by lawful means and conspiracy to injure by unlawful means prior to 1982.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
BoHao (Steven) Li

The Court of Appeal decision in Official Assignee v Wilson is the leading New Zealand case on "sham trusts". Obiter, O'Regan and Robertson JJ held that for a sham trust to exist, the settlor and trustee must have a common intention to not create a trust. Post-Wilson, debate continues over the precise elements that render a trust a sham. The Law Commission suggested that the sham doctrine, as a means of analysing the validity of an express trust, may not be the best approach. A better starting point would be a return to the certainty of intention requirement. In arguing that the Law Commission's recommendation is correct, this article will discuss three legal issues: whether an express trust is a unilateral or bilateral transaction; whether the excluded evidence has always been part of the objective intention requirement; and whether the legislative and policy factors have made foreign trust law distinct from New Zealand trust law. Finally, this article will expand on the test proposed by the Law Commission.


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