Research on the influence of equity pledge ratio of controlling shareholders on financing constraint of media listed companies based on Stata16.0 software

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongzhen Lei ◽  
Rui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Listed Companies ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Financing Constraint

Negative media coverage, law environment and tunneling of controlling shareholder

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Ye ◽  
Lei Huang ◽  
Ming Li
Keyword(s):  
Media Coverage ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Effects Of Media ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship among negative media coverage, law environment and tunneling of controlling shareholders. Design/methodology/approach – Under the Chinese especial institutional background, this paper empirically test the relationship among negative media coverage, law environment and tunneling of controlling shareholders with the sample of 2009-2011 Chinese listed companies. Findings – The empirical results demonstrate that negative media coverage can reduce tunneling of controlling shareholder, and compared with state-owned listed companies, negative media coverage have a greater effect on tunneling in non-state-owned listed companies; and negative media coverage have a greater effect on tunneling in areas with better law environment. Further study shows that the reduction of controlling shareholder’s behavior of tunneling can improve company performance, and the improvement is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies and areas with better law environment. The research results indicate that media coverage play a very active role on restraining stakeholder’s behavior and perfecting corporate governing. Originality/value – First, this paper will study of tunneling from the perspective of media coverage for the first time. Second, this paper further analyzes how the decrease of tunneling improves corporate performance following the research of how media coverage influence tunneling. Third, this study enrich literatures about the effects of media coverage on corporate governance in Chinese capital market.

scholarly journals Perceptions of independent directors about their roles of and challenges on corporate boards

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-96
Author(s):  
Thi Tuyet Mai Nguyen ◽  
Elaine Evans ◽  
Meiting Lu
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Transition Economy ◽  
Information Provision ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Advisory Role

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the perceptions of independent directors in Vietnam about their roles and challenges when sitting on the boards of listed companies.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses mailed questionnaires to collect data. The authors sent surveys to 810 independent directors from 354 listed companies and received feedback from 170 respondents.FindingsThe authors examine several aspects of independent directors’ work on the board (such as the roles of and challenges for independent directors) as well as board environment (such as information provision or board interaction). Findings suggest that independent directors in Vietnam place more emphasis on their advisory role than their monitoring role. In addition, they also point out their challenges including information asymmetries and the influence of controlling shareholders. These challenges are significant and they prevent independent directors to properly execute their independent role on the board. These findings reflect the unique features of corporate governance in transition economies.Originality/valueThe authors contribute to the literature through providing an insightful view about the nature of the work performed by this type of director in a transition economy. The study is also one of the first studies to use a qualitative instrument to provide an explanation of how controlling shareholders influence independent directors on boards of directors.

Does mixed ownership improve the financial quality of Chinese listed companies?

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tingting Zhou ◽  
Juan LI
Keyword(s):  
Building Materials ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Accounting Fraud ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Operating Income ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Financial Quality ◽  
Privatization Process ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore financial quality problems, based on the dynamics of the ownership structure, in the privatization process to clarify the internal relation among the ownership’s attribution of the commercial mixed ownership company, the company’s performance and its financial relationships. This paper also examines the mixed ownership enterprise’s potential problems during the development process. Design/methodology/approach Adopting the single case study method, the authors selected the mixed ownership public company Hubei Sanxia New Building Materials Co., Ltd. (stock code: 600293) to explore, from a privatization perspective, the impact of mixed ownership on financial quality. Findings The study found that Sanxia experienced tight cash flow and heavy debt burdens due to the privatization and that its controlling shareholders used non-operating income to support Sanxia, thus characterizing the dual role of “the grabbing hand” and “the helping hand.” Sanxia’s privatization process highlighted the volatility of performance, the exception of monetary funds and the existence of accounting fraud rather than the prosperous development of the capital combination. Originality/value These findings provided case support that privatization negatively affects the financial quality of the company. Previous studies have indicated that there should be greater focus more on the issue that state-owned shares rebound during the process of privatization and that, with respect to commercial mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, such reform must avoid the passive transfer of corporate control, ensure the fairness of the related transactions, prevent the loss of state-owned assets and preclude the controlling shareholders from seizing interests of listed companies.

scholarly journals Multiple large shareholders and corporate fraud: evidence from China

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xibo Zhao ◽  
Dan Yang ◽  
Zhengguang Li ◽  
Lynda Song
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Corporate Fraud ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Control Right ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis study tests the effect of multiple large shareholders on the level of corporate fraud using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2018. We find lower probabilities and lower corporate fraud frequencies when there are multiple large shareholders in Chinese listed companies, indicating that their presence plays a supervisory role in internal governance. These results persist after we control for endogeneity. Moreover, the effect of multiple large shareholders on corporate fraud is strengthened with the separation of control right and cash flow right. Further analyses reveal that companies with multiple large shareholders experience considerably reduced information disclosure fraud but no reduction in operating or leader frauds. Additionally, information asymmetry and the capital occupation of controlling shareholders both play a mediating role in the relationship between multiple large shareholders and the level of corporate fraud. This study enriches the literature on the determinants of corporate fraud and the effects of multiple large shareholders. Our findings also provide implications for companies and regulators regarding ways to reduce fraud.

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