South-east Asian security vulnerabilities may grow

Significance The January 14 terrorist attack in Jakarta has triggered a crackdown on ISG across South-east Asia. Impacts Greater freedom of movement as ASEAN integrates could pose terrorism security risks, for instance for airlines. Malaysia's government faces a new challenge from terrorism, but could rebuild political support by handling it effectively. Indonesia's government may face popular pushback if new anti-terrorism laws are deemed to be draconian.

Significance The meeting between Taiwan's Ma Ying-jeou and China's Xi Jinping resulted from seven years of rapid rapprochement between the former Cold War enemies. No concrete agreements or proposals emerged from the symbolic meeting. Impacts China will present the meeting as evidence of its peaceful intentions in a jittery East Asian security environment. A DPP president will not undo the cross-Strait trade and transportation agreements reached under the Kuomintang. The DPP's rejection of the 'one-China principle' as a basis for negotiations will strain relations with Beijing.


Subject South-east Asia's regional response to Islamic State. Significance South-east Asian countries face security risks from Islamic State (IS)-affiliated militants. States are seeking to coordinate action at a region-wide level, with the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit last month including a parallel Counter-Terrorism Conference. Impacts Washington will likely use support for counterterrorism to develop defence relations in South-east Asia. Tougher legal frameworks to combat terrorism could result in laws that constrain civil liberties. For Australia, stronger ties with ASEAN could encourage a more conciliatory approach to the region’s autocratic regimes.


Significance Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Koreas and the large ethnic Chinese populations of South-east Asia are the only societies with which China shares cultural affinity. Yet it is these same societies that feel most threatened by Chinese power. Impacts There is little sign that China’s irredentism will extend beyond its current claims, but its use of military intimidation may well do. Beijing’s attempts to disrupt Washington’s alliances with Seoul and Tokyo will fail. Most ASEAN states will try hard not to take sides in the China-US rivalry. Poorer South-east Asian countries will become more reliant on Chinese trade and financing; Beijing will leverage this for political support. Beijing will continue the ‘salami-slicing’ approach to maritime disputes that has served it well.


Significance It is the only country in South-east Asia with a large-scale nuclear plant, although this was never loaded with fuel. Other countries in the region have tentative plans to develop nuclear power programmes. Impacts The current absence of nuclear power programmes will help avert the diversion of capital from renewable energy development in the region. South-east Asian countries with small, non-power reactors, built for research, will try to maintain these facilities. Across the region, the need for electricity grid investment will increase as more decentralised generation sources are deployed.


Asian Survey ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 34 (12) ◽  
pp. 1047-1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheldon W. Simon

Significance It seeks to accelerate recovery from COVID-19 by capitalising on the rise in internet use and digital trade during the pandemic. However, new restrictive laws on internet use in several countries run counter to these regional digital integration goals. Impacts Beijing will give technical and political support to countries such as Cambodia seeking to replicate the Great Firewall on a smaller scale. Authoritarian regimes will use internet controls to advance their commercial interests. Western donor funding for digital projects could be halted.


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