scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Approach for Eco-Design and Remanufacturing Considering Take-Back Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7174
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Chang ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Qian Wang ◽  
Yongguang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Monetary Value ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Take Back ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.

A Stackelberg game theoretic approach to resilient control of an islanded microgrid

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prashant Bansode ◽  
Aniket Deshpande ◽  
Sushant Bahadure ◽  
Pratik Bajaria ◽  
Faruk Kazi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Resilient Control ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Islanded Microgrid ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

scholarly journals Deciding on Financial Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Projects

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-199
Author(s):  
Wiston Risso
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Additional Tool ◽  
Financial Variables ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This paper analyzes the renegotiation problem in the context of public-private partnership projects. Utilizing a game-theoretic approach, an equilibrium is found in which the government finds that accepting renegotiation can be efficient. A first indicator is proposed based the public sector comparator (PSC) that can be estimated by policymakers as an additional tool when deciding about renegotiation. A second more theoretical indicator is derived to analyze the economic and financial variables affecting renegotiation. This indicator is applied to four case studies in different countries (England, Taiwan, Portugal and China) and the results suggest that the model performs well.

The Polish transition to democracy : a game-theoretic approach

1995 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Zielinski
Keyword(s):  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Strategic Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach ◽  
Over Time

This article present a gametheoretic model of the transition to democracy in Poland. The events in Poland are conceptualized as a strategic game between a government and an opposition. The transition is modeled as a sequence of intentional decisions about political arrangements. During the 1980s Poland went through three such arrangements: dictatorship, broadened dictatorship, and democracy. Each one is understood as a game-theoretic equilibrium. The transition between two political arrangements is explained as a shift from one equilibrium to another. These shifts occurred because the probability of Soviet intervention diminished over time, changing incentives for the government and the opposition.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document