The dynamic game analysis of project manager's following investment incentive mechanism of the venture capital firms

Author(s):  
Cai Kun-ying ◽  
Li An-lan
2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 452-477
Author(s):  
Xiao-Bing Zhang ◽  
Magnus Hennlock

AbstractThis paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104225872110335
Author(s):  
Jake Duke ◽  
Taha Havakhor ◽  
Rachel Mui ◽  
Owen Parker

Building on the behavioral theory of the firm, we empirically examine how starting strategies and syndication networks can influence venture capital (VC) firms’ problemistic search. We propose that: (a) depending on a VC’s strategic starting point, that is, the VC’s extent of specialization, the directionality of problemistic search may change to either expanding or contracting search activities; and (b) depending on search direction, structural holes in syndication networks can either impede or facilitate the problemistic search process. In a sample of U.S. VC firms, we find results consistent with our predictions, which have important implications for entrepreneurship and organizational strategy research.


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