Multiple-parameter side-channel analysis: A non-invasive hardware Trojan detection approach

Author(s):  
Seetharam Narasimhan ◽  
Dongdong Du ◽  
Rajat Subhra Chakraborty ◽  
Somnath Paul ◽  
Francis Wolff ◽  
...  
2013 ◽  
Vol 401-403 ◽  
pp. 1776-1780
Author(s):  
Xu Xu ◽  
Xiong Wei Li ◽  
Yang Zhang ◽  
Fang Fang Xie

Aim at the feasibility of using electromagnetic emanation side-channel to detect hardware Trojan in IC chips, the structure of EM side-channel signal of chip is analyzed and the leaked model about signal is designed. With explaining the principle of Karhunen-Loeve transform, a method that uses KL transform to obtain characteristic signal of EM emanation side-channel is introduced. It detects hardware Trojan by analyzing the difference between the characteristic signal of chip with and without Trojan. Experiments of detecting hardware Trojan in FPGA cipher chip show that we can distinguish effectively the difference between the EM signals of Trojan chip and genuine chip, then the Trojan in chip can be detected.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (11) ◽  
pp. 2183-2195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seetharam Narasimhan ◽  
Dongdong Du ◽  
Rajat Subhra Chakraborty ◽  
Somnath Paul ◽  
Francis G. Wolff ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Fakir Sharif Hossain ◽  
Tomokazu Yoneda ◽  
Michihiro Shintani ◽  
Michiko Inoue ◽  
Alex Orailoglo

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (09) ◽  
pp. 1850138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atieh Amelian ◽  
Shahram Etemadi Borujeni

Hardware Trojan Horses (HTHs) are malicious modifications inserted in Integrated Circuit during fabrication steps. The HTHs are very small and can cause damages in circuit function. They cannot be detected by conventional testing methods. Due to dangerous effects of them, Hardware Trojan Detection has become a major concern in hardware security. In this paper, a new HTH detection method is presented based on side-channel analysis that uses path delay measurement. In this method, we find and observe the paths that Trojans have most effect on them. Most of the previous works add some structures to the circuit and need a large overhead cost. But, in our method, there is no modification in the circuit and we can use it for testing the circuits received after fabrication. The proposed method is evaluated with Xilinx FPGA over a number of test circuits. The results show that measuring the delays on 20 paths with an accuracy of 0.01[Formula: see text]ns can detect more than 80% of Trojans.


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