Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Approach in Joint Pricing and Assortment Optimizing for Small-Scale Online Retailers: Seller-Buyer Supply Chain Case

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahrs Saberi ◽  
Omar Hussain ◽  
Morteza Saberi ◽  
Elizabeth Chang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Online Retailers ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Joint Pricing ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Approach for Eco-Design and Remanufacturing Considering Take-Back Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7174
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Chang ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Qian Wang ◽  
Yongguang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Monetary Value ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Take Back ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.

scholarly journals The role of retailer's app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musen Xue
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Quality Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

The role of retailer's ability to add app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures is investigated in this paper. Applying a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, under certain conditions, retailer's ability to add app channel can induce the manufacturer to adjust the wholesale price and product quality in the opposite direction with the manufacturer being the leader. Second, for the manufacturer and the retailer, retailer's ability to add app channel can result in two distinct profit situations regardless of the power structure of supply chain: win-win and lose-win. Moreover, in a retailer-led supply chain, adding app channel will make the whole supply chain better off when the return cost is relatively low or high, while make the whole supply chain worse off when the return cost is moderate. Third, we identify a region of the return cost under which the manufacturer, the retailer, the supply chain and consumers can gain from adding app channel, leading to a Pareto improvement.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document