Naming of Chinese phonograms: from cognitive science to cognitive neuroscience

Author(s):  
Dan-Ling Peng ◽  
Hua Jiang
1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 847-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antti Revonsuo

Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.


Author(s):  
Colin W. Evers ◽  
Gabriele Lakomski

The influence of cognitive science on educational administration has been patchy. It has varied over four main accounts of cognition, which are, in historical order: behaviorism, functionalism, artificial neural networks, and cognitive neuroscience. These developments, at least as they may have concerned educational administration, go from the late 1940s up to the present day. There also has been a corresponding sequence of developments in educational administration, mainly motivated by accounts of the nature of science. The goal of producing a science of educational administration was dominated by the construal of science as a positivist enterprise. For much of the field’s early development, from the 1950s to the early 1970s, varieties of behaviorism were central, with brief excursions into functionalism. When large-scale alternatives to behaviorism finally began to emerge, they were mostly alternatives to science, and thus failed to comport with much of cognitive science. However, the emergence of postpositivist accounts of science has created the possibility for studies in administrator cognition to be informed by developments in neuroscience. These developments initially included the study of artificial neural networks and more recently have involved biologically realistic mathematical models that reflect work in cognitive neuroscience.


Author(s):  
Alexandre Siqueira de Freitas

This chapter discusses issues related to two fields of knowledge: neuroesthetics and cognitive neuroscience of art. These two fields represent areas that link historically dichotomic instances: nature and culture. In the first section, the author introduces a brief discussion on this dichotomy, reified here as science and art/aesthetics. Based on a preliminary analysis of these fields, as well as potential interfaces and articulations, the author then situates neuroesthetics and cognitive science of art. In both cases, the main definitions, usual criticisms, and comments on potential expectations regarding the future of these two areas will be presented.


1993 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 144
Author(s):  
Bruce Bridgeman ◽  
Guy A. Orban ◽  
Wolf Singer ◽  
Niels Ole Bernsen

2002 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 196-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Colombo

Visual attention has long been regarded as a tool for studying the development of basic cognitive skills in infancy and early childhood. However, over the past decade, the development of attention in early life has emerged as an important topic of research in its own right. This essay describes recent changes in the methods used to study attention in infancy, and in the nature of inferences about the early development of attention, as both research and theory in the area have become progressively integrated with models of attention from cognitive science and neuroscience.


Author(s):  
Evan Thompson

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.


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