Tug of War over Financial Assistance: Which Way Forward for Eurozone Stability Mechanisms?

This article analyses the development of financial assistance in the Eurozone since 2010. It argues that reforms to instruments and bodies, notably the European Financial Stability Facility, the European Stability Mechanism, and the current Covid-19 recovery fund, are best explained by a re-occurring pattern of negotiations between potential creditors and debtors based on common Eurozone interests and national cost-benefit considerations. Building on a liberal intergovernmentalist approach, this article shows how this pattern influenced the step-by-step reform of financial assistance in the Eurozone. The threat to Eurozone stability served as a constant factor encouraging member states to expand and deepen the assistance formula. Creditors’ cost-benefit considerations were key for retaining disincentives, a limited liability for common debt, and intermediary borrowing and lending within the financing design. However, on the back of common Eurozone interests, debtors were able to push for an increase in assistance, an expansion of assistance into areas of banking sector support, and a softening of moral hazard elements in the more recent Covid-19 pandemic. Due to creditors’ continuous insistence on safeguards and limited burden-sharing, reform outcomes were repeatedly unable to resolve the difficulties at hand.

Reform of the EU's Own Revenues and Covering ahe Expenditures Incurred by the Corona Crisis

This contribution focus on the revenue side of the EU budget, which consists of own resources, divided into traditional resources, income in the form of a share of value-added tax, and gross national income. On 21 July 2020, the European Council agreed on a multiannual financial framework for the period 2021-2027, and in response to the pandemic situation associated with Covid-19, a temporary recovery instrument for the next generation of the EU was agreed. At the same time, from which it was apparent that it is necessary to find new own resources for the EU, and how the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could be used to the consequences of the corona crisis. The author will focus mainly on issues on the revenue side of the Union budget and the role of the ESM. Within the ongoing debates when the result was the coronavirus response the question arises of whether it would be appropriate and effective to introduce a common tax for the EU. The main aim of the contribution is to use the descriptive method, the method of analysis and synthesis the revenue side system of the EU budget, and the reform efforts that culminated in the reform of own resources. In the last part of the article, the author using a descriptive method on how the ESM was activated as one of the walls to maintain the stability of the euro area. Including the view of introducing a common European tax as a fiscal instrument to cover the expenditures (debt) incurred related to coronavirus response i.e. recovery instrument Next Generation.

Locally decentralised responses to the European recovery: exploring the role of the Euratom Treaty and the ESM

The pandemic stressed the key role of sustainable consumption and production patterns and highlighted the role of local systems as key actors of a recovery aiming at enhanced resilience to endogenous and exogenous shocks. Although the Recovery Plan marked a radical shift in the attitude of the EU towards crisis management and allowed for an unprecedented joint financial effort, it might not be enough for tackling the challenges ahead. In this paper we suggest that two instruments should be further explored for this purpose: the Euratom Treaty and the European Stability Mechanism.

The European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact in European Integration

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance, often referred to as the Fiscal Compact, constitute two of the main European Union (EU) instruments for dealing with the eurozone crisis. Both had to be established as intergovernmental agreements outside of, but parallel to, the EU’s legal framework. However, the instruments were closely linked to the European Community framework and made extensive use of Community institutions. The ESM was originally set up as a loan facility to Eurozone countries facing problems financing their debt, but it became much bigger in size and scope than originally envisioned by the member states. The Fiscal Compact, on the other hand, can be considered as the fiscal counterpart to the ESM. It received a lot of attention in the press and academia, but it was first and foremost required as a political signal that would allow further enhancements of the ESM. The two instruments are often employed in the literature as part of a continuing juxtaposition of intergovernmentalist and supranationalist methods or approaches. However, from a theoretical perspective, the ESM and Fiscal Compact reflect an acknowledgment of new realities in European integration, in which intergovernmental actors and action channels play a more prominent role in decision making, but this does not necessarily come at the expense of the supranational actors. The instruments exemplify the rise of the European Council’s centered governance for dealing with major reforms. The processes of setting up the ESM and Fiscal Compact were undoubtedly political and top-down, but they were less driven and controlled by the big member states than the label ‘intergovernmental’ implies.