The charter of fundamental rights of the European Union: Pandora’s box or panacea?

2003 ◽  
Vol 45 (5/6) ◽  
pp. 145-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane Ryland

Aims to trace the legal bases for the protection of fundamental rights in the European Community and the European Union, but looks here at internal policy only. Though there was no basis in the Treaty of Rome (1957) for human rights, the European Court of Justice has declared that fundamental human rights are enshrined in the general principles of Community law and thereby protected by the Court. Investigates the Charter, in full, herein

1998 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 175-197
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in 1992, calls have gradually been increasing for a greater recognition of, and firmer foundation for, fundamental (social) rights within the European Union. These calls naturally became louder following the Opinion of the European Court of Justice excluding the possibility of EC accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and during the lead up to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. Academics, independent EU Advisory Committees, groups representing the interests of EU citizens and residents and the European Parliament lamented the almost complete absence of fundamental social rights in the Treaty, and called for an ambitious revision of the Treaty. To a large extent these calls went unheard in Amsterdam, and the new Treaty does not incorporate a comprehensive list of social fundamental rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-511
Author(s):  
Stephen Brittain

European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: relationship – Teleological method of interpretation of the European Court of Justice: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Originalist method of interpretation: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Original meaning of Article 52(3) of the Charter: text, drafting history, case law – Conclusion: case law of European Court of Human Rights not strictly binding on the Court of Justice of the European Union.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 191-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Witold Kurowski

This paper aims to comment an important ruling concerning the Posted Workers Directive (Directive 96/71/EC). In the judgement C-396/13 (Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v. Elektrobudowa Spółka Akcyjna), the European Court of Justice providedits pro-worker’s interpretation of Art 3 of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the scope of the "minimum pay rate". The second issue raised by the European Court of Justice was the assignability of pay claims governed by Polish law based on Art 14 (2) of Rome I Regulation and prohibited under that law. In commented judgement, the Court admitted the assignment of claims arising from employment relationships in light of article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and accepted the trade union’s right to represent the posted workers.


1998 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 175-197
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in 1992, calls have gradually been increasing for a greater recognition of, and firmer foundation for, fundamental (social) rights within the European Union. These calls naturally became louder following the Opinion of the European Court of Justice excluding the possibility of EC accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and during the lead up to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. Academics, independent EU Advisory Committees, groups representing the interests of EU citizens and residents and the European Parliament lamented the almost complete absence of fundamental social rights in the Treaty, and called for an ambitious revision of the Treaty. To a large extent these calls went unheard in Amsterdam, and the new Treaty does not incorporate a comprehensive list of social fundamental rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-363
Author(s):  
Bjarney Friðriksdóttir

Abstract This case report provides an account of the issues addressed in the preliminary ruling of the CJEU in Martinez Silva vs. Italy. The case centres on the limitations Member States of the European Union are permitted to apply in granting third-country nationals in employment equal treatment with nationals in social security rights according to Directive 2011/98/EU (the Single Permit Directive). Additionally, the preliminary ruling of the Court is discussed is discussed in the context of the human rights principle of equal treatment as it is enshrined in EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and International Labour Law.


Author(s):  
Katalin Ligeti

Since long before the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), the two highest courts in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have sought to develop their respective jurisprudence in such a way as to ensure a strong protection of individual rights, whilst avoiding clashes between the decisions taken in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. An important statement in this regard is provided by the Bosphorus judgment, in which the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR recognised the existence of a presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights under EU law. The presumption is rebuttable, but expresses the trustful attitude (and a certain degree of deference) of Strasbourg towards the ability of EU law (and of the CJEU) to protect Convention rights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 409-420
Author(s):  
Anna Podolska

Abstract There are various forms of jurisdictional dialogue. In addition to drawing from the case law of another court or seeking direct assistance of such another court in passing the judgment, we can notice in practice situations when by issuing a verdict the courts are communicating with each other. The rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the free movement of judgments in the European Union and protection of fundamental rights are the example of such activities. Each of these bodies was interpreting separately the extent to which the mechanisms of recognising and executing the judgments may interfere with the level of protection of fundamental rights. A common conclusion concerns assigning the priority to protection of fundamental rights, while individual bodies were determining differently the standards of such protection. The analysed judgments can be construed as a communication between these bodies. Although no direct discussion takes place between these courts, this is still a form of interaction which affects the development of the case law and understanding of the boundaries of mutual recognition of judgments and protection of human rights within judicial proceedings.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Rosanò

The meaning ofidemin thene bis in idemprinciple is controversial in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In interpreting the provision of Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, the court has emphasized the necessary requirement in the identity of the material acts while in antitrust law three requirements have been deemed necessary: (1) Identity of the facts, (2) unity of offender, and (3) unity of the legal interest protected. Despite the opinions of some Advocates General, the court has confirmed different interpretations of the same principle, depending on differences of the legal scope in question. A few years ago, however, the European Court of Human Rights proclaimed the criterion based on the identity of the material acts as the most suitable. This might push the Court of Justice of the European Union to correct its position in the antitrust field. Should this happen, this adjustment might serve as grounds to recognize the existence of a regional custom concerning thene bis in idemprinciple.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-84
Author(s):  
Max Vetzo

The cases of Menci (C-524/15), Garlsson (C-537/16) and Di Puma (C-596/16 and C-597/16) deal with the duplication of criminal and punitive administrative proceedings for the same conduct in the area of VAT and market abuse. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that this duplication of proceedings constitutes a limitation of the ne bis in idem principle of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). This infringement is only justified if the requirements of the limitation clause of Article 52(1) of the Charter are met. The judgments were highly anticipated as they constitute the response of the CJEU to the judgment in A and B v Norway delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in which the ECtHR lowered the level of protection afforded by the ne bis in idem principle of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention of Human Rights (A4P7 ECHR). While there are differences between the approaches taken by both courts, it appears that the reasoning of the CJEU in the judgments largely mirrors that of the ECtHR in A and B v Norway. This article frames the judgments in terms of the dialogue between the CJEU and ECtHR on the ne bis in idem principle. It does so chronologically, by focusing on the past, present and future of the ne bis in idem dialogue between both European courts.


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