It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties.—John Stuart MillJust about any proponent of a rule-based theory of morality must eventually confront the question of how to resolve conflicts among the rules that the theory endorses. Is there a priority rule specifying which rules must yield to which, as in Rawls's lexical ordering of the first principle of his theory of justice over the second? Must the agent intuitively balance considerations, as in certain forms of intuitionist pluralism? Or might there be some other conflict-resolving provision? Brad Hooker, a defender of a rule-based theory of morality that he calls ‘rule-consequentialism,’ confronts this question about conflicts of rules in his recent book Ideal Code, Real World: A rule-Consequentialism Theory of Morality. In this paper, I examine Hooker's answer to this question, and I argue that his answer fails to solve a serious problem that arises from such conflicts.