Austria's migration U-turn will cause further conflict

Subject Austria's migration U-turn. Significance The EU's much-praised open border policy, regarded as a major achievement, lies in tatters as one member state after another struggles to cope with the influx of thousands fleeing from conflict zones. Trying to sort out genuine cases from those seeking a better life has split not only the EU but also political parties and domestic politics. Unusually, Austria has risked the open wrath of its big northern neighbour Germany, and has become one of Chancellor Angela Merkel's most forthright critics. Impacts The EU's March 7 agreement in principle with Turkey on readmitting migrants is looking fragile and could unravel. The switch to controlling borders will disrupt trade and travel within the Schengen area. The prospect of further mismanagement of the migrant crisis within the EU could have an impact on the UK referendum on membership in June.

Subject Russia's contacts with Balkans political parties. Significance For Moscow, connections with Balkan parties are an instrument to exert influence in a region falling within the West's sphere. The declaration the ruling United Russia party signed with parties from Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH), Macedonia and Bulgaria on June 27 called for military neutrality in a Balkan zone of neutral sovereign states within a new pan-European continental security architecture that would exclude NATO membership and hark back to the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment. Impacts Russia will balance NATO expansion into the Western Balkans with initiatives to increase its influence in the region's domestic politics. Moscow will tacitly accept the Balkans' integration into the EU. Russia will seek to diversify alliances, cooperating with both mainstream pragmatists and radicals calling for a turn away from the West.


Subject UK-EU data flows post-Brexit. Significance Recent publication of the UK government’s no-deal Brexit plans highlight the difficulties that could arise in transferring data between the EU and the United Kingdom in the event of such an outcome. Impacts Data protection requirements may prompt EU companies to avoid the United Kingdom as a host for their data. This would undercut UK digital companies that rely on such data as a part of their business model. Firms dependent on data transfers within the EU are likely to relocate parts of their businesses to another member state.


Author(s):  
Deirdre Curtin
Keyword(s):  
The Uk ◽  

UK involvement in the EU Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) has been patchy. It never joined the Schengen border-free zone, and when in 2014 it exercised a block exit from all AFSJ measures, it selectively rejoined a substantial number. Even if partially outside, the UK has been a leader inside. Advanced intelligence capabilities meant it provided important support to the functioning of agencies such as Europol and UK laws inspired EU laws, for example, on data retention. The need to preserve some pragmatic forms of cooperation between the UK and the EU is obvious and shared by the UK security establishment. There is a partial institutional precedent . When Denmark rejected participation in Europol in a popular referendum, the Danish government obtained a deal from the EU institutions which allows it to remain associated to Europol as a ‘third country’ (and a Member State). The bespoke Brexit reality may prove even more complex.


2021 ◽  
pp. 21-47
Author(s):  
Michael Dougan

This chapter sets out the basic constitutional framework, under EU law, governing the withdrawal of a Member State. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union recognizes the sovereign right of any State to leave the EU and sets out a process for agreeing the terms of an orderly departure. But Brexit also required the EU and the UK to undertake extensive internal preparations, to ensure their own legal systems were ready for the UK’s departure. Moreover, Article 50 itself is drafted in only brief and sketchy terms, leaving many important decisions about Brexit to be worked out in practice. And EU law allows for other final outcomes to the withdrawal process—including a ‘no deal Brexit’; or the UK’s right to ‘revoke and remain’ under the Wightman ruling.


2020 ◽  
pp. 294-322
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter explores the free movement of goods, which lies at the very heart of the internal market. The idea of the free movement of goods was the starting point that the EEC Treaty aimed for, and remains one of the greatest achievements of the EU to date. However, as with everything in EU law, there are a lot of legal rules underpinning a fairly straightforward concept. The Treaty contains two separate sets of provisions that address matters of taxation when it comes to trade in products. The first relates to border taxation, while the second relates to internal taxation. With regard to non-taxation issues, the primary issue is quantitative restrictions: situations where a Member State either blocks a specific volume of products from entering its market, or outlaws/bans a product altogether. The chapter then considers the exceptions to free movement of goods, and assesses how Brexit may impact on the free movement of goods between the UK and the EU.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-174
Author(s):  
Phedon Nicolaides

The purpose of the two-year rule in Article 50 TEU is to prevent the remaining Member States from delaying the exit of the withdrawing Member State through stalling tactics. This article argues that the two-year period is a double-edge sword. It affords very little time to the withdrawing Member State to adjust its domestic legislation, regulatory system and administrative structure to be able to function effectively on the day after exit from the EU. The UK’s Great Repeal Bill proposes a ‘copy and paste’ approach. However, this approach is only a partial solution to the problem of the ‘exit-induced’ legal lacuna. With the use of two case studies, the article demonstrates that the UK will have to establish new regulatory procedures and redefine EU concepts inserted in national law. The UK will ‘regain control’ but will have to follow EU practice. At some point in the future it will also encounter the dilemma of diverging from EU practice and creating two sets of compliance standards for its companies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (7/8) ◽  
pp. 841-856 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isla Kapasi ◽  
Galina Grekova

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the perceptions and perspectives of students with regards to self-determined learning in an entrepreneurship education (EE) context and its potential contribution to employability. Design/methodology/approach This research used a mixed-methods approach with a sample of 25 students currently attending a UK higher education institute. The students had access to participation in EE modules but self-determined learning-informed modules or programmes were not currently offered. Students were invited to attend focus groups and as a result of emergent themes, a business school-wide survey was developed. Findings This research makes two tentative contributions to the EE field. First, the findings of this student cohort are similar to those found throughout the UK and the EU with regard to the perception of the value of a degree by students; its contribution to the hidden curriculum; and the importance of practical experience. The research also adds to the field by considering the value of a self-determined learning approach to developing the capabilities and competencies of graduates. This approach to learning in a context of EE was in general well received by potential students, particularly the applied aspect of the programme. However, there is a perception of risk about this approach to learning and students are concerned about the value of a programme like this to employers in general. Originality/value The study contributes to discussions on the value of EE on perceived employability and in particular self-determined learning through entrepreneurship activity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noah Carl ◽  
James Dennison ◽  
Geoffrey Evans

To date, most accounts of the UK’s vote to leave the EU have focussed on explaining variation across individuals and constituencies within the UK. In this article, we attempt to answer a different question, namely ‘Why was it the UK that voted to leave, rather than any other member state?’. We show that the UK has long been one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU, which we argue can be partly explained by Britons’ comparatively weak sense of European identity. We also show that existing explanations of the UK’s vote to leave cannot account for Britons’ long-standing Euroscepticism: the UK scores lower than many other member states on measures of inequality/austerity, the ‘losers of globalisation’ and authoritarian values, and some of these measures are not even correlated with Euroscepticism across member states. In addition, we show that the positive association between national identity and Euroscepticism is stronger in the UK than in most other EU countries. Overall, we conclude that Britons’ weak sense of European identity was a key contributor to the Brexit vote.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 83-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Forwood

AbstractThis chapter aims to explore some challenges that are likely to arise in the context of the UK’s present and future relationships with the EU. Three aspects come under scrutiny, namely the global opt-out available for the UK in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Protocol 36 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and the contemplated 2017 referendum on whether the UK should remain an EU Member State. The chapter stresses not only the importance of restoring objectivity in the debates surrounding these issues, but also the necessity of taking due account of the uncertainties that these processes unavoidably entail as to their end results for both the UK and Scotland.


Subject The package of reforms on a new EU-UK relationship. Significance The agreement between the United Kingdom and its EU partners sets the stage for the UK referendum on EU membership, which Prime Minister David Cameron has set for June 23. Cameron said he had negotiated new terms that would allow the United Kingdom to remain in the EU. Impacts The deal bolsters the campaign to remain in the EU, but the referendum outcome is still highly uncertain. The deal will only come into effect if the outcome is for remaining, forestalling a second referendum for better terms. If the outcome is for leaving, a new relationship with the EU would have to be negotiated during a two-year transition period. It would also probably lead to a second Scottish independence referendum and UK break-up.


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