Ne Bis Interpretatio In Idem?The Two Faces of theNe Bis In IdemPrinciple in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Rosanò

The meaning ofidemin thene bis in idemprinciple is controversial in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In interpreting the provision of Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, the court has emphasized the necessary requirement in the identity of the material acts while in antitrust law three requirements have been deemed necessary: (1) Identity of the facts, (2) unity of offender, and (3) unity of the legal interest protected. Despite the opinions of some Advocates General, the court has confirmed different interpretations of the same principle, depending on differences of the legal scope in question. A few years ago, however, the European Court of Human Rights proclaimed the criterion based on the identity of the material acts as the most suitable. This might push the Court of Justice of the European Union to correct its position in the antitrust field. Should this happen, this adjustment might serve as grounds to recognize the existence of a regional custom concerning thene bis in idemprinciple.

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Cedric Serneels

This article analyses the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Mihalache v Romania. In the judgment, the Court, dealing with the application of the ne bis in idem principle, further elaborates on the different components of the concept ‘final acquittal or conviction’ under Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights. The author studies this aspect of the ruling through the lens of judicial dialogue and examines in particular the influence of relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the ECtHR’s reasoning.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 955-977 ◽  
Author(s):  
NOREL NEAGU

AbstractAs a result of the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union over the former third pillar (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters), several cases were referred to the Court for interpretation, inter alia, of the dispositions of the Schengen Convention dealing with criminal matters, especially the ne bis in idem principle. This principle was also addressed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Supreme Court of the United States. While addressing the problem at international level, this article focuses principally on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights in the field of the ne bis in idem principle, concisely presenting the legal framework, findings of the Courts, and some conclusions on the interpretation of the principle. The study also analyses the absence of uniformity in interpretation and the use of different criteria in addressing identical situations by different courts, or even by the same court, concluding on a (seemingly) fortunate approximation in interpretation at European level.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 409-420
Author(s):  
Anna Podolska

Abstract There are various forms of jurisdictional dialogue. In addition to drawing from the case law of another court or seeking direct assistance of such another court in passing the judgment, we can notice in practice situations when by issuing a verdict the courts are communicating with each other. The rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the free movement of judgments in the European Union and protection of fundamental rights are the example of such activities. Each of these bodies was interpreting separately the extent to which the mechanisms of recognising and executing the judgments may interfere with the level of protection of fundamental rights. A common conclusion concerns assigning the priority to protection of fundamental rights, while individual bodies were determining differently the standards of such protection. The analysed judgments can be construed as a communication between these bodies. Although no direct discussion takes place between these courts, this is still a form of interaction which affects the development of the case law and understanding of the boundaries of mutual recognition of judgments and protection of human rights within judicial proceedings.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-84
Author(s):  
Max Vetzo

The cases of Menci (C-524/15), Garlsson (C-537/16) and Di Puma (C-596/16 and C-597/16) deal with the duplication of criminal and punitive administrative proceedings for the same conduct in the area of VAT and market abuse. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that this duplication of proceedings constitutes a limitation of the ne bis in idem principle of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). This infringement is only justified if the requirements of the limitation clause of Article 52(1) of the Charter are met. The judgments were highly anticipated as they constitute the response of the CJEU to the judgment in A and B v Norway delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in which the ECtHR lowered the level of protection afforded by the ne bis in idem principle of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention of Human Rights (A4P7 ECHR). While there are differences between the approaches taken by both courts, it appears that the reasoning of the CJEU in the judgments largely mirrors that of the ECtHR in A and B v Norway. This article frames the judgments in terms of the dialogue between the CJEU and ECtHR on the ne bis in idem principle. It does so chronologically, by focusing on the past, present and future of the ne bis in idem dialogue between both European courts.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Vilius Kuzminskas

The article discloses the fixed exclusion regulation of Clause 346 in the Treaty of Function of the European Union in different EU member states. A further assessment of different relevant judicial approaches to regulation are disclosed and evaluated in accordance with the European Court of Justice case law and procurement in the defense area doctrine.


2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques Ziller

In this paper Professor Ziller addresses the intriguing question of the relationship of the European Union – which is not a state and which has no territory of its own – to the territories of EU Member States. The paper provides a survey of the overseas territories affected and the evolution of the case law of the European Court of Justice on the extent to which the provisions of the EC Treaty apply to the European territories overseas.


2021 ◽  
pp. 57-100
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Frank Hoffmeister ◽  
Geert De Baere ◽  
Thomas Ramopoulos

This chapter provides an overview of the treaty-making procedures in the European Union. It explains the historical evolution of primary law in the field and gives examples for each step under Article 218 TFEU (negotiation, signature, provisional application, and conclusion). Excerpts of European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law illustrate how these provisions are interpreted and applied in practice. The chapter also discusses the principles covering suspension and termination of EU agreements, and the ever more important system that allows the EU to contribute to the adoption of international secondary law under Article 218, paragraph 9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A final section describes EU practice for adopting non-legally binding instruments and reproduces the new guidance of December 2017 issued by the Council and the Commission in this respect after the ECJ’s judgment in the case relating to the EU–Swiss Memorandum of Understanding.


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