Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of fairness concerns of the retailer on the pricing policies of the supply chain partners, their individual profits, and the overall performance of a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. First, the authors model the dual-channel supply chain under retailer’s fairness concern. Second, the authors derive the optimal pricing policies of the channel members. Third, the authors analyze the effects of retailer’s fairness and bargaining power on the pricing strategies and profit functions of the dual-channel supply chain system.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game theoretic framework, where the dominant manufacturer’s pricing decisions are based on the retailer’s pricing decision. The paper considers Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point to formulate the utility function of the fair-retailer. The paper uses this approach because it endogenously accounts for the competitive power and cooperative contribution of the channel members when they interact.
Findings
The authors find that the retailer’s fairness concerns are not always beneficial for its better performance. If the retailer is moderately sensitive towards its fairness, it will positively influence its performance. However, if the fairness concern becomes too high then it will negatively impact the retailer’s performance because it results in customers’ migration towards direct online channel for buying the products. In addition, if the retailer’s fairness concerns are mild, the manufacturer’s prices will decrease in retailer’s bargaining power, which is opposite otherwise.
Originality/value
The authors use Nash bargaining solution model as the fairness reference in the context of dual-channel supply chain, which is comparatively a recent approach and has been used independently from dual-channel supply chain system.
Pricing Decisions of a Supply Chain with Multichannel Retailer under Fairness Concerns
