Stalin, Generalissimo Joseph Vissarionovich, (21 Dec. 1879–5 March 1953), President of Soviet Council of Ministers since 1946 (late Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars) of the USSR, head of People’s Commissariat of the Armed Forces of the USSR, 1946–47; Chairman of the State Defence Committee, and People’s Commissar for the Defence of the USSR, 1941–46; member Supreme Soviet of USSR; General Secretary, Communist Party of Soviet Union (Bolsheviks); member Political Bureau of CPSU

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-167
Author(s):  
S.A. TARASOV ◽  

The main purpose of the article is to reveal the features of the organization of work with the leading per-sonnel of the Soviet Union in the 1930-s – 1940-s, as an important component of the effective state man-agement. The article examines the state of work with the highest leading personnelof the Soviet Union in the 1930-s – 1940-s on the example of the personnel bodies’ activities of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)(VKP (b)).The focus of the study is on the Personnel Departmentof the Central Committee, the time of functioning of which falls on the specified chronological period.On the basis of archival materi-als, the organizational structure of the Department and the most important tasks faced by its employees in the process of working with the highest party, Soviet, economic and military leaders of the country are revealed.Brief biographical information of a number of officials who held key positions in this party body is provided.The existing shortcomings in the work, the procedure and the ways of fixing them are highlighted.


2021 ◽  
pp. 37-40
Author(s):  
William Klinger ◽  
Denis Kuljiš

This chapter begins with a description of Jovan Mališić Martinović, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), who Marshal Tito perceived as a person without real revolutionary enthusiasm. It discusses the “Bombing Plot Trial” against Tito, which took place in Zagreb in November 1928. It also cites the state prosecutor of the trial Dr Ivo Marokini, who speculated that Tito had used the trial and the sensational press coverage for his own promotion. The chapter talks about the suspicion on Matija Brezović, the secretary of the Central Committee of the League of the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ), of being a police spy. It recalls how Tito's rivals and redundant fellow-travelers disappeared in Russia or fell into the hands of the police, of which only Brezović got away unscathed.


Author(s):  
Jorge I. Domínguez

Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), founded in 1959, have been among the world’s most successful military. In the early 1960s, they defended the new revolutionary regime against all adversaries during years when Cuba was invaded at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, faced nuclear Armageddon in 1962, and experienced a civil war that included U.S. support for regime opponents. From 1963 to 1991, the FAR served the worldwide objectives of a small power that sought to behave as if it were a major world power. Cuba deployed combat troops overseas for wars in support of Algeria (1963), Syria (1973), Angola (1975–1991), and Ethiopia (1977–1989). Military advisers and some combat troops served in smaller missions in about two dozen countries the world over. Altogether, nearly 400,000 Cuban troops served overseas. Throughout those years, the FAR also worked significantly to support Cuba’s economy, especially in the 1960s and again since the early 1990s following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Uninterruptedly, officers and troops have been directly engaged in economic planning, management, physical labor, and production. In the mid-1960s, the FAR ran compulsory labor camps that sought to turn homosexuals into heterosexuals and to remedy the alleged socially deviant behavior of these and others, as well. During the Cold War years, the FAR deepened Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, deterred a U.S. invasion by signaling its cost for U.S. troops, and since the early 1990s developed confidence-building practices collaborating with U.S. military counterparts to prevent an accidental military clash. Following false starts and experimentation, the FAR settled on a model of joint civilian-military governance that has proved durable: the civic soldier. The FAR and the Communist Party of Cuba are closely interpenetrated at all levels and together endeavored to transform Cuban society, economy, and politics while defending state and regime. Under this hybrid approach, military officers govern large swaths of military and civilian life and are held up as paragons for soldiers and civilians, bearers of revolutionary traditions and ideology. Thoroughly politicized military are well educated as professionals in political, economic, managerial, engineering, and military affairs; in the FAR, officers with party rank and training, not outsider political commissars, run the party-in-the-FAR. Their civilian and military roles were fused, especially during the 1960s, yet they endured into the 21st century. Fused roles make it difficult to think of civilian control over the military or military control over civilians. Consequently, political conflict between “military” and “civilians” has been rare and, when it has arisen (often over the need for, and the extent of, military specialization for combat readiness), it has not pitted civilian against military leaders but rather cleaved the leadership of the FAR, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), and the government. Intertwined leaderships facilitate cadre exchanges between military and nonmilitary sectors. The FAR enter their seventh decade smaller, undersupplied absent the Soviet Union, less capable of waging war effectively, and more at risk of instances of corruption through the activities of some of their market enterprises. Yet the FAR remain both an effective institution in a polity that they have helped to stabilize and proud of their accomplishments the world over.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Dunlop

A book published by the author in 1993 contained a lengthy chapter on the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union. This article builds on and updates that chapter, making use of a trove of newly available documents and memoirs. The article discusses many aspects of the coup attempt, but it particularly seeks to explain why the coup failed and what the implications were for the Soviet Union. The events of December 1991 that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union were the direct result of changes set in motion by the failed coup. The major state and party institutions that might ordinarily have tried to hold the country together—the Communist Party apparatus, the secret police, the military-industrial complex, the Ministry of Defense, and the state administrative organs—all were compromised by their participation in the coup. As a result, when events pushed the Soviet Union toward collapse there was no way of staving off that outcome.


Author(s):  
Miguel La Serna

Between 1980 and 1999, the Peruvian Communist Party—Shining Path—enveloped the Andean nation of Peru in an armed insurrection designed to topple the state and institute a communist regime. The Maoist insurrection began in the highland department of Ayacucho, quickly spreading throughout the countryside and into the cities. After initially dismissing the insurgency as the work of small-time bandits, the government responded by sending in counterterrorism police and the armed forces into guerrilla-controlled areas. Both Shining Path and government forces targeted civilians as part of their wartime strategies, while some Indigenous peasants took up arms to defend their communities from the bloodshed. In 1992, police captured Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán, severely weakening the insurgency. By 1999, most remaining guerrilla leaders had been arrested, all but ending the armed phase of the conflict.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1187-1216
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Hosking

The USSR was a unique empire in the universality of its claims and its aim of complete equality between nationalities. Its strengths and weaknesses were indissolubly connected. It was formally a federal state, with extensive rights given to constituent nationalities; in practice it was tightly centralized through Gosplan, the armed forces, the security services, and the Communist Party, with its messianic ideology. The USSR’s tight centralization ensured that in wartime it could mobilize social energy to an unprecedented extent, but also that in peacetime localized patronage became the main form of social cohesion. The economy was so rigidly planned as to discourage innovation, which meant that the USSR could not maintain its superpower status. Its nationality policy both encouraged ethnic feeling and repressed it. The final collapse was precipitated by the clash between the largest republic, Russia, and the Soviet Union as a whole.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-339

At a meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on March 1, 1950, the British Commonwealth representative, Colonel W. R. Hodgson of Australia, urged General MacArthur to take “positive action” on Japanese charges that war prisoners in the Soviet Union had been denied repatriation unless they agreed to join the communist party upon their return. Colonel Hodgson criticized General MacArthur's policy of maintaining that the Allied Council could only discuss the issue, and demanded that the Council order Japanese authorities to make a thorough investigation of the accusations, particularly to determine if charges of treason should be brought against Kiyuchi Tokuda, general secretary of the Japanese communist party. William Sebald, United States representative on the Council, after an original statement that Colonel Hodgson's proposal was “not appropriate,” agreed to suggest that Japanese authorities launch a “positive” inquiry. The Japanese government on the following day announced initiation of an investigation.


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