The Future of the Eurozone and the Role of the German Federal Constitutional Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 402-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Calliess
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

The ESM and the European Court's Predicament inPringle

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vestert Borger
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
European Stability Mechanism ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

On 27 November 2012, the European Court of Justice (“the Court”) rendered its judgment in thePringlecase. Sitting as a plenum, which is extremely rare, the Court did what had been expected. Just as theBundesverfassungsgericht(German Federal Constitutional Court orBVerfG) had done two months earlier, it gave the go-ahead for the euro area's permanent emergency instrument, the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”). With this decision, the possibility of granting assistance to financially distressed euro area Member States has now been secured for the future.

scholarly journals Karlsruhe’s Lochner Moment? A Rational Choice Perspective on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s Relationship to the CJEU After the PSPP Decision

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 995-1005
Author(s):  
Niels Petersen
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Courts ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Future ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractOn May 5, 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court issued the PSPP decision, sending shock waves through the European Union. This contribution analyzes the consequences of the PSPP decision for the future relationship between the German FCC and the CJEU and for European integration as a whole. The article consists of four parts. First, I will provide some context and model the interaction between domestic and international courts from a rational choice perspective. Second, I will recapitulate some core aspects of the relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the CJEU in particular. I argue that the relationship between both courts had evolved into a strategic equilibrium in which it was costly not to respect the decision of the other party. The third section then looks for reasons why Karlsruhe nevertheless deviated from this equilibrium despite the significant costs involved. The fourth section, finally, considers the way ahead and analyzes what possible consequences for the future relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court and the CJEU.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

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