Can corporate governance mechanisms reduce earnings-management practices in Islamic banks?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Virasty Fitri ◽  
Dodik Siswantoro
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing earnings-management practices in Islamic banks in Asia. Design/methodology/approach This study used 28 Islamic banks in Asia, which were listed on the stock exchange from 2013–2017. The research method used quantitative regression with data on the characteristics of Islamic banks taken from the websites of each bank. This study used discretionary loan loss provision as a proxy for measuring earnings management. Findings The results show that only the audit committee size has a significantly negative effect on earnings management. An independent audit committee has a negative, but not significant, effect. The difference expectation signs cannot be interpreted further. Research limitations/implications Only a few components of corporate governance were tested in this study. Therefore, it is expected that future studies will include more components. Practical implications In general, the components of corporate governance that include the characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee have a varied effect on reducing the earnings-management practices in Islamic banks, except audit committee size. In practice, audit committee size should have an important role in earning management reduces. Originality/value This may be the first paper that studies the effect of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks in Asia.

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in Islamic banks in the Middle East region

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hounaida Mersni ◽  
Hakim Ben Othman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the reporting of loan loss provisions by managers in Islamic banks in the Middle East region. Design/methodology/approach This empirical study uses balanced panel data from 20 Islamic banks, from seven Middle East countries for the period 2007 to 2011. The regression model is estimated using random effects specifications. Findings The empirical results show that discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) are negatively related to board size and the existence of an audit committee. Results also report a positive relationship between sharia board size and DLLP. This indicates that small sharia supervisory boards are more effective than larger ones, which could be due to the higher costs and negative effects of large groups on decision-making. Results also highlight that the existence of scholars with accounting knowledge sitting on the sharia board reduces discretionary behavior. Additional results provide evidence that an external sharia audit committee is also found to reduce discretion in Islamic banks. The conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues and potentially omitted variables. Practical implications The findings are potentially useful for regulators and shareholders. Regulators could use the findings to focus on corporate governance mechanisms that restrain earnings management practices in Islamic banks and implement regulations to strengthen them. Additionally, this study gives shareholders further insight which enables them to better monitor the actions of managers and thus increase their control over their investments. Originality/value This study provides two contributions to the literature on Islamic banking. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is only the second piece of research focused on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks. Second, the authors have examined the effect of some new corporate governance mechanisms that have not been studied previously in the research literature.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Ukuran Perusahaan Dan Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba Di Industri Perbankan Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Karina Karina ◽  
Sutarti Sutarti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Size Firm

The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence of the affect of ownership concetration, firms size, and corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management. Ownership concetration was measure by the biggest stock of individual or organization, firms size was measure by natural logaritma of net assets, and corporate governance mechanisms were measure by three variabels (composition of board of commisioner, audit quality were measure by industry specialize audit firm, and composition of audit committee). Earnings management was measure by discretionary accruals use Modified Jones Method. The population of this research is 41 companies in the banking sector which were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The research data were collected from banking companies financial statement for the period of 2016 to 2018. Based on purposive sampling method. The reseacrh hypotesis were tested using multiple regression analysis. The results of this research show that firm size, firm of commissioner and proportion of commissioner have significant relationships with earnings management. Next, variables composition of board of commissioner, ownership concetration and specialize audit firm have no significant relationship with earnings management. Keywords: ownership concetration, firms size, corporate governance, earnings management

The effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Abedalqader Al-Thuneibat ◽  
Hussam Abdulmohsen Al-Angari ◽  
Saleh Abdulrahman Al-Saad
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Negative Effect

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the compliance of Saudi shareholding companies with the requirements of corporate governance issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority in the Kingdom and their impact on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach – A questionnaire was used to collect data about the compliance of the Saudi shareholding companies with corporate governance requirements and discretionary accruals (DAs) were calculated from the financial statements of these companies using the modified Jones model, then multiple regression was used to test the relationship between the variables. Findings – The results of the study revealed that there was no statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of DAs on corporate governance. Additionally, no statistically significant effect for internal audit, audit committee and board of directors on earnings management was detected. However, the results revealed that there was a slight negative effect for internal audit scope of work and independence and audit committee independence on DAs. Research limitations implications – This research paper is applied on Saudi Arabia, a Middle East country with specific characteristics, that is, a specific context, and, therefore, the results must be interpreted within this context Practical implications – Regulators of Saudi corporations may need to reassess the effectiveness of corporate governance requirements issued by the Capital Market Authority and the actual implementation of these requirements. Researchers also may need further investigation of this phenomenon within its context. Social implications – The results of the study are very important to the Saudi society because they put a big question mark on the relevance of corporate governance of the Saudi shareholding companies Originality/value – The paper provides new evidence about the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in a Middle East environment, which may suggest that there is a need to expand this study using other methodologies to delve into the depths and understand this phenomenon within its context.

The effect of characteristics of audit committee and board on corporate profitability in Iran

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mohammad Tahervafaei ◽  
Hossein Tarighi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relationship between the characteristics of the audit committee and the board and profitability among the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) in Iran. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the companies listed on the TSE during the period from 2010 to 2015 are investigated. The Linear panel regression method is employed for this purpose. The independent variables of the study are composed of some corporate governance mechanisms including audit committee size, audit committee expertise, board size, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, and institutional ownership. Findings In spite of the fact that there does not exist any significant association between audit committee size and corporate financial performance, the results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and profitability. The authors found that the number of board members cannot affect corporate performance; moreover, duality of CEO role in Iranian companies does not affect company performance. However, the outcomes showed a positive and significant association between the proportion of outside directors on the board (board independence) and profitability at 99 percent confidence level. This implies that the role of non-executive directors in Iran is inconsistent with the stewardship theory. This is due to the fact that independent directors understand the status of business and market better than the board’s executive members. Finally, the results indicated that there is no significant association between institutional owners and Iranian companies’ performance. Practical implications The findings of this study will reveal more than ever the role of corporate governance mechanisms for society and users of financial statements because as tools on the CEO actions, they always have to pay attention to the implementation of corporate principles in the economic entity’ operation. Originality/value This is one of the most important studies that simultaneously examine the impacts of characteristics of the audit committee and the board on profitability in an emerging market, and the results of the study may give strength to Iranian as well other developing countries.

Did corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management? Further evidence from GCC Islamic banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Chakib Kolsi ◽  
Rihab Grassa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provision ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management practice for a sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks (IBs) using a new model of earnings management. Design/methodology/approach First, the authors estimate discretionary accruals based on loan loss provisions discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) using the procedure derived from Jones’ (1991) original model. Second, the authors run a multivariate regression model to check the linkage between corporate governance characteristics and discretionary loan loss provision. Finally, the authors use an additional sensitivity check analysis to assess whether the results are robust to the estimation procedure and to other exogenous factors. Findings Using as sample of 26 IBs pertaining to the GCC region with a total of 223 firm-year observations and a nine-year period (2004-2012), the results are conclusive and show that first, IBs with large Shariah Board size manage less DLLP. Secondly, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions membership positively impacts earnings management through DLLP in IBs. Third, there is a negative relationship between boards of director’s independence the extent to which IBs manage DLLP. Fourth, the existence of block holders positively affects earnings management by IBs. Fifth, there is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and DLLP. Finally, institutional ownership and bank size have no effect on earnings management through DLLPs. Research limitations/implications In this research, the authors do not take into account all governance factors that are supposed to impact earnings management in IBs. Future research should explore the impact of additional IBs governance structures including chief executive officer bonus, experience, gender and the extent to which IBs use real earnings management with Murabaha, Mudaraba and Musharaka transactions. Practical implications The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in helping the future development of corporate governance of IBs. In addition, the findings could prove to be useful for regulators because they are responsible for the acceptable level of corporate governance standards. Thus, they must consider strengthening governance mechanisms either through new legislation or stronger enforcement where earnings management is of such magnitude to that serious impedes information transparency and financial reporting quality of IBs. Originality/value This study associates the corporate governance characteristics with earnings management by IBs. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on earnings management and corporate governance in IBs. It should be useful to researchers, regulators, investors, analysts and creditors as well as other players in the capital markets, as it presents a new and important aspect that needs to be accounted for when assessing the quality of IBs’ accounting information in GCC countries.

scholarly journals Free Cash Flow And Earnings Management: The Moderating Role Of Governance And Ownership

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Nekhili ◽  
Ines Fakhfakh Ben Amar ◽  
Tawhid Chtioui ◽  
Faten Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

<p class="Default">The purpose of this paper is to analyze the moderating effect of corporate governance and ownership features in lessening earnings management practices in a free cash flow (FCF) situation. A simultaneous equations model is developed to address endogeneity of the FCF variable. Based on a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2001 to 2010, the results highlight the opportunistic behavior of managers in presence of free cash flows. Particularly, managers engage in earnings management practices that increase reported earnings. Our results also show that corporate governance mechanisms such as audit committee independence and external audit quality, in addition to institutional investors and managerial ownership reduce the extent of earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms are substitutive in their monitoring role of managers’ behavior to reduce earnings management in presence of a free cash flow problem. </p>

scholarly journals Corporate governance and conglomerate diversification strategy – evidence from Vietnam

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 1578-1596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Xuan Trang Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Unrelated Diversification ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Control Devices ◽  
Interest Alignment ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including interest alignment and control devices, on the unrelated diversification level in Vietnam. Additionally, the moderation of free cash flow (FCF) on these relationships is also tested. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a balanced panel data set of 70 listed companies in both stock markets, Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange and Hanoi Stock Exchange, in Vietnam for the years 2007–2014, which gives 560 observations in total. Findings The results show that if executive ownership for CEOs is increased, then the extent of diversification is likely to be reduced. However, the link between unrelated diversification level and executive stock option, another interest alignment device, cannot be confirmed. Among three control devices (level of blockholder ownership, board composition and separation of CEO and chairman positions), the study finds a positive connection between diversification and blockholder ownership, and statistically insignificant relations between the conglomerate diversification level and board composition, or CEO duality. Additionally, this study discovers a negative link between diversification and state ownership, although there is no evidence to support the change to the effect of each internal corporate governance mechanism on the diversification level of a firm between high and low FCF. Practical implications The research can be a useful reference not only for investors and managers but also for policy makers in Vietnam. This study explores the relationship among corporate governance, diversification and firm value in Vietnam, where the topics related to effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms to public companies has been increasingly attractive to researchers since the default of Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) happened in 2010 and the Circular No. 121/2012/TT-BTC on 26 July 2012 of the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance was issued with regulations on corporate governance applicable to listed firms in this country. Originality/value This research, first, enriches current literature on the relationship between corporate governance and firm diversification. It can be considered as a contribution to the related topic with an example of Vietnam, a developing country in Asia. Second, the research continues to prove non-unification in results showing the relationship between corporate governance and conglomerate diversification among different nations. Third, it provides a potential input for future research works on the moderation of FCF to the effects of corporate governance on diversification.

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

scholarly journals CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN MANAJEMEN LABA RIIL PERBANKAN ISLAM INDONESIA DAN MALAYSIA

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Zubaedy Sy ◽  
Nuryati Nuryati ◽  
Surifah Surifah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Islamic Banks

 The main objective of this research is to create good corporate governance that is able to restrictopportunistic REM. The specific objectives of this study are 1) to provide evidence of difference inthe practices of CG and REM in Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic banks,and 2) to provide empirical evidence of the influence of CG on the REM of Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic banks.           The study was conducted on Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic banks from 2011 to 2016by using purposive samplingmethod. The research data is secondary data in the form of annual reports and financial reports originating from the Indonesian Banking Directory, the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the Malaysia Stock Exchange. The analysis method used to test the differences between CG and real earnings management is the Man Whitney test whilethe method used to test the effect of CG on the REM of Islamic Banks in Indonesia and Malaysia is the multiple regression analysiswithordinary least square.            The results show that the practices of corporate governance in Indonesia and Malaysia have their own strengths and weaknesses. CG mechanism of Indonesia and Malaysia shows lower level in some parts and higher level in other parts. Malaysia’s REM islower than Indonesia’sREM through operating cash flow, investment profit sharing, and discretionary costs. The experimental results show that CG generally does not affect real earnings management and only the independent audit committee who is able to restrictreal earnings management through operating cash flows.            Riset ini  menguji  hubungan antara corporate governance (CG) dan manajemen laba berdasar aktivitas riil  atau disebut real earnings management (REM) bank-bank Islam  di Indonesia dan Malaysia. Tujuan jangka panjang riset ini adalah terciptanya good corporate governace yang mampu membatasi REM oportunistik. Target khusus penelitian ini adalah 1) memberi bukti empiris perbedaan praktik CG dan REM bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia. 2) memberi bukti empiris pengaruh CG terhadap REM bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia.             Metode penelitian menggunakan metode ilmiah - kuantitatif, dengan membangun satu atau lebih hipotesis berdasarkan pada suatu struktur  atau kerangka teori dan kemudian menguji hipotesis-hipotesis tersebut secara empiris. Penelitian dilakukan pada bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia periode waktu 2011 sampai 2016. Metode pengambilan sampel secara purposive sampling. Data penelitian merupakan data sekunder berupa  annual report dan laporan keuangan yang berasal dari Directory Perbankan Indonesia, Bursa Efek Indonesia  dan Bursa Efek Malaysia.  Teknik analisis untuk menguji perbedaan CG dan manajemen laba riil adalah uji beda Man Whitney, sedangkan untuk menguji pengaruh CG terhadap REM Bank Islam  Indonesia dan Malaysia menggunakan analisis regresi berganda ordinary least square.            Hasil menunjukkan bahwa praktik corporate governance Negara Indonesia dan Malaysia, masing masing memiliki kelebihan dan kelemahan. Mekanisme CG ada yang lebih rendah, maupun lebih tinggi antara Negara Indonesia dengan Malaysia. REM Malaysia lebih rendah signifikan dari pada Indonesia, baik melalui arus kas operasi, bagi hasil investasi, maupun biaya diskresioner. Hasil uji menunjukkan bahwa pada umumnya mekanisme CG tidak berpengaruh terhadap manajemen laba riil. Hanya Independensi komite audit yang mampu menekan manajemen laba riil melalui arus kas operasi.Keywords:Corporate governance, real earnings management, Islamic banking.

scholarly journals PENGARUH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA (Studi Pada Perusahaan Food and Baverages Yang Terdaftar di BEI

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Pipit Rabiatun ◽  
Irianto Irianto ◽  
Indah Ariffianti ◽  
Baiq Kisnawati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Sampling Method ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Discretionary Accrual ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Method Analysis

This study is aimed to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, such as, independent board of. commissioner composition, board of commisioner size, audit committee, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership toward profit management. This research used 5 of food company and Baverages that was listed in Indonesia stock Exchange since 2014-2018. The sample of this research are selected by purposive sampling method. Analysis method of this research used multiple regression. Earnings management measured by using discretionary accrual. The result of this study showed that the result of regression as follow: = 7,365 + 0,631 XI + 0,553 X2 + 0,583 X3 + 0,674 X4 + 0,768 X5 + e. However the result of variable: (1) Composition of independent commissioner council has the effect of significant at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t table that was 4,291 > 2,085. (2) Standard of commissioner council has the effect of significant at profit management, it was proved by the result of t value is higher than t table that was 3,148 > 2,085. (3) the committee of audit has the effect of significant at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t value 3,569 > 2.085. (4) The ownership of constitutional has the effect of significant at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t table that was 4,422 > 2,085. (5) The ownership of managerial at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t table 5,618 > 2,085. (6) Composition of independent commissioner council, standard of commissioner council, the committee of audit, the ownership of constitutional, the ownership of managerial have the effect of significant at profit management. The result of calculation showed that f value that is 22,861, while f table 2,74 (22,861 > 2,74). It means that f value is higher than f table. The result of calculation of Composition of independent commissioner council, standard of commissioner council, the committee of audit, the ownership of constitutional, and the ownership of managerial showed that the value coofesien was 0,730 (73%) and the balance 0,270 (27%) it is described by other variable was not include in this research.

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