scholarly journals Allelopathy as an evolutionarily stable strategy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel M McCoy ◽  
Joshua Widhalm ◽  
Gordon G McNickle

In plants, most competition is resource competition, where one plant simply pre-empts the resources away from its neighbours. Interference competition, as the name implies, is a form of direct interference to prevent resource access. Interference competition is common among animals who can physically fight, but in plants, one of the main mechanisms of interference competition is Allelopathy. allelopathic plants release of cytotoxic chemicals into the environment which can increase their ability to compete with surrounding organisms for limited resources. The circumstances and conditions favoring the development and maintenance of allelochemicals, however, is not well understood. Particularly, it seems strange that, despite the obvious benefits of allelopathy, it seems to have only rarely evolved. To gain insight into the cost and benefit of allelopathy, we have developed a 2x2 matrix game to model the interaction between plants that produce allelochemicals and plants that do not. Production of an allelochemical introduces novel cost associated with synthesis and detoxifying a toxic chemical but may also convey a competitive advantage. A plant that does not produce an allelochemical will suffer the cost of encountering one. Our model predicts three cases in which the evolutionarily stable strategies are different. In the first, the non-allelopathic plant is a stronger competitor, and not producing allelochemicals is the evolutionarily stable strategy. In the second, the allelopathic plant is the better competitor and production of allelochemicals is the more beneficial strategy. In the last case, neither is the evolutionarily stable strategy. Instead, there are alternating stable states, depending on whether the allelopathic or non-allelopathic plant arrived first. The generated model reveals circumstances leading to the evolution of allelochemicals and sheds light on utilizing allelochemicals as part of weed management strategies. In particular, the wide region of alternative stable states in most parameterizations, combined with the fact that the absence of allelopathy is likely the ancestral state, provides an elegant answer to the question of why allelopathy rarely evolves despite its obvious benefits. Allelopathic plants can indeed outcompete non-allelopathic plants, but this benefit is simply not great enough to allow them to go to fixation and spread through the population. Thus, most populations would remain purely non-allelopathic.

Behaviour ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 71 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 203-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Jane Brockmann ◽  
Richard Dawkins

AbstractOne suggested evolutionary origin of insect sociality is joint nesting by females of the same generation. Long before selection favoured joint nesting itself, it might have favoured some other incidental preadaptation such as the habit of 'entering' abandoned burrows, found in the usually solitary wasp Splaex ichneumoneus. We have comprehensive economic records of individually marked wasps. There is little evidence of consistent individual variation in nesting success. Wasps often abandon the nests they have dug, and other individuals adopt or 'enter' these empty burrows. 'Dig/Enter' is a good candidate for a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy : digging and entering decisions are not characteristic of particular individuals; the probability of entering is not conditional upon whether it is early or late in the season; there is no correlation between an individual's size and her tendency to dig or enter; there is no correlation between an individual's egg-laying success and her tendency to dig or enter; individuals do not choose to dig or enter on the basis of immediate past success; individuals do not dig and enter in runs, nor do they alternate; wasps do not choose to dig or enter on the basis of how long they have been searching. At one study site digging and entering decisions are roughly equally successful, but at another entering decisions are perhaps slightly more successful. Entering wasps seem not to distinguish empty, abandoned burrows from burrows that are still occupied. As a consequence of indiscriminate entering, two females sometimes co-occupy the same burrow. Co-occupation should not be called 'communal' because the wasps usually share the same brood cell, not just the same burrow. One might expect that wasps would gain some benefit from co-occupying, but they do not, for a number of reasons: only one egg is laid in a shared cell, and obviously only one of the two wasps can lay it; two wasps together do not fetch noticeably more food than one alone; two wasps together are no quicker at provisioning a cell than one wasp alone; wasps sometimes duplicate each others' efforts when they co-occupy a nest; co-occupying wasps often have costly fights. About all that can be said for joint nesting is that it may reduce parasitism. The risk of joint nesting is the price wasps pay for the advantages of taking over an already dug and abandoned burrow. A mathematical model assuming 'dig/enter' as a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy has some predictive success. If the parameters changed quantitatively, the Sphex model could come to predict selection in favour of joint nesting as such. The selection pressures would have to be very strong to overcome the demonstrated disadvantages of co-occupying. Variants of the Sphex model may be applicable to other species, and may help our understanding of the evolution of group living. The theory of evolutionarily stable strategies is relevant not just to the maintenance of behaviour but to its evolutionary change.


1980 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. S. Hines

In addition to the concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), developed specifically for considering intraspecific conflicts, concepts such as the Nash equilibrium from game theory and the attractor or sink from dynamical systems theory appear relevant to the problem of characterizing populations of stable composition. The three concepts mentioned are discussed for one simple standard population model. It is found that evolutionarily stable strategies of one type are necessarily Nash equilibrium strategies, although the converse is not true. The dynamical systems characterization is found to provide a model for populations susceptible to invasion by ‘co-operative' strategies, but capable of evolving back in average to the original equilibrium.


1983 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. S. Hines ◽  
D. T. Bishop

A simple argument demonstrates that the mean strategy of a diploid sexual population at evolutionary equilibrium can be expected to be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the formal sense. This result follows under a wide set of models of genetic inheritance of strategy (including sexual selection) provided that the ESS is both attainable and maintainable.


Author(s):  
Sam Ganzfried

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biology and even cancer. Finding such a strategy has been shown to be difficult from a theoretical complexity perspective. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a mutation strategy. We present an algorithm for the case where mutations are restricted to pure strategies. This is the first positive result for computation of ESS, as all prior results are computational hardness and no prior algorithms have been presented.


1980 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 333-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. S. Hines

In addition to the concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), developed specifically for considering intraspecific conflicts, concepts such as the Nash equilibrium from game theory and the attractor or sink from dynamical systems theory appear relevant to the problem of characterizing populations of stable composition. The three concepts mentioned are discussed for one simple standard population model. It is found that evolutionarily stable strategies of one type are necessarily Nash equilibrium strategies, although the converse is not true. The dynamical systems characterization is found to provide a model for populations susceptible to invasion by ‘co-operative' strategies, but capable of evolving back in average to the original equilibrium.


1979 ◽  
Vol 16 (01) ◽  
pp. 76-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Taylor

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.


2021 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
József Garay ◽  
Tamás F. Móri

AbstractWe consider matrix games with two phenotypes (players): one following a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy and another one that always plays a best reply against the action played by its opponent in the previous round (best reply player, BR). We focus on iterated games and well-mixed games with repetition (that is, the mean number of repetitions is positive, but not infinite). In both interaction schemes, there are conditions on the payoff matrix guaranteeing that the best reply player can replace the mixed ESS player. This is possible because best reply players in pairs, individually following their own selfish strategies, develop cycles where the bigger payoff can compensate their disadvantage compared with the ESS players. Well-mixed interaction is one of the basic assumptions of classical evolutionary matrix game theory. However, if the players repeat the game with certain probability, then they can react to their opponents’ behavior. Our main result is that the classical mixed ESS loses its general stability in the well-mixed population games with repetition in the sense that it can happen to be overrun by the BR player.


1984 ◽  
Vol 21 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Cressman ◽  
W. G. S. Hines

The assumption of arbitrary and biologically implausible inheritance patterns in sexual diploid populations can yield population models in which convergence of a population's mean strategy to an evolutionarily stable strategy will not occur, even though this strategy is attainable with the correct choice of gametic frequencies. The present paper investigates the effect of imposing a simplifying and biologically reasonable restriction on the assumed inheritance patterns; namely, that dominance or underdominance occurs.


1979 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Taylor

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.


1983 ◽  
Vol 20 (02) ◽  
pp. 395-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. S. Hines ◽  
D. T. Bishop

A simple argument demonstrates that the mean strategy of a diploid sexual population at evolutionary equilibrium can be expected to be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the formal sense. This result follows under a wide set of models of genetic inheritance of strategy (including sexual selection) provided that the ESS is both attainable and maintainable.


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