scholarly journals The Complexity Analysis in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based on Fairness Concern and Different Business Objectives

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Qiu-xiang ◽  
Zhang Yu-hao ◽  
Huang Yi-min
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Business Objectives ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Operation

We study a dual-channel supply chain which consists of one dual-channel manufacturer and one traditional retailer considering fairness concern. The manufacturer takes the market share as one of its business objectives in the competition game. We are devoted to establishing a vertical Nash game model and analyzing the price evolution of the model via the method of complexity theory and take adaptive adjustment control method to control the system’s chaotic state. The results show that an excessive price adjustment speed will hurt the system’s stability as well as profit of the supply chain. A high level fair caring for retailer will push the system to fall into chaos earlier, while a higher level fair caring for manufacturer will enlarge the stability region of the system. Setting the different objectives by the manufacturer will cause drastic competition in dual-channel supply chain. The research of this paper is of great significance to the decision-makers’ price decision and supply chain operation management.

scholarly journals The Impacts of Fairness Concern and Different Business Objectives on the Complexity of Dual-Channel Value Chains

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers a Stackelberg game model in a dual-channel supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer and retailer consider fairness concern in the market competition, and the manufacturer takes market share and profit as his/her business objectives. The entropy complexity and dynamic characteristic of the dual-channel system are analyzed through mathematical analysis and numerical simulation, such as local stability, bifurcation, entropy, and chaos. The results show that, with the increase of price adjustment speed, the dual-channel supply chain is more complex and falls into a chaotic state in which system entropy increases; the stability of the dual-channel supply chain will be robust with the increase of weight of market share and weaken with the increase of the fairness concern level of the manufacturer and retailer. The high level of fairness concern of the manufacturer and retailer is always disadvantageous to the leading manufacturer but not always bad for the follower retailer. The performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved with a high level of the manufacturer’s fairness concern and reduced with a high level of the retailer’s fairness concern. We also find the retailer will gain more profits in the chaotic state than the stable state in the Stackelberg game model. The variable feedback control method is applied to control the chaos of the dual-channel supply chain, and choosing appropriate control parameters can make the dual-channel supply chain system return to the stable state from the chaotic state, or delay the system to enter the bifurcation state. The research results can provide a guideline for enterprise decision-making.

scholarly journals Green Manufacturing Strategy Considering Retailers’ Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhang ◽  
Zhang ◽  
Pu ◽  
Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Green Manufacturing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Manufacturing Strategy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level

This paper addresses the problem of green manufacturing decision making for a green dual-channel supply chain (SC). In the investigated SC, the manufacturer will decide whether to adopt green manufacturing under the influence of the retailer’s fairness concern-based dual-channel. Thus, we discuss two decision scenarios: the no green manufacturing strategy with retailer fairness (NM model), and green manufacturing with retailer fairness (GM model). Our study has several findings: Firstly, adopting a green manufacturing strategy is not always beneficial to supply-chain members when a retailer has fairness. In particular, when fairness is at a relatively high level, the manufacturer will not adopt green manufacturing. Secondly, under green manufacturing, the product’s green degree and subsidies have a positive impact on the price and demand and the members’ profit and utility. Besides, the subsidies and retailer fairness have a counter effect on the optimal decision. Thirdly, comparing the two scenarios (NM & GM), we found that the channel price of the GM model is lower than the NM model. Finally, from the perspective of the supply chain system, the system tends toward the manufacturer adopting green manufacturing and maintaining retailer fairness concerns at a lower level.

scholarly journals Preferred Service Investment in the Dual-Channel Supply Chain: Leader-Follower Relationships and Product Characteristics

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Wanmei Zhao ◽  
Chunming Ye ◽  
Xiaodong Ding
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Relationship Building ◽  
Actual Process ◽  
Product Characteristics ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Combination Modes ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Operation ◽  
Combination Mode

This paper examines the influence that members’ preferred service investments have on their decision-making and profits in a dual-channel supply chain. We discuss changes in the supplier’s and retailer’s decision-making and optimal profits with reference to their different preferred service investment combination modes and their different leader-follower relationships. We also provide classified comparisons of the supplier’s and retailer’s optimal profits by referring to four types of product characteristics combination modes that are assessed across two channels. By providing classifications and comparisons, we put forward operational insights for the supplier and retailer who have direct implications for their optimal decisions and profits, including selling products with higher homogeneity between two channels, choosing the retailer as the leader of the supply chain, and confirming appropriate preference combination mode under a certain product characteristics. We analyze the influences of the preferred service investment levels as well as preference intensities of the supplier and retailer on their strategies and profits in their respective advantaged states and obtain some enlightenment about the cooperation strategies and relationship-building methods of the supplier and retailer in the actual process of their participation in the dual-channel supply chain operation.

Impact of price adjustment speed on the stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium and profit of the retailers

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (8) ◽  
pp. 1494-1523
Author(s):  
Rofin T.M. ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Chaotic Dynamics ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Online Retailer ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of price adjustment speed on the stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium in the context of a dual-channel supply chain competition. Design/methodology/approach The paper considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising a manufacturer, a traditional retailer and an online retailer. A two-dimensional discrete dynamical system is used to examine the Bertrand competition between the retailers. The retailers are assumed to follow bounded rational expectations. Local stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is investigated with respect to the price adjustment speed. Findings As the price adjustment speed increases, the stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is lost, leading to complex chaotic dynamics. The results showed that chaotic dynamics deteriorates the profit of the retailers. The authors also found that the chaos can be controlled using an adaptive adjustment mechanism and the retailers enjoy higher profit when the chaos is controlled. Practical implications This study helps retail managers to choose an appropriate price adjustment speed to maximize profit. Originality/value The heterogeneity of the retailers is not considered in the studies involving dynamics of retailer competition. This paper contributes to the literature by considering the operational difference between a traditional retailer and an online retailer, i.e. price adjustment speed. In addition, the study establishes a link between price adjustment speed and profit.

EVOLUTION OF TRUST IN A DUAL-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN CONSIDERING RECIPROCAL ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (06n07) ◽  
pp. 1650014 ◽  
Author(s):  
KUIRAN SHI ◽  
HUJIE MA
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Input Output ◽  
Learning Abilities ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Output Ratio ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In order to alleviate the conflict between the channels in dual-channel supply chain, the altruism tendency and trust input are important for strengthening the cooperation between the channels. We view the dual-channel supply chain as a nonlinear system that consists of co-competition, learning decision and dynamic game between direct channels and retail channels. Then, we develop learning dynamics and evolutionary game model to analyze the channels’ altruism behavior and the factors that influence trust input. We find that the evolutionary direction of altruistic behavior is determined by the sensitiveness and the learning abilities of both members of supply chains. The trust input decision of both channels is highly related to the output ratio of high-level trust input, only if the input–output ratio is ideal for both game parties, the system may come to an evolutionary stable equilibrium of high trust input. If the trust input of the two sides is unilateral, then one side chooses high trust input, while the other side chooses low trust input. In this case, even the input–output ratio is high, it will not be evolutionary stable. The profit both sides earned from the low-trust cooperation is the basic for further trust input, the increased free ride income, trust input risk and the trust evaluation cost will affect the enthusiasm of trust input for the dual-channel supply chain members. To promote high trust input in dual-channel supply chain, a certain amount of compensation should be negotiated in the contract in order to improve the performance of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Supply Chain with Multichannel Retailer under Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xueping Zhen ◽  
Dan Shi ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
Wei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Offline Channels

With the rapid development of the Internet, many traditional retailers have built their online channels. The fairness concern may play an important role in a dual-channel supply chain with a multichannel retailer. This paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in which a manufacturer produces and sells products through direct online channel and a retailer sells directly to consumers through online and offline channels. The manufacturer’s fairness concern (advantageous inequity) and the retailer’s fairness concern (disadvantageous inequity) are considered. Four scenarios are investigated: no fairness concern (NF), the retailer fairness concern (RF), the manufacturer fairness concern (MF), and both the manufacturer and the retailer fairness concern (MRF). The theoretical analysis shows that if the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern is low, the profit of the whole supply chain in the MRF scenario is the greatest. Otherwise, the supply chain profit in the NF or RF scenario is the greatest. That is, the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s fairness concern may increase the profit of the supply chain. This study also finds that the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern can increase the social welfare. The retailer should not concern about fairness if the manufacturer has high fairness concern. Besides, this paper shows that the manufacturer’s selling price cannot be affected by the fairness concern. Adjusting the wholesale price is the only thing that the manufacturer can do to reduce disadvantageous or advantageous inequity. In the RF scenario, the role of the retailer’s disadvantageous inequity concern is to reallocate the supply chain profit. Our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision when the multichannel retailer and the manufacturer consider the fairness.

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