scholarly journals Wild agency: nested intentionalities in cognitive neuroscience and archaeology

2008 ◽  
Vol 363 (1499) ◽  
pp. 1981-1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Scott Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Multi Scale ◽  
Internal States ◽  
Semantic Properties

The present paper addresses the tensions between internalist and radical-interactionist approaches to cognitive neuroscience, and the conflicting conclusions these positions lead to as regards the issue of whether archaeological artefacts constitute ‘results’ or ‘components’ of cognition. Wild systems theory (WST) and the notion of wild agency are presented as a potential resolution. Specifically, WST conceptualizes organisms (i.e. wild agents) as open, multi-scale self-sustaining systems. It is thus able to address the causal properties of wild systems in a manner that is consistent with radical-interactionist concerns regarding multi-scale contingent interactions. Furthermore, by conceptualizing wild agents as self-sustaining embodiments of the persistent, multi-scale contexts that afforded their emergence and in which they sustain themselves, WST is able to address the semantic properties of wild agents in a way that acknowledges the internalist concerns regarding meaningful (i.e. semantic) internal states (i.e. causal content ). In conclusion, WST agrees with radical interactionism and asserts that archaeological artefacts constitute components of cognition. In addition, given its ability to resolve tensions between the internalist and the radical interactionist approaches to cognition, WST is presented as potentially integrative for cognitive science in general.

Neuroscience and the explanation of psychological phenomena

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 847-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antti Revonsuo
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Actual Problem ◽  
Philosophy Of Neuroscience ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Biological Explanations ◽  
Different Levels

Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.

scholarly journals The role of complex systems theory in cognitive science

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 315-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Scott Jordan ◽  
Narayanan Srinivasan ◽  
Cees van Leeuwen
Keyword(s):  
Complex Systems ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Complex Systems Theory

Cognitive Science and Educational Administration

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin W. Evers ◽  
Gabriele Lakomski
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Artificial Neural Networks ◽  
Mathematical Models ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Early Development ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Educational Administration ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Artificial Neural

The influence of cognitive science on educational administration has been patchy. It has varied over four main accounts of cognition, which are, in historical order: behaviorism, functionalism, artificial neural networks, and cognitive neuroscience. These developments, at least as they may have concerned educational administration, go from the late 1940s up to the present day. There also has been a corresponding sequence of developments in educational administration, mainly motivated by accounts of the nature of science. The goal of producing a science of educational administration was dominated by the construal of science as a positivist enterprise. For much of the field’s early development, from the 1950s to the early 1970s, varieties of behaviorism were central, with brief excursions into functionalism. When large-scale alternatives to behaviorism finally began to emerge, they were mostly alternatives to science, and thus failed to comport with much of cognitive science. However, the emergence of postpositivist accounts of science has created the possibility for studies in administrator cognition to be informed by developments in neuroscience. These developments initially included the study of artificial neural networks and more recently have involved biologically realistic mathematical models that reflect work in cognitive neuroscience.

A Study on the Interface between Arts and Sciences

2017 ◽  
pp. 71-86
Author(s):  
Alexandre Siqueira de Freitas
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Preliminary Analysis ◽  
Arts And Sciences ◽  
Science And Art ◽  
Nature And Culture ◽  
The Future

This chapter discusses issues related to two fields of knowledge: neuroesthetics and cognitive neuroscience of art. These two fields represent areas that link historically dichotomic instances: nature and culture. In the first section, the author introduces a brief discussion on this dichotomy, reified here as science and art/aesthetics. Based on a preliminary analysis of these fields, as well as potential interfaces and articulations, the author then situates neuroesthetics and cognitive science of art. In both cases, the main definitions, usual criticisms, and comments on potential expectations regarding the future of these two areas will be presented.

Interacting in the Open

2018 ◽  
pp. 146-162
Author(s):  
Maurice Lamb ◽  
Anthony Chemero
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical Systems ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Theoretical Orientations ◽  
Systems Approaches ◽  
Interaction Hypothesis ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
And Behaviors

Dynamical systems theories describe a wide range of theoretical orientations in cognitive science. In this chapter we focus on a particular formulation of dynamical systems theory that provides a strong theoretical basis for some of the claims made by 4E approaches to cognition. In particular, the target dynamical systems approaches depend on two hypotheses. First, the interaction hypothesis states that the states and behaviors of any entity in a cognitive system are highly dependent on the states and behaviors of some other entity or set of entities. Second, the openness hypothesis states that cognitive systems only persist in the context of other systems. Taken together, these hypotheses entail that the boundaries of cognitive systems should not be taken for granted, and that there are both metrics and reasons for empirically investigating how cognitive systems may be bounded and how those boundaries might change.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document