Pirzada, Syed Sharif Uddin, (12 June 1923–2 June 2017), Hon. Senior Adviser to Chief Executive on Foreign Affairs, Law, Justice and Human Rights, Pakistan, 2000–08; Member, National Security Council, 1999–2008; Ambassador-at-Large, since 1999; Attorney-General of Pakistan, 1965–66, 1968–71 and 1977–89

Significance President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared the SoE following a four-and-half-hour National Security Council meeting on July 20, five days after a failed coup. A countrywide SoE is a first. During the 1980s and 1990s, one was in force in the mainly Kurdish south-east. That was a bitter experience in which hundreds of people disappeared, and 'deep state' extra-judicial killings were an everyday occurrence. Impacts Abuses under cover of the SoE would confront Turkey directly with the Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights. The government says it will be sensitive about economic freedoms, market functioning and continued investment. A bitter propaganda struggle for Western public opinion between Erdogan and the Gulenists is likely.


1985 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 3-4
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Simon

In the spring of 1981 I designed and taught what I considered, at the time, a "high risk" seminar for seventeen junior and senior political science majors. There were to be no textbooks, no lectures, no examinations and no term papers, those hallmarks of the traditional college course. Nevertheless, when the thirteen week course was over, the students were exhausted and claimed that they had never worked so hard in their college careers.The adventure that my students (and I) undertook was a semester long simulation of the United States National Security Council (NSC), dealing with actual global events as they happened. As Washington dealt with a problem, we dealt with the same problem. The simulation was initially offered during the deteriorating situation in Iran and instability in the Gulf region.


2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles David

This article examines the performance of the U.S. National Security Council as a policy-making body vis-à-vis the southern African conflict under the Nixon and Ford Administrations. It discusses and verifies the hypothesis that the institutionalized System of the NSC gives the President a way of seriously improving his policies, by analyzing (within a structured and formalized framework) the range of options and alternatives, free of negative bureaucratic influences. Furthermore, it shows the impact that the presidential decisions had over the orientation of the southern African conflict from 1969 to 1976.


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