China positions itself to exploit 'America First'

Significance Trump affirmed US commitment to the 'one-China policy' vis-à-vis Taiwan, which he had questioned following his election. Nevertheless, Trump's willingness to raise the issue in the first place -- and his other post-election comments on North Korea and the South China Sea -- lead Beijing to expect an unprecedentedly rocky relationship with Washington during his term. Impacts Trump seems now to accept that questioning the one-China policy is taboo, but he could still provoke Beijing regarding Tibet. The combination of uncertain US policy and a China-sceptic government in Taipei will prompt Chinese preparations for a worst-case scenario. US-Russia rapprochement could complicate Beijing's strategic partnership with Moscow. Other governments stand to benefit from a Chinese 'charm offensive', as Beijing attempts to win friends rather than confront Washington.

Significance Increased anxiety over Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea, particularly its construction of an airstrip and harbour on Fiery Cross Reef, is drawing considerable attention to US policy in the region where US allies have been pressing for greater involvement. Impacts Regional and US rhetoric on Chinese reclamation may provoke an increased demonstration of US military engagement in the region. However, the size and scale of these activities will be highly dependent on the pace and character of Chinese activities. This issue is likely to be featured conspicuously by Carter at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. It will almost certainly raise difficulties during Chinese President Xi Jinping's September visit to Washington. Given Hillary Clinton's previous statements, pursuing a 'tough' China policy may become a prominent theme of her presidential bid.


Subject The outlook for deepening defence links between Japan and Malaysia. Significance Chinese Politburo member Yu Zhengsheng warned visiting Japanese lawmakers on June 29 that the South China Sea maritime disputes have "nothing to do with Japan". This comes amid new developments in South-east Asian governments' efforts to strengthen security cooperation with Japan. Among them is the agreement between Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on May 25 to elevate bilateral ties to the level of 'Strategic Partnership'. This reflects Malaysia's growing concern over China's actions in the South China Sea, which are increasingly expanding southwards, affecting Malaysian-claimed territorial waters. Malaysian officials on June 9 announced a complaint to China over a Chinese coast guard vessel near Luconia Shoals. Impacts The Philippines's armed forces are less powerful than Malaysia's, implying more scope to develop Japan-Philippines defence ties. Vietnam, and perhaps Indonesia, may be the next ASEAN countries to seek deeper defence ties with Japan. Malaysian criticism of China over the South China Sea could see a more assertive ASEAN over disputed maritime claims.


Significance The United States had lobbied its allies not to join the China-led AIIB, to little avail. Although the White House claims that the media has overplayed its opposition, it appears clear that Washington and Beijing are competing for influence through institutions, with China suspecting that the Trans-Pacific Partnership is a US effort to contain its geopolitical influence. Impacts The South China Sea is the most likely source of conflict, especially if underwater resources are discovered. All parties have an interest in containing North Korea, but missile defence systems may rattle China. A Chinese sea-based nuclear deterrent will trigger greater US investment in anti-submarine capabilities.


Subject A potential Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea. Significance Satellite images taken June 28 show that China has nearly completed construction of a 3-kilometre airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly islands. US and Philippine officials say China could soon base fighter jets on the island for enforcing an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, like the one Beijing declared, with much controversy, over the East China Sea in November 2013. Impacts China is unlikely to declare an ADIZ over territory under the actual control of other states. An ADIZ that covers only part of the South China Sea would be more practicable, but would highlight the limitations of China's capabilities. Declaring an ADIZ would increase the involvement of non-claimant states, especially the United States, an outcome China wants to avoid.


2012 ◽  
Vol 06 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250010 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANAWAT SUPPASRI ◽  
FUMIHIKO IMAMURA ◽  
SHUNICHI KOSHIMURA

In the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, many hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost due to tsunami events, and almost half of the lives lost occurred following the 2004 Indian Ocean event. Potential tsunami case scenarios have been simulated in these regions by a number of researchers to calculate the hazard level. The hazard level is based on a variety of conditions, such as the tsunami height, the inundation area, and the arrival time. However, the current assessments of the hazard levels do not focus on the tsunami risk to a coastal population. This study proposes a new method to quantify the risk to the coastal population in the region that includes the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The method is simple and combines the use of readily available tsunami data, far-field tsunami simulation models to determine the regional risk and global population data. An earthquake-generated tsunami was simulated, following an earthquake that had a magnitude larger than 8.5 Mw and occurred along a potential subduction zone. The 2004 Indian Ocean event seemed to be a "worst case scenario"; however, it has been estimated that a potential tsunami, occurring in a coastal region with a high population density, could cause significantly greater casualties.


2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 1207-1212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Li ◽  
Qi-hang Xu ◽  
Xiao-tian Wang ◽  
Hou-wen Lin ◽  
Yan-hua Lu

A novel marine actinomycete, designated LHW63021T, was isolated from a marine sponge, genus Craniella, collected in the South China Sea. A polyphasic approach was applied to characterize the taxonomic position of this strain. The strain was found to have scarce aerial mycelia that differentiated into spore chains. The cell-wall hydrolysates contained meso-diaminopimelic acid as the diagnostic diamino acid. Glucose, galactose, mannose and madurose were found in the whole-cell hydrolysates. The dominant polar lipids were phosphatidylinositol and diphosphatidylglycerol. MK-9(H6) and MK-9(H8) were the predominant menaquinones. The major fatty acids were iso-C16 : 0, iso-C18 : 0, 10-methyl C17 : 0 and C18 : 1 ω9c. The DNA G+C content based on the draft genome sequence was 72.0 mol%. 16S rRNA gene sequence analysis indicated that strain LHW63021T was a member of the genus Actinomadura and had the highest similarity to Actinomadura echinospora DSM 43163T (97.3 %). Phylogenetic trees supported their close relationship. The average nucleotide identity and digital DNA–DNA hybridization values between the whole genome sequences of strain LHW63021T and A. echinospora DSM 43163T were 79.13 and 23.20 %, respectively. The evidence from the polyphasic study shows that strain LHW63021T represents a novel species of the genus Actinomadura , for which the name Actinomadura craniellae sp. nov. is proposed. The type strain is LHW63021T (=DSM 106125T=CCTCC AA 2018015T).


Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This chapter (and the next) look at the US’s recent intervention in the South China Sea and China’s responses. It considers the varying domestic and strategic concerns of these primarily island countries. It analyses the drivers of their responses to the sovereignty disputes in the Sea and to the key US initiative of the TPP. This chapter and the next are linked to the one that follows on Vietnam, which also plays a critical role in the shifting relation of forces in the South China Sea disputes. This is the region where the US has invested most hopes in a dramatic shift in regional alignments against China. These chapters assess the US’s progress, and conclude that – despite its lack of a local ally with anything like the weight of Japan or South Korea and the immense geographic extension of American power involved in maintaining its presence in the region – in some respects the US ’rebalance’ strategies have made more progress here to China’s south than to its east.


Significance However, China's navy already has an operational sea-based nuclear deterrent based on Hainan Island. The deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, and their need to reach the mid-Pacific to threaten the continental United States, makes the South China Sea an arena not just of maritime disputes but of US-China military rivalry. Impacts The strategic importance of the Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore to the United States will increase. A new defence agreement with the Philippines will, as of last month, support US military activities in the area. Washington will encourage greater Japanese involvement in the South China Sea; as long as Shinzo Abe is prime minister, Japan will oblige.


Subject ASEAN-China security cooperation. Significance China-ASEAN security cooperation has moderated the assertiveness Beijing displayed in the South China Sea during the first half of this year. In October, China and the ASEAN states held their first ever joint naval exercise. Impacts The verbal statements on regional maritime security cooperation will increasingly be followed by concrete actions. Negotiations over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea will advance slowly and contentiously. China-Philippines joint energy explorations in the South China Sea will remain hamstrung by Philippine constitutional conditions.


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