The ESM and the European Court's Predicament inPringle

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vestert Borger
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
European Stability Mechanism ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

On 27 November 2012, the European Court of Justice (“the Court”) rendered its judgment in thePringlecase. Sitting as a plenum, which is extremely rare, the Court did what had been expected. Just as theBundesverfassungsgericht(German Federal Constitutional Court orBVerfG) had done two months earlier, it gave the go-ahead for the euro area's permanent emergency instrument, the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”). With this decision, the possibility of granting assistance to financially distressed euro area Member States has now been secured for the future.

Saving Face? The German Federal Constitutional Court DecidesGauweiler

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asteris Pliakos ◽  
Georgios Anagnostaras
Keyword(s):  
Policy Decision ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Critical Commentary ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

The German Federal Constitutional Court has issued its long-awaited judgment in theGauweiler Case.The Court ruled that the policy decision on the Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT programme) does not manifestly exceed the competences attributed to the European Central Bank (ECB) and does not manifestly violate the prohibition of monetary financing of the budget, if interpreted in accordance with the preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice (Court). This article surveys the Court's decision and offers a critical commentary on this important case.

Das PSPP-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Umfang der Übertragung von Souveränität und Überprüfung von Ermessensgebrauch

IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 220-226
Author(s):  
Achim-Rüdiger Börner
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
National Constitution ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In its judgment of 5 May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has held that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB), which started in 2015, and the relevant decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 11 December 2018, holding that the programme is compatible with European Union (EU) law, are ultra vires acts. Indeed, this decision is based on a French understanding of discretion which has previously been adopted in the European Treaties and according to which discretion is controlled only for undue, illegal influence. Today, the Treaties have adopted a review of discretion under the aspects of suitability, necessity, and appropriateness. Moreover, criticism at the decision of the FCC neglects that the accession to and the membership in the EU have to observe the thresholds of the respective national constitution, as its violation is not and may not be expected by the Union or any other Member State. Ultra vires acts of the Union, which remain uncorrected by the Union itself, are subject to disapproval and rejection by the constitutional court of any Member State.

scholarly journals Separation versus Fusion – or: How to Accommodate National Autonomy and the Charter? Diverging Visions of the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thym
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Separation Thesis ◽  
National Autonomy ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

German Federal Constitutional Court's dialogue with the European Court of Justice – Background, trigger, contents and context of the FCC's reaction to the Åkerberg Fransson judgment – The FCC's Counter-Terrorism Database judgment – Constitutional control standards – theoretical repercussions of the judicial dispute – Underlying conceptual differences – The ‘fusion thesis’ versus the ‘separation thesis’ – Pragmatic approximation of divergent positions

Essay: The Integrative Function of a European Constitution (Discussion of Chr. Dorau: Die Verfassungsfrage der Europäischen Union)

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Eric Murkens
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Convention ◽  
European Constitution ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

Why did the European Union (EU) leaders at the Laeken summit in December 2001 agree to a constitutional convention headed by the former French President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing to design a constitution for the EU when, according to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the German Federal Constitutional Court, and many academic commentators, the founding treaties already form a constitution?

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Wendel
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Less Is More ◽  
Public Expectations ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
European Stability Mechanism ◽  
Media Hype ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Sometimes less is more. Hence, it is not necessarily bad news if a judgment on a matter of fundamental public interest does not meet public expectations. And it certainly was not bad news that the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 12 September 2012 on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Treaty did not meet the exaggerated public expectations that had been fuelled by an unprecedented media-hype.

Much Ado About Human Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 869-894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hartwig
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Court

On October 14, 2004 the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) delivered a judgment which gave rise to vivid reactions in the mass media and to a dispute between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the German Federal Constitutional Court. In interviews, members of the Strasbourg court spoke about their disappointment in the German Court's unwillingness to implement decisions of the ECtHR while members of the German court referred to the necessity to respect national particularities. Whereas, normally, the ECtHR and the constitutional courts of the Member States of the Council of Europe are fighting side by side for human rights and, therefore, consider themselves as natural allies, this time their decisions, which seem to be incompatible, led to a dispute which attracted as much public interest as a film or theatre premiere.

scholarly journals Globalization and the Law: Deciphering the Message of Transnational Human Rights Litigation

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Law ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document