scholarly journals Strategy logic with imperfect information

Author(s):  
Raphael Berthon ◽  
Bastien Maubert ◽  
Aniello Murano ◽  
Sasha Rubin ◽  
Moshe Y. Vardi
Author(s):  
Francesco Belardinelli ◽  
Alessio Lomuscio ◽  
Aniello Murano ◽  
Sasha Rubin

We study a class of synchronous, perfect-recall multi-agent systemswith imperfect information and broadcasting (i.e., fully observableactions). We define an epistemic extension of strategy logic withincomplete information and the assumption of uniform and coherentstrategies. In this setting, we prove that the model checking problem,and thus rational synthesis, is decidable with non-elementarycomplexity. We exemplify the applicability of the framework on arational secret-sharing scenario.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-51
Author(s):  
Raphaël Berthon ◽  
Bastien Maubert ◽  
Aniello Murano ◽  
Sasha Rubin ◽  
Moshe Y. Vardi

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bastien Maubert ◽  
Munyque Mittelmann ◽  
Aniello Murano ◽  
Laurent Perrussel

Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.


2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suci Handayani Handayani ◽  
Hade Afriansyah

Decision making is one element of economic value, especially in the era of globalization, and if it is not acceptable in the decision making process, we will be left behind. According to Robins, (2003: 173), Salusu, (2000: 47), and Razik and Swanson, (1995: 476) say that decision making can be interpreted as a process of choosing a number of alternatives, how to act in accordance with concepts, or rules in solving problems to achieve individual or group goals that have been formulated using a number of specific techniques, approaches and methods and achieve optimal levels of acceptance.Decision making in organizations whether a decision is made for a person or group, the nature of the decision is often determined by rules, policies, prescribed, instructions that have been derived or practices that apply. To understand decision making within the organization it is useful to view decision making as part of the overall administrative process. In general, individuals tend to use simple strategies, even if in any complex matter, to get the desired solution, because the solution is limited by imperfect information, time and costs, limited thinking and psychological stress experienced by decision makers.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristoffel R. Grechenig ◽  
Sven Fischer ◽  
Nicolas Meier

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